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THE VARIABLE DETERMINACY THESIS

Harry SurdenI

This Article proposes a novel technique for characterizing the
relative determinacy of legal decision-making.
I begin with the
observation that the determinacy of legal outcomes varies from context to
context within the law. To augment this intuition, I develop a theoretical
model of determinate legal decision-making. This model aims to capture
the essential features that are typically associated with the concept of legal
determinacy. I then argue that we can use such an idealized model as a
standard for expressing the relative determinacy or indeterminacy of
decision-making in actual, observed legal contexts. From a legal theory
standpoint, this approach - separating determinacy and indeterminacy into
their constituent conceptual elements - helps us to more rigorously define
these theoretical ideas. Ultimately, from a practical standpoint, I assert
that this framework assists in understanding why legal outcomes in certain
contexts are determinate enough to be amenable to resolution by
computers.
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"[T]he ... conclusions [of the law] ... are not so clear, constant, and determinate,

as conclusions in logic or mathematics are...."
Lord Chief Justice Matthew Hale (1668)

2

I. INTRODUCTION
The determinacy of legal outcomes varies throughout the law. 3 Under some
factual scenarios liability and other legal determinations appear tolerably constrained. 4 In
other contexts, legal outcomes are notoriously unpredictable. 5 Early debates within the
legal literature considered whether legal outcomes were largely determinate or
indeterminate within American law generally. 6
More recent commentators have

Matthew Hale, Preface to Rolle 's Abridgement (1668), in Francis Hargrave, Collectanea
juridica: Consisting of Tracts Relative to the Law & Constitution of England, 273-275 (Clarke
and Sons 1840).
2

use "determinacy" as synonymous with "constrained predictability" of legal outcomes.
I justify such a usage in Part III.
3

1

4
Drivers proceeding below the speed limit can justifiably consider themselves compliant
with vehicular speeding laws. For the proposition that meeting the speed limit is generally
consideredprimafacie compliance with the vehicular speed limit laws, see, e.g., Safe Roads,
Happy Visits, The News-Star, Apr. 14, 2008, at B3, available at 2008 WLNR 27264770 ("[W]e
don't hear from those same folks is that the police pull them over, ticket or fine them if they obey
the posted speed limit."); Clay Evans, Not About the Revenue. Want to Avoid a Ticket? Don't
Speed, Boulder Daily Camera, Dec. 9, 2008, at A6, available at 2008 WLNR 23577980; New
York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Speeding & Speed Limits Index & Overview,
http://www.nysgtsc.state.ny.us/spee-ndx.htm#slower (last visited Oct. 1, 2010) ("Always drive at
or below the speed limit. If you choose to follow the crowd and travel at the same speed as
everyone else, you could receive a ticket for speeding."). But see companion rule NYS Vehicle
and Traffic Law section 1180(a) for an exception. The point is that determinacy in this context is
not absolute, but relatively more determinate than other contexts.is not absolute, but relatively
more determinate than other contexts.

Many decisions of Constitutional law are notoriously difficult to predict, even for experts
grappling with the same facts. See Andrew D. Martin et al., Competing Approaches to Predicting
Supreme Court Decision Making, 2 Perspectives on Politics 761-68 (2004) (In one study, experts
on constitutional law predicted outcomes of Supreme Court decisions at a 590%success rate, only
a little better than chance. A probabilistic computer model bested the experts with a 7500 success
rate.).
6See
Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Summary of the Law of Contracts 20-21 (2d ed.
1880) for a famous view of legal decisions as primarily formally derived. By contrast, see
Jerome Frank, What Courts Do In Fact, 26 U. Ill. L. Rev. 645, 645-65 8 (1932). Frank and other
realists have been caricatured as holding the view that legal decisions can be so indeterminate as
to depend upon what a 'judge had for breakfast." See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 36
(1986). For the assertion that such a view from the legal realists was largely apocryphal rather

2
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recognized the false dichotomy in such an approach. 7 It makes little sense to generalize
about the overall determinacy of legal outcomes in the law. Rather, the determinacy of
legal outcomes differs depending upon context.
That some legal outcomes do appear reasonably ex ante8 determinate raises an
interesting question: Are legal issues ever determinate enough to allow computers to
analyze them? This prospect has long been alluring to intellectual inquiry.9 As early as
the seventeenth century, Gottfried Leibniz, the great mathematician and co-inventor of
calculus, speculated that legal liability might be derivable through calculation.' 0 Since
that time, this notion - that legal determinations might be "calculable" and perhaps
automatable - has continued to intrigue scholars in the computer science domain."
Legal academics - to the extent they have addressed this issue - have tended to
view the possibility of automated legal analysis with skepticism.12 Scholars from the
legal domain tend to insist upon a nuanced view of legal analysis. In this conception,
legal reasoning is too imbued with uncertainty, ambiguity, judgment, and discretion to
permit computerized assessment. This literature's common theme is that even if
computers were technically able to mimic legal decision-making in a mechanical fashion

than representative, see Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1138,
1148 (1999). See also Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory ConstrainAny Judicial
Decision?, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 513, 513-20 (1989).
Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing CriticalDogma, 54 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 462, 470-73 (1987).
Here, ex ante refers to a liability determination by a non-official legal actor, such as an
attorney or layperson, before an authoritative legal decision-maker - such as a judge or
administrative official - makes a binding determination about liability.
8

9
See, e.g., Virginia J. Wise, Book Review. Modeling Legal Argument. Reasoning with
Cases and Hypotheticals, by Kevin D. Ashley, 5 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 245 (1991); Susan Haack, On
Logic in the Law: 'Something, But Not All', 20 Ratio Juris 1, 29 (2007).

See Giovanni Sartor, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, Vol. 5:
Legal Reasoning 389-90 (Enrico Pattaro ed., Springer 2005). Sir Matthew Hale, the Chief Justice
of England, and Leibniz's 17th century contemporary, was skeptical of such an idea. Id.
10

I
For examples of computer science articles studying whether aspects of law might be
computable see Jeffrey Meldman, A Structural Model for Computer-A ided LegalAnalysis, 6
Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 27 (1977); Jon Bing, Legal Norms, DiscretionaryRules, and
Computer Programs, in Computer Science and Law (Bryan Niblett ed., 1980); Guido
Governatori & Antonino Rotolo, An Algorithm for Business Process Compliance, in Legal
Knowledge and Information Systems: Jurix 2008, 186 (2008); Ashley, supra note 8; Adam
Wyner & T eveor Bench-Capon, Ar gument Schemes for Legal Case-basedReasoning, in Legal
Knowledge and Information Systems: Jurix 2007, 139 (2007).
Kevin Ashley et al., Symposium. Legal Reasoning andArtificial Intelligence: How
Computers Think Like Lawyers, 8 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 1, 19 (2001) (Cass Sunstein argues
that, "[A]t the present state of the art, artificial intelligence cannot engage in analogical reasoning
or legal reasoning.").
12

3
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they would necessarily miss the subtle institutional, value-based, experiential, justiceoriented, and public policy dimensions that are the heart of lawyerly analysis.13
It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding this view, computers are currently
used to derive legal conclusions in some contexts. The widespread adoption of income
tax preparation software such as TurboTax provides a familiar counter-example to the
view of law as inherently unsuited to automated legal analysis. Such software contains a
representation of the personal income tax code that has been formulated in a way that
computers can understand. Supplied with "facts" by the user, the computer applies the
laws to the facts using internal computer logic to generate legal conclusions. So good are
these automated conclusions that the Internal Revenue Service, the definitive arbiter of
liability in this context, routinely accepts them.14
With one example of automated legal analysis, it is tempting to dismiss the idea
as idiosyncratically limited to the personal income tax context. However, multiple efforts
to this effect from the public, private, and academic sectors suggest that a serious
examination of this topic from legal scholars is overdue.1 5 For example, the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) is investigating whether electronic devices can be
made to automatically comply with government-issued spectrum management rules.16
Similarly, the government of Singapore has explored the possibility of automatically
assessing architectural building designs for compliance with building code laws.' 7 Within
the private sector, numerous corporations are investigating software aimed at automating
business-compliance with health care,8 privacy,19 corporate, 20 and financial laws.21

Anthony D'Amato, Can/ShouldComputers Replace Judges, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 1277, 127781(1977).
13

See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Corporate Returns, Forms 1120/1120S,
http://www.irs.gov/efile/lists/0,,id= 119096,00.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (certifying tax
preparation software providers).
14

For an early, pioneering work in this area, see Richard Susskind, Expert Systems in Law:
A Jurisprudential Inquiry 13-14 (1987).
15

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking & Order, In re FacilitatingOpportunitiesfor Flexible,
Efficient, & Reliable Spectrum Use Employing Cognitive Radio Techs., No. 03-108, 2003 WL
23022050 (FCC Dec. 30, 2003).
16

C. Eastman et al., Automatic Rule-Based Checking ofBuilding Designs, 18 Automation
in Construction 1011, 1017-18 (2009). Singapore was a pioneer in this area, see
BCA/CORENET Website, http://www.corenet.gov.sg/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). Others
initiating projects include the United States, Norway and Australia.
17

18See Symantec Corporation, The Importance of Automating Compliance,
https://www.symantec.com/business/resources/articles/article.j sp?aid=20090224 the importance
of automating compliance (last visited Jan. 18, 2010).

See IBM Corporation, Compliance Management Solutions,
http://www.ibm.com/software/tivoli/governance/security/compliance.html
2010).
19

4

(last visited Jan. 18,
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Within the academic realm, multiple projects are exploring automation in substantive
areas as varied as intellectual property,c22constitutional, 23 criminal, 24 and corporate law.
Despite these efforts, we cannot lightly dismiss the skepticism from the legal
community about the plausibility of automating legal analysis. It is indeed hard to
imagine a computer system satisfactorily adjudicating most disputes under the Free
Speech Clause of the United States Constitution. How do we reconcile this skeptical
view with the examples of automated legal reasoning systems that we actually see in
practice? The answer ties back to this Article's opening theme. The automated legal
reasoning systems that exist operate within particular legal contexts 25 in which legal
decisions tend to be relatively more determinate.
Despite considerable attention to indeterminacy, legal scholars have devoted
comparatively little attention to determinacy as a distinct jurisprudential topic.26 Few
articles have systematically considered the legal theoretical characteristics that allow for
relatively determinate legal outcomes in particular contexts. This is understandable. In
comparative terms, the number of legal contexts in which legal outcomes are tolerably

See, e.g., Brightleaf Corporation, Brightleaf, http://www.brightleaf.com/ (last visited
Feb. 5, 2010).
20

See IBM Corporation, Business Rule Management Systems for Financial Markets,
http://www.ibm.com/software/websphere/industries/financial/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2010).
21

Stanford University, Stanford Intellectual Property Exchange,
http://codex.stanford.edu/projects.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2010). See also the work of Elizabeth
Gard at http://www.durationator.com/, formalizing the law of copyright term and duration in a
software wizard (last visited Jan. 8 2011).
22

Daniel J. Weitzner et al., Transparent Accountable Data Mining: New Strategies for
Privacy Protection (2006),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=?doi=10.1.1.128.1076 (last visited Jan. 18,
2010) (suggesting ways to technologically implement Fourth Amendment protections in privacy).
23

Arno R. Lodder et al., AI & CriminalLaw. Past, Present & Future, in Legal Knowledge
Based Systems: Jurix 1998, 59-60 (1998).
24

25
1 use the term "legal context" in a particular way. I use it to refer to repeated, factual
scenarios, under which actors in the legal system make legal determinations. For example, there
is the "personal income tax" legal context, a reoccurring factual scenario in which actors make
intermediate determinations about whether and how~ particular legal rules apply. They, for
example, might make an intermediate determination about whether a particular expense qualifies
as a deductible business expense under a particular rule, and ultimately, an overall determination
about total personal income tax liability. Similarly, we have the "driving" legal context under the
vehicular code, see supra note 3. I describe this further in part III.

Maj or articles addressing the issue of determinacy directly are: Kent Greenawalt, How
Law Can Be Determinate, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1990); Solum, supra note 6; and Ken Kress,
Legal Indeterminacy, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1989).
26
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determinate is probably somewhat small. 27 These contexts also tend to concern relatively
mundane mechanical compliance on the part of lay-persons - e.g., subsets of rules found
within the personal income tax code or building codes. Law, and by extension, legal
scholarship, is more often concerned with the exercise of trained legal judgment in
environments of uncertainty. From a scholarly perspective, relatively mechanical rules
guiding quotidian compliance by laypersons may appear uninteresting as a topic for
study.
I argue that there is something to be learned from studying these seemingly
mundane subsets of determinate legal rules. Computer questions aside, there are larger
lessons of legal theory to be gleaned by considering those conditions that enable
relatively determinate legal outcomes. To that end, this Article provides a model for
characterizing the relative degree of determinacy associated with given legal contexts.
The inquiry is framed around the following question: what assumptions about the law,
facts, and legal reasoning in a given context would have to hold for legal outcomes to be
determinate enough to permit computerized resolution? Because computerized analysis is
the very epitome of legal assessment based upon explicit, determined, and constrained
mechanical inputs, framing the issue in this way not only addresses the practical
automated legal analysis question but also places broader issues of jurisprudence
concerning legal determinacy in sharp relief.
Part II anticipates the theoretical approach to the problem of determinacy and the
automation of legal analysis with an informal, intuitive overview of the topic. This
section describes the historically attractive parallel between mathematical and legal
formalism that has led so many thinkers to the problem of the non-computability of law.
In exploring the idea that legal determinacy varies contextually within the law, I
informally hypothesize that our ability to usefully automate legal analysis is limited by
considerations of indeterminacy in legal decision-making.
In Part III, I provide a theoretical model for characterizing the relative legal
determinacy of legal outcomes in any given legal context. I consider a hypothetical
model of legal decision-making in which legal outcomes would be ex ante determinable.
I use this framing as a vehicle for identifying the assumptions about the law and about the
process of decision-making that would have to hold in a given context in order to enable
determinate legal outcomes. In this view, relative determinacy is a function of choice; it
is dependent upon the constrained or flexible choices that are available to legal officials
during the various phases of the legal decision-making process in any given context.
Here, I borrow from a body of scholarship that has critically examined the role of choice
in legal decision-making. 28 In articulating the various ways in which choice-based
indeterminacy manifests itself during the stages of legal decision-making, these works

27
Although the number of determinate legal contexts might be comparatively small, in
absolute terms, the number is not insignificant given the large number of laws overall in society.

Primarily, I draw from scholars emanating from the Legal Realist and Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) traditions.
28
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provide (perhaps unintentionally) a helpful taxonomy of the potential sources of ex ante
uncertainty in the law. 29
This Article's model characterizes relative indeterminacy through the lens of
choice. Opportunities for choice appear at predictable and identifiable points of the legal
decision-making process. Each discrete junction I label a dimension of indeterminacy. At
each point at which a range of choices are available to a legal decision-maker - for
example, which laws to apply and how to apply them - there will typically be an
opportunity for uncertainty. Thus, the more choices available in a given context, the less
ex ante certainty there will be about those considerations that a legal official 30 Will
ultimately bring to bear on a given legal decision, and consequentially, more uncertainty
about ultimate the legal outcome.
We can use these observations that were developed to demonstrate indeterminacy
in the law as a toolkit for identifying determinacy in the law. If indeterminacy is a
function of choice, then determinacy depends upon the absence of choice. We know that
choice is not always available to legal decision-makers in every context. Constrained by
formal processes, explicit rules, the linguistic strictures of conceptually restrictive words,
or by norms and policies of forbearance in crafting exceptions, exercising discretion or
engaging in review, officials have comparatively fewer opportunities to exercise
judgment in certain contexts. In those areas, there are explicit or implicit limits on the
types of choices that might otherwise be available in other contexts. Sometimes these
constraints work together to produce environments where determinate legal outcomes are
not only possible, but also the norm. This is what I call the "variable determinacy thesis."
Part IV applies this thesis to the technical task of computationally modeling
automated reasoning. What permits us to create usable computer models of legal
outcomes in the Federal personal income tax context? It is a function of relative legal
determinacy. The legal system has evolved a context in which the choices and arguments
available to legal officials are, in that arena, relatively constrained.
In the personal income tax context, we can, for example, create reasonable
computer models of the legal rules and factors that impact decision-making, because our
system has restricted and reified the set of laws that are deemed to officially resolve
outcomes in that context. We can be reasonably certain that in most instances liability
will be governed by an ex ante fixed and determinable rule set of tax statutory provisions,
regulations, and interpretations.31 By contrast, we could imagine ex post legal officials
routinely challenging lay reliance in assessing tax liability based upon such a fixed,
For the original inspiration for the idea of systematically categorizing the dimensions of
indeterminacy listed in the CLS and legal realist scholarship, see Richard Fischl & Jeremy Paul,
Getting to Maybe: How to Excel on Law School Exams (1999). Although this book modestly
styles itself as a student study aid, I think it is one of the most important works of jurisprudence in
recent years. See also Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74 Va. L. Rev. 915 (1988), for an earlier
take on this idea.
29

30By legal officials, I those who are, in any given context, deemed the official arbiters in
resolving legal uncertainties, e.g., judges or administrative officials in some contexts.

For example, the statutory provisions contained in positive sources such as Title 26 of the
Federal Code.
31
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positive, and constrained rule-set. But this would undermine certainty, and create
indeterminacy about the governing legal rules. Instead, through informal and formal
norms of forbearance and restraint in review, the legal system has created relative
determinacy along one dimension of potential uncertainty. And, because there is a set of
rules that can be, with confidence, specified and identified ex ante, we can, in turn, create
accurate computer models of the substantive rules and factors implicated in legal
decision-making in that context. Similar considerations of determinacy concerning other
aspects of the legal decision-making process, limit our ability to usefully model legal
outcomes in a given context.
In Part V, I raise a theory about how lawmakers can consciously calibrate the
degree of determinacy in a legal context. I argue that they can often do this through the
use of legal "meta-rules." Meta-rules are rules about rules.32 In principle, lawmakers
could adjust the expected determinacy of a legal context by providing ex ante meta-rules
that explicitly constrain predictable points of indeterminacy. Using this Article's model,
we not only have a means of characterizing the relative determinacy of existing legal
contexts, but a view about how lawmakers might create new, more (or less) determinate
legal contexts.
One reason that lawmakers might want to create relatively more determinate
contexts is to make them more amenable to computation. As more regulable activities
become electronically mediated, lawmakers will increasingly confront the prospect of
automating aspects of legal compliance in those contexts. This model provides
lawmakers with a framework for competently assessing the plausibility and trade-offs of
such a decision. In many, if not most legal contexts, increased determinacy is not
necessarily desirable due to well-known trade-offs in terms of regulatory flexibility,
complexity, reductionism, fairness, and ability to achieve overall social goals. 33
However, in other select contexts, the ability of computable legal rules to act as a
reasonable proxy for substantive regulatory goals will be acceptable due to efficiency and
other benefits. I conclude by framing some of the normative questions raised by
automated legal analysis, and the prospect of lawmakers intentionally increasing
determinacy in particular legal contexts. 3 4

H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 77-90 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing law as the union of
primary and secondary rules).
32

33
A full exploration of the normative issues of automated legal analysis are beyond the
scope of this piece. I hope to explore more thoroughly the normative consequences of
formalizing and automating legal analysis in a future work.

This Article should not be taken as an endorsement of automating legal analysis
wherever theoretically possible. The normative issues, for example, whether it is a good idea to
computerize areas of law even if possible, will be the subject of future scholarship.
34
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II. IS IT POSSIBLE TO AUTOMATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE?

A. An Overview

It may strike some as odd to even consider automating legal analysis. After all,
few issues seem so dependent upon the skills of trained professionals and so nonamenable to mechanistic processing as the assessment of liability under the law.
Nonetheless, it is possible to automate legal analysis under some conditions. We know
this because we have current examples in which conclusions about legal liability have
been successfully automated within computer systems.
The best-known example of a comprehensive, and partially automated system for
assessing liability in a substantive legal area comes from the domain of personal income
tax law. In that area, software systems such as TurboTax employ deductive legal
reasoning to arrive at substantive determinations as to liability under the personal income
tax code. Such systems contain representations of portions of the personal income tax
code translated into a form understandable by the computer. Supplied with legal "facts"
from users and from other sources, the software applies the facts to the law to determine
liability. Other examples of emerging systems engaging in rudimentary legal reasoning
come from building law, vehicular law, and communications law, among others. 35 In
short, contemporary computer systems like these can indeed come to legal conclusions
under certain circumstances. This trend is already having a significant impact on the law
and will increasingly become more important as regulable activities migrate into
computerized environments.
That we have several operational examples in which legal analysis has been
automated is important for several reasons. First, the ability to automate legal reasoning
in some areas of law suggests the possibility of automating reasoning and compliance in
others. Second, and perhaps more interesting, it appears to pose a challenge to a view
from the legal domain that automating legal reasoning at any level of abstraction, is
infeasible. At the very least, the presence of such exemplars suggests that we need a legal
theoretical account as to why such systems are possible, and what their scope and limits
might be. It is important to thus reconcile their existence, with the explicit and implicit
skepticism from the legal theory scholarship doubting the possibility of automated legal
analysis.
In that spirit, this piece aims to strike a pragmatic balance between the frequently
optimistic proponents of automated legal analysis and the skeptics of this idea. That is,
despite confidence from some members of the computer science community about the
possibility of automating legal reasoning, it is important to confront the inherent limits to
the determinability of legal outcomes that are endemic to the process of legal decisionmaking. These limits have not been realistically incorporated into the cross-disciplinary
literature exploring this issue. To this end, I aim to employ well-understood concepts
from legal theory to explain how limited automated legal analysis is consistent with the

eg, BCA/CORENET Website - Home, http://www.corenet.gov.sg/ (last visited Jan.
18, 2010) (Singapore automated building code compliance site); Solibri, Solibri Model Checker,
http://www.solibri.com/ (last visited Feb 18, 2010).
35See,
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nuanced understanding of legal decision-making painted in contemporary legal
scholarship. In particular, the Article approaches the issue cautiously under an
overarching question: Is automated legal analysis possible throughout the law, or only in
limited doctrinal areas, and why? In other words, is there something idiosyncratic about
the personal income tax context that makes it uniquely amenable to computerized
analysis, or can we extrapolate more broadly throughout the law?
My major claim is that contemporary computers can come to legal conclusions
only in those contexts in which legal outcomes are relatively determinate. 36 This point is
deceptively simple for several reasons. First, most of those who have considered the
topic have not explicitly made this connection between the ability to automate the
analysis of legal outcomes and ex ante determinacy. 37 This has led to a perception within
the legal community that computer scientists have unrealistically over-claimed the
potential scope of automated legal reasoning within the law.
Second, the concept of legal determinacy (as opposed to indeterminacy), has been
comparatively underexplored in the legal literature. Thus, even if we make the connection
between automating legal analysis and legal determinacy, we still do not have a robust
vocabulary detailing what it means for a legal context to be ex ante determinate. I attempt
to address this issue in Part III by providing a functional characterization of the concept
of legal determinacy. Finally, there is the impression that mechanistic legal analysis
necessarily implies simplistic legal analysis, can only be employed in mundane subsets of
the law, or requires the development of computer technologies capable of exhibiting
attorney level professional judgment. As I will argue, even in determinate contexts, there
are applications of automated legal analysis that can produce results of surprising
complexity, sophistication, and utility. Such useful and sophisticated resolution can occur
without requiring the type of discretionary evaluation typically associated with the idea
"legal analysis," which is beyond the technological capacity of typical contemporary
computer systems.
At the core of this Article are a few broad ideas. First is the idea of that there are
"legal contexts." Legal contexts are reoccurring and predictable factual scenarios in
which actors within the legal system are routinely required to assess legal liability. The
assessment of income tax liability under the personal income tax code is one example of
a reoccurring "legal context." The second idea is that that the "amenability to
This is part of a larger point I am making explicitly linking "legal conclusions" and the
relative determinacy of legal outcomes. To ask the question, "can a computer come to a legal
conclusion," is to miss a crucial point - that we must first ask whether anyone can come to a legal
"conclusion" (a highly ex ante certain outcome) in a given context. In other words, it is
dependent upon whether legal decision-making is consistently determinate in that context. Only
after we have established the relative determinacy of legal decision-making in that context,
should we look to the next issue -whether computers -under existing technology -are able to
come to legal conclusions in that context. I further argue that automated legal reasoning can
typically occur, under contemporary technology, under a subset of contexts in which legal
decisions are relatively determinate. That is, determinacy is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition for automated legal reasoning. Particular determinate conditions must prevail.
36

37For an exception, see Richard Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential
Inquiry (1987).
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computation" of a legal context - the degree to which computer systems can be
constructed to generate legal conclusions within that context -- is a function of
identifiable legal theoretical characteristics about legal decision-making in context. In
particular, the amenability to computation (in the way the term is used is this Article) is
dependent upon how ex ante determinate legal outcomes tend to be within that context.
The third idea is that determinacy among legal contexts is relative. The relative
determinacy of legal outcomes is affected by multiple variables identified in this Article.
Fourth, lawmakers can consciously adjust the degree of determinacy of legal outcomes in
a given context. Finally, adjusting legal contexts to make them more determinate in
particular ways can, in turn, make them more amenable to being automatically analyzed
by computer systems (albeit with known tradeoffs).

1. The Problem of Legal Compliance
Firms and individuals exist within a complex legal regulatory environment.38 To
comply with the law in even a limited substantive area is often a complicated, uncertain,
and expensive endeavor, even for sophisticated parties. Computers, on the other hand,
excel at organizing, managing, analyzing, and processing information, even of substantial
volume and complexity. For this reason, a branch of research within the computer
science domain has been looking at this problem of complexity in complying with the
law. This research asks: Can the information processing and analytical abilities of
computers be harnessed towards the task of determining compliance and liability under
the law?
Research into the possibility of automated legal analysis has been ongoing since
the early 1960s. 39 Those who have explored this idea have done so in pursuit of several
claimed advantages. The primary motivation from the private sector appears to be
For example, as of 1997, a federal report estimated that the Code of Federal Regulations
alone was over 130,000 pages long. See Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of
the President, Draft Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations (1997),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/fedreg_rccb/ (last visited May 27, 2010). The total number of
pages of all of the volumes of the unannotated 2009 U.S. Code numbers in the tens of thousands.
See 2009 U.S.C. Repository, http://uscode.house.gov/pdf/2009/ (last visited Jul 6, 2010). How
many laws are there in effect at any given time in the United States? It is difficult to come up
with such an overall estimate as to the number of laws, even if we limit the inquiry into federal
positive statutory law and regulation. Jurisprudential debates about what a "law" is, and the
difficulty in dividing statutory codes into subsets that constitute standalone atomic "laws," for
which there would be widespread agreement, make precise quantification difficult, if not
impossible. Nonetheless, the above numbers make it possible to get some rough sense as to the
magnitude of the number of existing, potentially applicable, federal legal obligations. Note that
the above rough quantification only addresses the magnitude of the statutory and regulatory
federal law, and does not even include the substantial additional legal obligations imposed at the
state, local, and international levels, or those emanating from other non-statutory sources of legal
authority or obligation.
38

39Lay man E. All en & Mary Ellen Caldwell, Modern Logic andJudicialDecision Making
A Sketch of One View, 28 Law & Contemp. Probs. 2 13-70 (1963).
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increased efficiency. Corporations are attracted to the notion of using computers to
lessen the various costs of complying with laws and regulations. 40 Other justifications
include greater accessibility of the law to the public and improved transparency in legal
decision-making. 41
Before developing the thesis further, it is important to clarify a more basic issue
that might not be obvious to those unfamiliar with the research in this area. What do
scholars mean when they write of a "computer coming to legal conclusions" or describe
"automated legal analysis?" 42 Does determining compliance with a law necessarily entail
a sophisticated understanding of the meaning and dynamics of the legal system, or can
useful work sometimes occur at a more basic level?

a.

Overview of Automated Legal Analysis

"Legal informatics" is the collective name used to describe the field concerned
with the use of computers and information technology within the legal system. 43 Legal
informatics, however, is a general term, covering the multiplicity of ways in which
computers are used in the law. This Article is concerned with a particular subset of legal
informatics involving the "legally substantive" application of computer technology
within the law. This section will provide a brief overview of the legally substantive/nonsubstantive distinction within the various uses of computer technology within the law.

Id. Some other justifications are worth mentioning. Some have argued that such systems
will allow us to deal effectively with the increased complexity of regulation. Michael
Genesereth, CodeX: Stanford Center for Computers and Law, Computational Law,
http://codex.stanford.edu/background.html (last visited Feb 25, 2010).
40

41
Other authors have argued that the integration of such systems within the legal system
will allow us to achieve measurable societal benefits, including increased legal accessibility to
underserved communities, improved transparency in legal decision-making, and increased clarity
and predictability in the law. Similar strains of argument about increased accessibility to
underserved communities are found in the legal scholarship as well. See Deborah L. Rhode,
Access to Justice 190 (2004) (advocating for, among other things, increased automation for low
income clients).

See e.g., G. Sartor, A Formal Model of Legal Argumentation, 7 Ratio Juris 177, 177-211
(1994); L. Karl Branting, Building Explanationsfrom Rules and Structured Cases, 34
International Journal of Man-Machine Studies 797-837 (1991) ("[The computer program's]
output is a memorandum that justifies a legal conclusion in terms of the applicable precedents and
legal rules.").
42

43Simona Binazzi et al., ITLaw: An Advanced DocumentationSystem in Legal Informatics,
1 J. Info. L. & Tech. (1999)
http://text.www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/1999_1/idg/binazzi/?external true ("Legal
informatics is, then, that science concerned with problems linked to the effective storage, retrieval
and transmission of legal data; but it also deals, and from a slightly different perspective, with
problems relating to the rationalization of legal activity; within this second grouping, the studies
relating to formalization of the legal order.").
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We can draw two broad categories of computer applications within the law: those
that are principally concerned with the substance of the law, and those that are focused on
organizing, managing, and retrieving legal information. 44 Substantive legal informatics
aims to model the meaning and logic of laws in computer-understandable form. In other
words, we deem a project "substantive" if it aims to represent the logic and meaning of
legal rights and duties in computer systems. These substantive projects often (but not
exclusively) employ formal, mathematically based, symbolic representations of the laws
themselves and the various rights and duties that the laws create. 45
We can contrast substantive projects against legal informatics projects that are
non-substantive in nature. These non-substantive projects do not aim to convey to
computers the underlying meaning of the law. Rather, such applications consist of the
familiar uses of computers for organizing, sorting, and retrieving of legal data for
presentation to and interpretation by attorneys and other legal users. Non-substantive
tasks include: searching textual databases of laws such as Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis,
analyzing empirical data, sorting and searching legal documents, e-discovery, engaging
in statistical analysis, etc. 46 Importantly, in those examples, the computer does not have
any "understanding" about the meaning or substance of the underlying law retrieved.
Thus, we deem a project "substantive" only if the computer has been given an explicit,
logical understanding of the rights/duties created by the law.
Since the substantive/non-substantive distinction is subtle, an example will help
illustrate the principle. Let us imagine that an attorney retrieves the text of a speed limit
statute using the computerized database such as Westlaw. Further imagine that this
statute establishes a 65 mile per hour vehicular speed limit on highway driving. 47 Once
retrieved, we assume that the attorney can read the statute and understand its underlying
meaning. This is because the statute is written in English text, presumably with enough
context to convey the meaning to the attorney. However, we would not say that the
attorney's computer has any meaningful "understanding" about the substance or logic of
the law it is displaying to the attorney. To the computer, the text of the statute is just a
stream of data, without any particular information relating it to the real world or
distinguishing it from any other stream of information. Without being given explicit
context by a human in some sort of structured computer language, ad hoc information,
such as written English text, is generally meaningless to computers. Thus, retrieval of the
plain text of a statute by an attorney would be considered a non-substantive application of

Id. (The authors describe a similar distinction between "decisional informatics" in which
the projects are concerned with the rationalization and computerization of legal decisions, and
"documentary informatics," in which projects are concerned with researching and documenting
the law. In this taxonomy, "substantive" informatics would be a subset of decisional informatics,
as it is more concerned with the substance of legal decisions.).
44

45See

Sartor, supra note 41, at 200-03.

46For an example of using legal informatics for organizational purposes, see Patricia
Hassett, Technology Time Capsule: What Does the Future Hold?, 50 Syracuse L. Rev., 1223,
123 1-33 (2000).

47

See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code §22349 (2009).
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technology to the law. The attorney has used the computer system for the purposes of
organizing and retrieving data that is meaningful to him but no effort has been expended
conveying the meaning of the law in computer language. As counterintuitive as it
sounds, we deem a legal informatics project substantive or non-substantive from the
perspective of the computer.
Let's change the example slightly to illustrate what it would mean for a computer
to have a rudimentary substantive understanding of the law. Suppose that it was somehow
possible to convey the essential logic underlying the speeding restriction law to a
computer. Imagine that the attorney, in consultation with a computer programmer,
created a translation of the speed limit statute into a technical form capable of being
understood by computers. The programmer creates a computer program that can accept
numerical speed limits as an input. Imagine further, that the programmer designs a
computerized rule telling the computer to flag all speed limits greater than 65 miles per
hour as being in violation of the particular provision of the vehicular code.
In this way, we could deem the project substantive, because the computer had a
more substantial "understanding" of the logic, and legal duties underlying the law. The
computer now has a rule with the logic that speed limits above 65 miles per hour are
deemed a violation of the legal duty created by the law. Let us suppose further that the
computer had access to data about speed of particular vehicles on an actual highway.
Perhaps we could even characterize the computer as being able to apply the law to the
speed limit data, and arrive at prima facie legal conclusions about liability under the
vehicle code. In other words, the substantive meaning of the text of the law has been
translated into computer-understandable logic, and perhaps we might be justified in
claiming that the computer has engaged in rudimentary, prima-facie automated legal
analysis.
Why might we consider this automated legal analysis rather than non-legal
"mechanical application" of the law? Because, in most instances, the process conducted
by the computer will be approximately the same as the process engaged in by people attorneys and lay persons - in this context. We would normally characterize an attorney
assessing speeding liability in this context as engaging in basic, albeit mechanical, legal
analysis. It is simply that, in this case, the legal analysis called for is not analogical in
nature. Rather, prima facie legal analysis here mostly involves rudimentary mechanical
or "deductive" reasoning. For now, let this intuitive example of a computer arriving at an
automated, prima-facie legal conclusion suffice to illustrate the point.
Substantive legal informatics projects thus aim to create computer systems that
can apply laws to particular factual circumstances, and derive substantive legal
conclusions. Such projects are known as automated legal reasoning or automated legal
analysis projects. In projects such as these, programmers attempt to convey the logic and
meaning of the laws to computers, by translating the substance of the law into computerunderstandable form. The process of imparting meaning to a computer system in
structured, logical form, is often described as overlaying "semantic information." 48
Roughly speaking, the concept of a computer coming to an accurate legal conclusion
suggests that the computer, after performing its own legal analysis, is able to reach the

48

Stuart Russell & Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach 469 (3rd ed.

2010).
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same conclusion that a person assessing liability would have come to. 49 Such a computer
system is therefore assessing legal liability by engaging with the substance or underlying
meaning of the law, hence, the synonymous phrase "automated legal analysis" or
"automated legal reasoning."
First, I wish to make a preliminary cautionary note that it is important to take the
terms computerized "knowledge" and "understanding" with a bit of caution. These terms
are primarily meant as shorthand metaphors indicating the translating of the logic of the
law to a form accessible to computer systems. They are not meant to imply contemporary
technology endowing independent, human-like intelligence or professional judgment on
the part of the computers.so Where we find a portion of the law - such as in the personal
income tax context - in which we find computers regularly and successfully drawing
conclusions based upon the substance of the law, I will refer to these contexts as
"computable legal contexts" or "amenable to computation." 5 As I will argue later, the
mere fact that resolution of a law does not require professional judgment does not
necessarily imply that it will necessarily be incapable of regulating relatively
sophisticated behaviors.

b. Motivations Behind Automated Legal Compliance Research
To those who have not pondered it, it is worth considering what trends are
animating increased research into automating legal compliance. 52 A major change is the
increase in activity by firms and individuals that is electronically mediated.53 "Electronic
mediation" refers to the idea that regulable interactions are increasingly occurring in
electronic format, on networked computers, with the results of those interactions stored in
databases. For example, contemporary firms and individuals routinely contract and

49
Although these topics are intimately related to relatively developed computer science
topics such as Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, which are cited throughout this Article,
I deliberately avoid the use of this terminology here, in that they can occasionally be misleading
or suggestive of larger points not being made in this Article.

It should be noted that part of the enterprise of the sub-discipline of computer science
known as "Artificial Intelligence" (AI) does have as its goal simulating or replicating actual
human intelligence. Moreover, the computer semantics and computer logic which I refer to
through this Article are often considered within the sub-discipline of Artificial Intelligence.
However, I make the distinction between the idea of "communicating the logic of the law to the
computer" and the lofty goals of Artificial Intelligence, primarily for the purpose of not confusing
my relatively simple theoretical points with the much further reaching goals of AI.
50

siFor the idea of referring to these as computable or computational bodies of law, see
Nathaniel Love & Michael Genesereth, ComputationalLaw, Proceedings of the Tenth
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law, 205, 206-07 (2005).
See Richard Susskind, The End of Lawyers 140-43 (2008), for a thoughtful discussion of
this topic.
52

53Love

& Genesereth, supra note 50, at 205-08.
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purchase goods over the Internet through business-to-business transactions in which the
entirety of the transaction is conducted electronically on computers.54 The results of such
interactions are typically stored electronically. Thus, more data about what has actually
occurred in the real world is being stored online in structured databases, and is
increasingly retrievable at a later time for ad hoc reference. 55
Because of this increase in electronically-mediated activity, it is increasingly
possible to apply and resolve substantive "elements" of legal rules electronically. For
example, take the simplified scenario of a contract concerning the delivery of a purchased
good.56 Whether or not a delivery has occurred is a factual determination, and is
resolvable in the sense that it is usually determinable by reference to particular types of
external evidence. 5 7 In the above example, let's assume that the contract creates a legal
obligation of payment, the resolution of which turns upon the actual delivery of the good
to the purchaser. We might simplify the legal obligation in the following form, "If
delivery occurs, then the legal obligation to pay begins." Since records of dispositive
evidence are increasingly available and retrievable from online, structured 58 databases,
computer systems are increasingly capable of automatically resolving foundational
elements of legal rules.
To illustrate this point, let's first examines the resolution of this foundational
factual element in the non-electronically mediated world. To resolve the contractual legal
obligation we must first determine - from a legal perspective -- whether delivery has
occurred. Let us assume, for the sake of the example, that the production of the relevant,
signed paper delivery receipt will legally establish the resolution of the element of
delivery, and that neither party will party will dispute the fact of delivery after visually
verifying the date and signature information. In the non-electronically mediated world,
the determination of this "legal fact" of delivery typically requires an inquiry into the
records of the sending and receiving parties, often at considerable transaction cost.
Individual employees at each party would commonly have to search through internal
records, assert that a particular receipt is relevant to the transaction at hand, and send a
copy of the documentary evidence of delivery and receipt to the other party.
By contrast, in our imagined electronically-mediated example, all of the stages of
the transaction - the creation of the purchase and delivery obligation, and the record of

54
As of the first quarter of 2010, the total estimated e-commerce sales in the United States
was over $38 billion. U.S. Census Bureau, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales 1st Quarter 2010
(2010).

56

U.C.C. 2-507.

Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 238-39 (2005) (the underlying assumption here is that
the "natural fact" will likely become a "legal fact," to use Kelsen' s terms, if it emerges from a
typically uncontroverted authoritative source of facts.).
To say that the data is "structured" is simply to say that the information about the
delivery -such as date, time -are stored in an unambiguous form and have been properly
classified in a computer database in this meaningful way.
58

16

The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review

Vol. XII

2011

delivery and receipt have been stored in structured databases, and available online. Thus,
this prima-facie legal inquiry as to whether the delivery has been performed can be
automatically resolved by a computer system with access to the database containing the
authoritative records of the parties. 59 We have authenticated evidence of delivery support for a foundational factual element of the governing legal rule - that is available in
a form that computers can now automatically retrieve. Because the data is structured, the
computer will be able to extract information such as the delivery date and signee. This is
not to say that this evidence cannot be overcome with other evidence in some instances.
But - just like physical copies of a delivery receipt - an electronic record of receipt will
be strong prima-facie evidence of a foundational legal element of delivery. In most
instances -just like a photocopy of a signed physical receipt submitted to evidence - we
could imagine an authenticated electronic record of delivery as being dispositive on the
legal issue of delivery.
Moreover, we could imagine emerging contracts explicitly contemplating within
the body of the contract that the resolution of substantive legal obligations be determined
electronically. In order to reduce transaction costs, both parties might explicitly agree
within the contract that the legal fact of delivery is to be definitively resolved by
reference to electronic records detailing some real-world occurrence. In that case, the
electronic records would not simply be strong evidence of delivery; they would actually
be - according to the substantive terms of the contract - legally dispositive on the issue of
delivery.
Another example will further convey the point that data stored in structured
databases is increasingly permitting the automated resolution of substantive elements of
legal rules. Currently, the tax code treats "capital gains" differently from ordinary wage
income. 60 Capital gains also receive different tax treatment depending upon time held,
with long-term capital gains taxed at a lower rate. In order to apply the legal rule
concerning the treatment of capital gains, one must first determine whether particular
income is classified as a capital gain, and then, how long the underlying asset has been
held. Most modern, sophisticated brokerage firms store data about customer investment
gains in structured databases, keeping track of the type of asset that generated the gain, as
well as the length of holding. Thus, when an individual must later apply the legal rule
with the foundational "capital gains" element, computers are often automatically, and
unambiguously, able to draw out data about investment income, including whether the
income is considered a capital gain, and whether the capital gains have been held long
enough for treatment at the lower tax rate. 61 As in the contract example, the increasing
trend towards recording activity in structured, accessible databases in electronic
environments is enabling simple automated legal determinations that previously required
human intermediation. In short, the storage of accessible, structured data about real

59

Susskind, supra note 51, at 142-45.

60

Se

...

1(h)(1)(C).

Of course, the value of the data depends upon how reliably the legal assertion as to
whether an investment is, or is not, a capital gain, is in the first place. This idea of a captured
legal assertion is discussed infra.
61
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world factual occurrences is reducing the transaction costs of resolving particular
substantive elements within some legal rules.
Beyond electronic-mediated regulable activity and storage of structured data,
there is a second technological trend enabling increased automation in legal compliance.
This is the emerging tendency for manufacturers to include within common devices and
products, sophisticated computer processors capable of engaging in logical reasoning, as
well as data sensors which are able to extract data from the world. This trend is
permitting finer-grained, and more efficient regulatory control of these objects in certain
instances. An example of this can be found in so-called "cognitive radio" research. 62
Part of the goal of this research is to explore whether, for example, consumer electronic
devices - can be made to automatically determine their own compliance according to
FCC radio spectrum rules. 63 In short, it is increasingly becoming possible to embed the
logic underlying particular legal rules within devices, and, in some instances, allow the
devices to automatically analyze or alter their behavior to comport with these legal rules.
These two major technological movements are among the most important factors
enabling increased research into automation of legal analysis.
B. An Intuitive Approach to the Problem

It's helpful to proceed with a simple reframing of the overall problem - why can't
we always automate legal analysis? What, if anything, is preventing computers from
routinely coming to legal conclusions today in all areas of the law given the state of the
art of contemporary computers? This is a question that has been thoughtfully posed by
computer scientist Michael Genesereth and others. 64 No less than the eminent
mathematician Gottfried Leibniz posed similar questions, not of computers, but of using
mathematics and formal logic, in order to determine compliance with the law. 65 Other
great thinkers including John Locke and John Austin advocated the use of formal
mathematical reasoning to express and apply the law. 66
As indicated above, in such a mixed computer-law question, there are both legaltheoretical and computer science-theoretical limitations that complicate the answer to this
question. In this section I provide a more intuitive approach to the question of automated
legal analysis that will anticipate some of the more theoretical issues that I raise later in
this Article.

Roy Rubenstein, Radios Get Smart, IEEE Spectrum, Feb. 2007,
http://spectrum.ieee.org/consumer-electronics/standards/radios-get-smart.
62

Id. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has created the authoritative legal
rules concerning which types of electronic devices may use which portions of the radio spectrum.
63

64Love

& Genesereth, supra note 50.

65See Sartor, supra note 9, at 389-90.
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 16-18 (1983) (analogizing
the classic legal science to Euclidean geometry).
66
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1. Parallel Between Formality in Law and Formality in Computing
a. The Formal Structure of Computer Logic and Mathematics
It is worth exploring why computer scientists like Genesereth would even think to
use computers to conduct substantive legal analysis. As many have noted, there is a very
appealing parallel between formalist depictions of the law, which rely on structured legal
form and deductive legal reasoning, and the underlying structure of computers - which
are based upon mathematical and formal computer logic. It is this parallel between legal
formalism and mathematical formalism that has long captivated thinkers such as Leibniz,
into employing the principles of mathematics to bear upon legal analysis. 67
The underlying structure of much of computing is based on the field of
mathematical logic. Mathematical logic is the study of logical reasoning in which the
formal rigor and symbolic precision of mathematics is employed. For those unacquainted
with these ideas, I will provide a very brief, non-technical overview of the subject to
convey the essence of the issue.
The early work of Aristotle provides a comprehensible and time-tested point of
entry on the topic. Aristotle developed an early version of formal, logical reasoning
which illustrates the same basic principle of deductive logic with us today. In Aristotle's
classic conception of deductive logic, we have the three-part syllogism. The syllogism is
composed of two premises - a general statement about the world, and then a specific
assertion (often about a fact in the real world) covered by the general statement.
Combining these two premises using deductive logic, one can arrive at a new conclusion,
whose truth is guaranteed if the premises are true and correctly structured. For instance,
using the classic example:
1) If all men are mortal;
2) and Socrates is a man;
a. then we can conclude that
3) Socrates is a mortal.
In sum, Aristotle observed that you could separate the form of reasoning from its
substantive content. What does it mean to separate form from content? In mathematics,
algebra provides a familiar analogy. In algebra, specific numerals are replaced by
variables, but the overall mathematical relationship of form is preserved despite the
substitution of the variables. If one has two apples and one doubles that amount, one has
four apples. If one has two of any regular unit and one doubles that amount, one has four
of that thing, regardless of what that thing is. Algebra allowed the abstraction that
relative mathematical quantity relationships persist -no matter what the particular object
be it men or apples -we are actually referring to.

Leibniz studied law at the university level, and was an accomplished legal thinker in
addition to his well known mathematical contributions. See The Cambridge Companion to
Leibniz, 20-22 (Nicholas Jolley ed., 1995).
67
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There is an analogous interplay between form and substance in deductive logic.
For example, the above syllogism could be replaced by symbols thereby retaining the
form of the syllogism without altering its truth value
1) All A are B;
2) CisanA;
and the conclusion:
3) Since all A are B, and C is an A, therefore C is a B.
The abstraction means that the relationship holds beyond "mortals" and
"Socrates" -- it does not matter what real world object you substitute for "A," "B" and
"C." As long as the premises are true and the argument is properly formed, under
deductive logic, the conclusion is guaranteed to be true. 68 In other words, we can learn
about the truth of the conclusion based upon the form of the argument combined with the
truth of the premises. Mathematical formality implies that there is a definite structure or
organization present in the form, which is defined by rules. 69 This definiteness in terms
of structure and process is the essence of what it means to be able to formalize a concept.
In modern times, mathematicians have created what might be thought of as very
advanced variants of Aristotle's syllogistic logic, based upon formal mathematical
foundations.7
19th century mathematicians observed that the syllogism could be
reworked into more familiar, and easier to work with, but logically equivalent, "If-Then"
rules. For example, the syllogism above can be reformulated as the logical equivalent:
1) If A then B (If a person is a man then he is mortal)
2) C is an "A"; (Socrates is a man)
3) Therefore "C" is "B." (Therefore Socrates is mortal) 71
Because both formal logic and computer systems are based upon mathematical
foundations, computer scientists are able to write computer programs that are capable of
applying formal logical reasoning and coming to logical conclusions. These are known
as rules-based automated reasoning systems. As a simple example, if we were to input
into these systems the premises of Aristotle's syllogism - that Socrates was a man, and
If a logical argument is formulated in proper deductive form such that the truth of the
premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion, it is said to be valid. When a logical argument is
valid, and the premises are actually true, it is said to be sound.
68

The mathematician George Boole was a pioneer in modern symbolic logic. George
Boole, An Investigation of the Laws of Thought, 72-79 (1854).
69

Aristotle's syllogisms were improved upon in the nineteenth century, leading to the
development of Propositional Logic by pioneers George Boole and Gottlob Frege. More
advanced and expressive logical variants, such as First Order Logic have since been developed.
See Stuart Russell & Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach, 240-43 (3d. ed.
2010).
70

71

Boole, supra note 68, at 175-86.
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that all men are mortal - in technical form understandable by the computer - the
computer system would be able, on its own, to conclude that "Socrates was a mortal." In
recent years, computer scientists have created computer software capable of
automatically resolving what amount to complex amalgamations of such "if-then"
statements. These computer programs have proven to be extraordinarily good at
analyzing vast amounts of complex if-then rules and their incredibly complicated
interrelations. 72
Why are such automated "if-then" resolvers useful? One of the benefits of
formal, deductive reasoning is that one can deduce unknown truths "hidden" within
existing information. Often there is useful information embedded within information that
we already have, but it the complexity of the relationships make it to difficult to draw out
the entrenched information. 73 To continue with our simple example, we might know that
Socrates was a man, and that all men were mortal, but embedded in the combination of
these two pieces of information was a hidden piece of information gleaned through
deductive reasoning - namely, that Socrates was mortal. Without the power of
connecting these disparate pieces of information, and applying the truth guarantees of
logic, we may never have drawn out that conclusion. Such deduced knowledge is often
non-obvious, and has value above and beyond that which was available by simply
knowing the premises. Much of modern computational deductive reasoning is geared
towards using the immense computational power of computers to draw out non-obvious,
embedded information in a way that would be impossible for unassisted humans.
So good are computers today at manipulating formal logical rules, that computer
scientists have developed rules-based "automated theorem-prover" systems in which
computers have been able to solve complicated mathematical and industrial problems too
complex for human analysis. 74 In short, computers today are extremely good - much
better than people - at automatically analyzing if-then rules. Moreover, mathematicians
have developed logical forms far more advanced than the simple "if-then" based logics of
the earliest decades.7s These highly expressive logical languages are capable of
representing highly complex objects in the real world and their properties and
interrelationships. 76
Given this confluence - the development of highly expressive formal
mathematical rule languages that are capable of being understood by computers and
computer systems that are excellent at rapidly manipulating these rules and determining
the consequences of their application, it was a natural step to conceive of applying these
See Russell & Norvig, supra note 69, at 295 ("[Automated] theorem provers have been
applied widely to derive mathematical theorems, including several for which no proof was known
previously.").
72

73Susan

Haack, On Logic in the Law. 'Something, But Not All', 20 Ratio Juris 1, 10-11

(2007).

For an overview of First Order Logic, see Russell & Norvig, supra note 69, at 240-68.
76

Haack, supra note 72, at 10-13.
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technologies to the law. Why? Because in many conceptions of the law, there is a
logical structure at its heart - not unlike the series of "if-then" rules that computers have
become so adept at analyzing.
b. The Formal Structure Of Law
What has motivated contemporary theorists to explore the parallels between
formal mathematical logic and the law? 77 No doubt that it is due to the numerous formal
elements present within the modern legal system. These formal legal elements parallel,
at least at on a superficial level, some of the mathematically formal logical structures that
are processable by contemporary computer systems. Because there are high-level
similarities between the formal aspects of the law and the formal mathematical models in
automated reasoning computer systems, there has been a particular allure to the idea that
legal analysis could be automated.
To illustrate this parallel, it is helpful to briefly survey some of the major formal
features of American law. The first formal characteristic present in the law relates to the
fact we refer to the law as if it is structured organizationally - at least at some high level
of abstraction. 78 True, many have contested particular structures within the law, and
debated its content. 79 But at the very highest level, in a very practical sense, there is
thought to be is at least superficial structure within the organization of law as a group of
rules and doctrines organized by topic. 80 For instance, laws are generally categorized into
large bodies or areas of law such as "tort law" or "anti-trust" or "constitutional" law.
Bodies of law are in turn grouped into subtopics within a given area. That there is a
formal structure to the organization of the law is most apparent in modern statutory
schemes. In these realms, legislation is typically organized into formal sections and subsections and paragraphs.
However, even outside statutory law, we see formal
organization. Judges characterize different cases as dealing with different statutory or
common law doctrines, and position judge-made rules into particular categories of the

Perhaps earlier theorists such as Locke and Leibniz were motivated by formal elements
of the law of their time; it is not clear. Anecdotally, it seems that law was less formal in terms of
structure and formal hierarchy of law than it is today, in the modern statutory state.
78Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism. On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L.J.
949, 951 (1988) (noting that "legal activity invariably takes place within some structure, however

lax").
79
Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution.-A Case of Contemporary Common Law
Conceptualism, 52 Vill. L. Rev. 487, 487-89 (2007) (discussing the attack on common law
conceptualism by legal realists).
"See,

e.g., Frank, supra note 5.
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area of law the rule is meant to be part of.81 This categorization and typing is a feature of
formality. 82
We also see formal structure within the composition of individual legal
obligations. Laws are frequently phrased in the declarative form, and can typically
broken down into logically distinct, substantive elements. Law students are taught such a
logically structured approach to the law in terms of finding rules within bodies of law,
and then breaking down rules into their composite elements.
Within this structural view, similarities between mathematical formalism and
legal formalism begin to emerge. Importantly, most laws can be reformulated into a
logically equivalent "If-Then" formulation. 83 For example, let us take once again a
vehicular speed limit statute. Imagine this statute says: "No person may drive a motor
vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than 65 miles per hour." 84 This law can be
converted into a logically equivalent statement that says, "If one is driving a vehicle upon
a highway at a speed greater than 65 miles per hour Then this will result in a violation of

the vehicular code." As indicated previously, these "If-Then" rules are precisely the type
of statement that can be converted into formal mathematical logic - the language of
computers - and inputted and processed by rules-based automated reasoning systems.
In another parallel, the overall framework for legal decision-making is often
presented in terms of deductive "If-Then" style of logical reasoning. 85 Often the mode of
general legal reasoning leading to legal outcomes is characterized as proceeding through
the structure of the "legal syllogism."86 In terms of assessing liability, the basic
framework in processing the legal syllogism is often depicted as follows: find the law,
compare the law to a given factual situation, and if the law applies, use deductive logic to
derive the legal result. 87
For example, determining whether a speeding violation has occurred usually
requires, at some level, 1) Taking the general rule, "If driving a vehicle upon a California
highway at a speed greater than 65 miles per hour Then violation of the vehicle code."
81

82

Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics ofAmerican Law, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1047, 1055 (2002).
See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 199-200 (1992).

Ward Farnsworth, The Legal Analyst: A Toolkit for Thinking About the Law 164 (2007)
("Most laws - whether made by legislatures, courts, agencies, or anyone else - can be understood
as if-then statements.").
83

84

Cal Veh. Code § 22349(a) (West 2000).

85

Farnsworth, supra note 82 (2007).

86

Paul B. Treusch, The Syllogism, in Readings in Jurisprudence 539 (Jerome Hall ed.,

1938).
87

See Torben Spaak, Deduction, Legal Reasoning, and the Rule of Law, 23 Const.

Comment. 121 (2006) (summarizing legal philosopher Neil MacCormick' s view~ of legal
reasoning as "essentially applying rules to facts" and suggesting that MacCormick viewed the
legal syllogism as having upmost importance in legal reasoning); see also Neil MacCormick,
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1994).
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2) Taking a particular factual situation - person X was driving his car on California
Highway 101 and was measured as traveling at 90 miles per hour. And then 3) Applying
deductive logic to see if the specific instance matches the general description of the rule,
to see if a violation has occurred. This is the same procedure that was illustrated in
deductive logic context, when we saw the structure: If X Then Y, X, therefore Y.
Even when legal decision-makers such as judges engage in analogical reasoning
or instrumental balancing to come to a result, they are frequently portraying their analysis
within the overall deductively structured framework. For example, a high level
formalized simplification of the tort doctrine of negligence might be
"If Duty and Breach
and Causation and
No Defenses
Then
Liability Under Negligence."
When courts engage in analogical reasoning about whether the defendant did or
did not exhibit the requisite care under the breach element of the doctrine of negligence,
they still proceed through the structured, formal framework of elements to be analyzed.
Given that most laws can be formulated into if-then statements, and that much of
legal decision-making is characterized, at a high level, in terms of deductive structure, we
can begin to see the natural appeal between computerized automated reasoning systems which take complicated "if-then" rules and analyze them applying deductive logic - and
the law. Of course, it's worth noting that our modern law's similarly formalist structure
is no coincidence. The legal formalist thinkers of the early 2 0 th century, were called
"formalist," precisely because they attempted to apply the mathematically formal
techniques of science and logic and organization within the law. 88 At least at the
organizational level, their influence still remains.
C. A Thought Experiment for Understandingthe Problem
Now that we've established that there are at least superficial similarities between
formal elements within the law and the mathematical formalism of computerized
reasoning systems, we can see why there is an attraction to the idea of "computing the
law." Despite this attraction, there are reasons to think that such an idea may be harder
than it appears at first blush. In this section, we'll engage in a thought experiment to help
us understand the problems at an intuitive level.
Let us return to the original question -what is preventing a computer from
engaging in legal analysis today in every area of the law? Two competing visions of the
law, at conceptually opposite ends of the spectrum will help highlight the issues involved.
In order to highlight my point, I will offer somewhat oversimplified views of both
positions that I am discussing.
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See Horowitz, supra note 81.
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1. The View of the Law as Principally Computable
At one end of the spectrum we see a vision of the law advanced by computer
science professors and mathematicians such as Michael Genesereth. 89 In a rough version
of this view of the law, the law should be, in principle, entirely computable from a legal
substantive standpoint. Imagine that we would like to determine legal liability in a given
factual situation or legal context. The determination of liability in many or most cases
should, under this view, simply involve the finding of the relevant legal rules, the finding
of the relevant facts under these laws, and then inputting this information into a computer
system in a way that is formulated for the formal language of the automated reasoning
systems. Such computer systems would then apply the rules of formal logic using
automated reasoning software and return the results. The resulting output which would
be an assessment of legal liability under the circumstances, based upon the rules
formulated in computer logic, and the "facts" inputted in an unambiguous format. We
can term this the "rules-centric" view of legal decision-making.
In principle, some computer scientists wonder why many if not most legal
determinations should be capable of being ascertained this way. 90 Those who adopt this
view see the inability to automate legal analysis widely throughout the law as primarily a
problem of the various ambiguities that are prevalent within the law as it currently exists.
The problem, according to these scholars, is that law is written primarily by lawyers, and
not those trained in the rigors of formal logic.91 This is similar to the critiques of the
imprecision, ambiguity, and vagueness of the law advanced by Liebnitz92 many years
ago. Strong strains of this view can also be found within legal scholarship by some of the
early legal formalist scholars. 93 This is by no means an unusual view of legal decisionmaking from those outside the legal profession. 94
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Love & Genesereth, supra note 50, at 205-09.

90

Id

Layman Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool For Drafting and Interpreting
Legal Documents, 66 Yale L.J. 833 (1957).
91

See See Sartor, supra note 9, at 389-90 ("[T]he young Leibniz proposed the transposition
of the axiomatic approach to law by expressing the legal system in a few propositions, from
which all legal conclusions could be 'geometrically' derived.").
92

93See Grey, supra note 65.
94We see strains of this position in occasional popular laments to replace judges, who are
susceptible to biases, with "objective" computers. See Bettijane Levine, Judging the Judges, L.A.
Times, Apr. 9, 1997, at 1, available at http://articles.1atimes.com/1997-04-09/news/1s46727_1 county-judge ("Barbara Swist, founder and executive director of Consumers for Legal
Reform in Costa Mesa ... would also like to see computers replace judges in some civil
matters.").
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2. The View of the Law as Largely Indeterminate
At the other end of the spectrum, we see a view of the law advanced by scholars
who I will refer to as the "anti-formalists." These are primarily scholars of the Legal
Realist and Critical Legal Studies tradition. 95 Many of them see the law as fraught with
indeterminacies - or uncertain elements that cannot be precisely pinned down prior to
official determination during litigation. This is in contrast to "rule-centric" view of
Leibnitz and Genesereth. The "anti-formalist" view is sometimes described as a form of
"rule skepticism." 96
Under the strong view of legal indeterminacy, the law is often seen as so fraught
with inherent uncertainty, arbitrariness, judgment, and unpredictability that it would be
difficult for a person (or a computer) to routinely come to anything resembling the ex
ante, deductively derived, legal conclusions suggested by the rules-centric model. 97 Legal
analysis, according to this position, involves a nuanced mix of factors, and requires
taking into account institutional dynamics, judicial choice, interest-balancing, public
policy, ideology, and social norms. According to this view, not only are deductive rules
inadequate to capture the full range of the subtle features relevant to legal decisionmaking, such decisions do not actually depend upon formal deductive reasoning
involving formal legal rules. This view also challenges a major premise to Genesereth's,
which takes the inputs to the legal reasoning process as decidable and reified.
3. Mixed Results in Many Computerized Reasoning Projects
The tension between these polar views of legal decision-making helps illustrate
the limited success of actual automated legal reasoning systems. Despite a number of
attempts to implement the idea of automated legal reasoning, there have been decidedly
mixed results in practice. L. Thorne McCarty's pioneering advocacy in the late 1970's for
using computerized reasoning systems to assist in assessing liability under the tax code
was among the early successes. 98 McCarty's intuition was ultimately borne out, as we
now routinely see personal income tax software, such as TurboTax, used in order to
compute legal liability under the personal income tax code.
However, there have been a number of other projects that, while fascinating from
a theoretical level, have not gained traction in the real world.
For example,
mathematician Robert Kowalski and others famously attempted to convert British
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Wilfrid E. Rumble, Jr., American Legal Realism 36 (1968).

96

Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism. Responding to Dean Pound, 44 Harv.

L. Rev. 1222, 1222-24 (1931).
97
See Solum, supra note 6, at 464. Lawrence Solum has termed the view of the law in
which it is seen as primarily indeterminate the "strong indeterminacy" view, and a lesser view of
the law in which it is seen as frequently indeterminate, the "weak indeterminacy" view.

98L. Thorne McCarty, TaxMan: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal
Reasoning, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 837 (1977).
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legislation governing British citizenship into a logic-based computer program, but
encountered several problems of ambiguity and irresolvable competing issues of public
policy.99 Other projects involving attempts to translate the substance of actual statutory
legislation into computerized code, have run into similar problems. I argue that at least
part of discrepancy between those that have largely succeeded, and those that have not, is
due to a lack of a coherent legal theoretical framework for understanding which portions
of the law are likely to be amenable to computerized substantive analysis.
Intuitive Understanding as to Why This is a Hard Problem at all
One way of understanding the limited success of automated legal reasoning
systems is to conclude that the rules-centric view, upon which such systems are premised,
provides an incomplete account of legal decision-making. To make this point, I will
present a simplified overview of the standard critique of the rules-centric view.
H. L. A Hart provides the classic demonstration of the descriptive limits of a
rules-centric view of legal-decision-making. Hart asks us to consider a statute that states,
"No vehicles are allowed in the park."' 00 Under the lay, rules-centric view of legal
decision-making, we might imagine that determining violations of this law would be
fairly straightforward. 101 To assess violations of this statute would be simply a matter of
applying the text of the law to the facts - in this case examining what is entering the park
and deciding whether it is within the prohibited class of "vehicles."
However, as Hart shows, the apparent simplicity of deductive legal analysis, even
under such a seemingly elementary rule, can be deceptive.102 For example, we might
inquire if a person riding a bicycle in the park is violating the law? Most people would
agree that the bicycle is likely a "vehicle," but would simultaneously wonder whether that
was the type of vehicle - likely motor vehicles-that the statute aimed to prohibit.
Similarly, let us take the example of an ambulance driving through the park to rescue an
injured citizen. Again, most people would view this as a literal violation, since an

See M.J. Sergot et al., The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program, in 29 Comm of
the ACM 370 (1986).
99

100

H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593,
607 (1958).

See Frederick Schauer, Thinking Like a Lawyer 13 (2009) ("A widespread popular
conception has it that .. ,.judges make their decisions by consulting books full of . .. rules.
Having found the right rule ..,. the judge proceeds to apply it mechanically to the case at hand,
and that is the end of the matter.").
101

Take for example, the situation in which a person is walking through the park. Is this a
violation of the law? It's hard to make a plausible case that a walking person qualifies as a
"vehicle." Let's take another example of a car driving through the park. Is this a violation of the
law? It is hard to make a plausible case that an automobile is not a vehicle as commonly
understood. In principle, it seems that they lay view is correct and that there is nothing being
done here in the adjudication of liability that computers couldn't, in principle, also do.
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ambulance is motor vehicle, yet they would intuitively think that there was likely an
unstated exception for official emergency vehicles.
The "no vehicles in the park" rule initially appeared to be fairly straightforward to
apply. Yet, a series of atypical facts produced unacceptable results when we employed
strict deductive logic. We can imagine that legal analysis becomes only more
complicated in areas of law where the legal rules do not appear, even superficially, to be
straightforward. For example, provisions within U.S. Constitutional law frequently
contain legal criteria that involve open-ended judgment. The Supreme Court has ruled
that schools can regulate school-sponsored speech "so long as their actions are reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."1 03 It would be hard to imagine a
computerized legal reasoning system, employing only deductive reasoning, reaching a
satisfactory legal determination (or any determination at all) as to whether a pedagogical
concern is "legitimate" under First Amendment jurisprudence.
D. Skepticism ofa Rules-Centric/Formal View of the Law

The point of the Hart example was to highlight that the rules-centric/formalist
view of legal decision-making has easily identifiable limitations as a descriptive model.
Such illustrations undermine claims of the overall ex ante determinability of legal
decisions, and the degree to which the text of statutes themselves can be widely and
deductively dispositive.
Hart's critique parallels a shift in American legal thought over the last one
hundred years away from formal, rules-centric views of legal decision-making. Today,
the dominant view in American legal thought is decidedly (and justifiably) rule-skeptical.
This skepticism is a partially a reaction to over-claiming by Legal Formalist scholars
concerning the determinacy and rules-centric nature of legal decision-making. 104
According to the standard account of this transformation, in the early part of the 2 0 th
century, scholars from within the Legal Formalist tradition proffered a view in which
legal outcomes were entirely the result of mechanical, deductive logical reasoning on the
part of judges. In that perspective, judges arrived at legal conclusions solely by
identifying and applying legal rules to objective facts.' 0 5 A subsequent generation of
scholars from the Legal Realist tradition strongly critiqued the formalist view as nalve,
inaccurate, and non-descriptive of actual legal decision-making. In the wake of these
criticisms, most mainstream scholars soon discarded the early Legal Formalist position as
a non-viable view of legal decision-making.
The modern view of legal analysis is now indelibly infused with the insights and
skepticism from the Legal RealistS.1 06 This rule-skeptical theme was picked up and
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vastly expanded by Critical Legal Studies scholars beginning in the 1970s. Consequently,
today, the formalist view of the law - as closed, formal and rule-centric - is used as a foil
and is quickly dismantled during the typical first year of law school.107 While legal
decision-making appears to entering students as simple matter of judicial automatons
applying laws to facts - something that could be readily replicated in a computer in the
lay conception - the process appears distinctly more complex after legal training.108
Moreover, law training emphasizes that the rules-centric view glosses over important
nuances about the role of the legal system in society. In the rules-centric view, an
official's role is limited to the determination of objectively correct legal answers. By
contrast, students learn that many, perhaps most, legal cases represent true societal
disputes. In that position, officials are not determining objective answers, but rather,
serving the functional role of conclusively electing between the reasonable but
conflicting legal rights and interests of different entities in society.
It has largely been beneficial that the Legal Realist view has come to dominate
American legal thought. The dismantling of the implausible over-claiming by legal
formalists as to the extent of determinacy in the law has led to a more nuanced model as
to how legal outcomes come about. However, there has been one negative side effect of
the dominant realist view. This shift has caused legal scholars to overlook, and perhaps
dismiss, those limited contexts in which the rules-centric description is actually apt.
Since the very essence of modern, American law school education involves the
inculcation of judgment, analysis, and argument in environments of legal uncertainty,
such perspective tends to cause legally trained individuals to overlook the more modest
claim that some, small subsets of legal decisions are actually relatively determinate.109
This view contributes to the perception that automated computerized legal reasoning
systems are unrealistic, because the term "legal analysis" often brings to mind the more
nuanced type of reasoning employed in environments of legal uncertainty routinely
employed by professional attorneys.
But focusing on the issue in terms of the question suggested by that view - "Can
computers come to legal conclusions or engage in legal analysis?" - is possibly confusing
in two ways. It distracts us from the point that, in many respects, this has nothing to do
with the question of legal decision-making specific to computers. A formal legal
analysis, involving facts, using formal deductive reasoning, should be the same whether
conducted by computer or lawyer. The relevant question is not, can computers come to
legal conclusions, but is actually can anybody come to ex ante legal conclusions? In other
76 Cal. L. Rev. 465 (1988) (arguing that "We are all realists now."); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism
About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the FirstAmendment, 375 Duke L.J. (1990)

(describing a common view that when it comes to analysis of Constitutional law, that a legal
realist approach is taken).
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It's probably a fair characterization to say that the general view within the legal
academia and practice today that legal decisions are not determinate. It is unlikely if any
American law professors today would take the early legal formalist position that legal decisions
are always or largely determinate, and are usually the product of mechanized reasoning.
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words, are there parts of the law where one can come to a definitive legal conclusion ex
ante, or is everything hopelessly indeterminate until resolved by an official?" 0 Is the law
composed solely of educated guesses and hedges by lawyers and lay-people, or is there a
realm of approximate legal certainty in prediction that could be properly characterized as
an ex ante legal conclusion?" Larry Solum, Kent Greenawalt and others have provided
theoretical footing for the proposition that legal decisions need not be insolubly
indeterminate. 112
In the next section, I will explore the features that contribute to decisions in a
legal context being relatively more determinate, and explore why certain aspects of
determinacy render a context more amenable to computation. In short, if we take legal
indeterminacy to mean ex ante unpredictability about legal outcomes, we can explore the
various sources that contribute to the indeterminacy. For example, one source of
indeterminacy concerns ex ante uncertainty about which laws, facts, and other
considerations will be brought to bear in the ultimately analysis of liability. This is
reflective of the insight that many of the inputs to the legal process do not in fact become
determined - until a later date in the future - when some official- a judge or finder of fact
- makes this decision. In other words, the applicable law may be a true unknown ex ante
- subject to determination in the future. A legal outcome will be unsuited to deductive
reasoning when the applicable laws and facts that we input to the system are themselves
uncertain and unknown ex ante.
The counterpoint is that, if there actually are legal contexts that share some of the
features of formalist, rules-centric views of legal decision-making - we might imagine
that the particular decisions in those contexts will be incrementally more amenable to
computational analysis. We might say that such contexts exhibit "practical determinacy,"
and suggest that the personal income tax context exemplifies such a context. The
personal income tax context is not perfectly determinate. But it is relatively more
determinate along several potential dimensions of uncertainty than other contexts - so
much so that the indeterminacy can be relatively cabined and formalized and modeled in
a computer system. Thus, that existing automated legal reasoning systems have seen
only limited success is not necessarily about the complete failure of the rules-centric view
of legal decision-making. Rather, it is more likely a story about computationally
modeling the wrong types of laws.

Jules Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, andAuthority, 142 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 549, 559 (1993) ("The question about metaphysical objectiviy. .. is . .. whether [legal
facts] hold .. ,. independently of what all lawyers and judges would think.").
110

"See, supra note 25, making this point about the possibility of objectivity and ex ante
legal "conclusions" in the law.
112

Solum, supra note 6, Greenawalt, supra note 25.
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III. CHARACTERIZING LEGAL DETERMINACY

A. A More Rigorous View of Legal Determinacy
A primary theme of this Article is that under a certain subset of legal conditions many of which are associated in the legal scholarship with the concept of "legal
determinacy" - we can employ computers to come to legal conclusions. In other words,
the extent to which we can employ computers to assess liability in particular contexts will
depend on the degree to which outcomes in that legal context are relatively determinate in
certain ways. The outcomes that I am exploring are all connected to deductive legal
determinacy - which can be thought of as just one part of the general concept of
constrained predictability.
In the previous section, we examined this concept of relative determinacy in an
informal, intuitive fashion. The intuition was that the personal income tax context was
relatively determinate by some measures. I hypothesized that various aspects of this
determinacy permitted computerized analysis.
In this section, I develop a model that aims to capture the idea of legal
determinacy more rigorously. Such a model will allow us to identify that subset of legal
conditions that permit computability. One way of generating determinate legal outcomes
- there are perhaps others - is to have official legal decision-making occur according to a
pre-determined, rule-bound process. If there is an ex ante determinable set of rules, and
if legal decision-making by authoritative officials actually proceeds according to those
rules, and if the application of those rules is constrained under various conditions, we
might characterize legal outcomes under these circumstances as being relatively more
determinate.
It would be helpful to have a means to carefully express the relative degree of
legal determinacy and indeterminacy in differing legal contexts. To this end, I will argue
that the determinacy of legal outcomes in a given context can be best considered through
the framework of the choices available to officials during the legal decision-making
process. These choices occur along every step of the legal decision-making process and
most of them represent predictable types of decisions. They are decisions, for example,
about what laws and other considerations to use in decision-making, and how to apply
them. Importantly, relative determinacy will depend upon the extent to which the
decision-maker's choices are limited in a particular context due to constraints.
We can use these decision-points, or choice-points, as a vocabulary for
characterizing the relative degree of legal determinacy in a given context - i.e., think of
these choice-points as "dimensions of potential indeterminacy." My major claim will thus
be that legal determinacy is a quality that must be assessed along these multiple
dimensions, and my task will be to articulate those dimensions. The more constrained
legal decision-making is in a given context along these dimensions, the more determinate
we say that context is. Before moving to the heart of the model proposed here, I will
address some threshold topics concerning my usage of the terms "legal analysis" and
"legal determinacy" that will aid the reader in understanding the thesis.
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1. Legal Analysis, Outcomes, and Conclusions
What does it mean for an attorney or computer to "come to a legal conclusion?"
This Article uses several concepts interchangeably - legal analysis, legal assessment,
liability assessment, determining legal outcomes or conclusions. It is important to clarify
my usage of these terms. At a high level, these concepts share the same core idea whether there is an "objective"113 (as opposed to persuasive) assessment about whether a
particular set of facts implicates the law, and the likely consequences of such implication.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes famously noted, legal analysis is ultimately an
unofficial prognostication conjectured from the point of view of an official legal
decision-maker.11 4 Holmes said that "a legal duty...is nothing but a prediction that if a
man does or omits certain things he will be made to suffer in this or that way by judgment
of the court." 11 5 Embedded in this observation are three distinct concepts that I will
disentangle: 1) Legal analysis varying with the perspective of who is doing it (e.g.,
officials or non-officials); 2) Legal analysis as a concrete determination or a probabilistic
prediction; 3) The likelihood of enforcement and consequences.
Legal analysis, as a process, has different implications depending upon which
type of legal actor is performing it. We can distinguish two broad categories of legal
actors: those who are official arbiters of the law, and those non-officials who are
regulated by the law. The official arbiters of the law are those legal authorities, most
commonly judges or regulators (although sometimes juries play this role), who have the
official capacity to resolve legal uncertainties, and to officially determine legal liability.
Those regulated by the law most commonly include individuals, and corporate and
government entities.
Because of their ability to officially and definitively resolve legal uncertainties,
we can think of judges and other official arbiters as engaging in the process of making
legal determinations or coming to legal conclusions. Official arbiters can resolve
intermediate legal issues, as well as arrive at ultimate decisions of liability. By contrast,
regulated legal actors can typically only come to probabilistic predictions about
intermediate legal issues, or ultimate questions of liability. Their assessments can be
thought of, as Judge Holmes aptly noted, as forecasts about likely determinations from
officials.
That fact notwithstanding, individuals and corporations, the objects of regulation,
routinely engage in compliance prediction based upon their expected conduct, and
Law students are often taught that legal analysis comes in two flavors "objective
analysis" and "persuasive analysis." Objective analysis means that one is performing the analysis
from the point of an objective third party, while persuasive analysis means that one is in
advocacy role, attempting to influence the outcome in favor of one's client. I mean "objective" in
the first sense, and not in the sense of objective indicating an external, determinable reality. See,
e.g., Julie M. Spanbauer, Teaching First-SemesterStudents That Objective Analysis Persuades, 5
J. Legal Writing Inst. 167 (1999).
113
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modify their behavior accordingly. In many cases, they choose behaviors that they
believe to be clearly compliant with the law. In these instances, it is reasonable to deem
these assessments as determinations of liability, or conclusions of non-liability, even
though, strictly speaking, they are probabilistic predictions with a high likelihood of
occurrence. From a system-wide standpoint, the only actors truly capable of collapsing
legal uncertainty into a legal certainty are the official legal decision-makers like judges or
administrative officials. Thus, I speak of legal analysis as taking place in environments
of varying degrees of probability about likely official outcomes.
To the extent that the probabilities of certain outcomes seem to be high, we can
colloquially refer to these non-official assessments as legal conclusions or
determinations. It is helpful to refer to them as conclusions or determinations, despite the
fact that technically, until passed upon by a determinative legal decision-maker, they are
in fact probabilistic predictions, whose likelihood is simply extremely high. Another way
of thinking about such lay determinations is that, when the likelihood of an official
decision-maker coming to a different result is extremely low, it can be usefully thought of
as a legal conclusion.
2. What is Legal Determinacy?
The term "determinacy" in the law is used in various ways. At its root, legal
determinacy is usually linked to relative certainty or predictability when assessing official
legal outcomes ex ante.116 To the extent that legal decisions are more predictable, we
usually consider them to be relatively more determinate." 7 Conversely, indeterminacy
refers to the degree to which legal determinations are ex ante unpredictable.
There are two interwoven concepts embedded in the idea of determinacy that are
worth disentangling. Determinacy implies ex ante certainty about conclusions concerning
liability. But we can think about two paths for arriving at relative certainty about a
particular legal conclusion: legal conclusions that are certain because they are ex ante
constrained, and legal conclusions whose certainty stems from widespread agreement

about their likelihood because there is only one viable option." 8
The first variant of legal certainty occurs when we think that legal decisionmakers are constrained in the available legal conclusions that they can produce. In this
scenario, officials are limited by formal substantive rules and procedures for generating
legal outcomes. Because the range of outcomes is constrained by the ex ante rule-set, it
becomes relatively easier to predict legal outcomes. In some cases, there may be only
one available outcome under the given constraints. We can call this "constraint-based
determinacy."
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Greenawalt, supra note 25, at 1-5.
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Coleman & Leiter, supra note 109, at 580-585.
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Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 513-14 (1988).
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The other meaning of "legal determinacy" involves certainty in the sense of
widespread agreement about a legal outcome. 119 For example, imagine a scenario in
which liability was predictable not because the outcome was formally constrained by
rules, but because there was simply universal consensus on the likely outcome.
Widespread agreement about a legal outcome might occur simply because one particular
outcome is vastly more plausible or likely than others. In this way, we might say that the
outcome is "determinate" in the sense that is predictable ex ante, but not determinate in
the sense that the outcome is the result of formal rules which constrain analysis. Imagine
a negligence fact pattern in which a defendant caused an accident because he was driving
on the highway while looking away from the road to idly type a routine text message on a
cell phone. There will likely be consensus that this conduct does not meet negligence
law's standard of ordinary care when driving on the highway. The predictability of this
scenario results because, absent other facts, there are no plausible competing arguments.
We might term such a scenario as displaying "consensus determinacy" about the legal
outcome, even if we can't point to a particular rule whose constraint makes this outcome
deductively preordained. I raise this distinction between these two senses of determinacy
only to clarify the scope of this Article's thesis.
This Article is focused upon a particular subset of relatively determinate legal
contexts - contexts where legal outcomes are deductively constrained, rather than simply
consensus-based. In particular, I am attempting to identify the characteristics of contexts
in which official decision-making is so constrained that lay and official determinations
about liability concerning the same facts and laws, are likely to be the same. Such
constraint can occur through legal architectural decisions that remove choice on the part
of legal officials (or make exercising official choice costly), or through policies of
conscious forbearance on the part of legal officials in challenging reasonable assessments
made by laypersons.
We can therefore think about legal determinacy as predictive agreement between
officials and laypersons about the outcome of legal decision-making. To illustrate this
point, at one extreme we could envision a legal system in which official liability
determinations were explicitly linked to a highly objective, constrained and predictable
legal rule with little substantive regulatory value. Joseph Singer offers the example of a
legal system in which official liability decisions are always determined by the following
rule, "The defendant is never liable."1 20 Such a rule would be entirely ex ante legally
determinate - laypersons predicting the outcome ex ante and officials constrained by the
rule, would always come to the same result.
Nonetheless, if we agree that a major purpose of law is to influence human
behavior in desirable ways, from a usefulness standpoint, such a law would clearly fail.
The point is that law is ultimately a human creation that in principle could be made
completely determinate, if not always usefully so. Relative determinacy is an artifact of
the way in which laws are architected to trade off between the often conflicting goals of
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Greenawalt, supra note 25, at 1-5.
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See Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards. Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94

Yale L.J. 1, 9-12 (1984).
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predictability and legal certainty, and the substantive goals of regulating behavior
flexibly, fairly, and effectively in an unpredictable and complex world.
3. The Concept of Variable Legal Determinacy
A major theme underlying this Article is that legal determinacy varies along a
continuum among legal contexts in describable ways. It might seem to be a contradictory
use of the term "determinacy" to claim that one can characterize it along a spectrum.
After all, determinacy is often used as a synonym for "certainty," and the notion of
"certainty" has a dichotomous sense to it - e.g. things are either certain or they are
uncertain. Similarly, to say that legal outcomes in one context tend to be more
determinate relative to another context might appear to be a strange use of the term.
Nonetheless, I argue that it is useful to characterize legal determinacy as relative concept
that exists along a spectrum rather than as a binary concept. As Larry Solum has
suggested, most legal decisions are neither fully ex ante determinate, nor fully
indeterminate, but reside in a middle set in which legal decisions are "underdetermined."121 I aim to draw out particular features that allow us to situate legal
decision-making closer or further from the various poles within this under-determined
spectrum. In comparing the personal income tax context to the First Amendment free
speech context, we do not say that one is determinate and the other is not, but rather legal
outcome under one appear relatively more determinate than under the other.
Determinacy and indeterminacy are correlative concepts that trade off on a sliding
scale.
B. Idealized FormalistModel PreliminaryConcepts
In this section I develop a theoretical model for characterizing the concept legal
determinacy. I call this the "idealized formalist model," and use it to find a way to
descriptively capture the idea that legal outcomes are relatively more determinate in some
legal contexts than in others. Such a model will serve as a foundation for understanding
which legal contexts will be amenable to automation, and why.
The idealized formalist model is guided by the following thought experiment:
How determinate would a legal context have to be, and in what ways, for computers to be
able to arrive at legal conclusions for a given set of facts? What assumptions about the
determinacy of laws, facts, and how legal decisions are generated in a context would have
to be in place in order to render a legal decision automatable?
We can think of the computer question as a framing device that has the effect of
placing the concept of determinacy in sharp relief. Given the specificity with which
inputs have to be crafted for deterministic computers, issues of indeterminacy rise to the

121
See Solum, supra note 6, at 473 (Discussing that most legal contexts involve neither fully
determinate decisions, nor fully indeterminate, but rather a larger category of under-determined
decisions. In the under-determined context, the legal official is neither fully constrained, but
neither fully unconstrained, instead she has a range of constrained choices).
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forefront. 122
Legal contexts that approximate the theoretical characteristics of
determinacy in the idealized model will be the most amenable to automation.
The idealized formalist model is so named, because it is loosely based upon views
of legal decision-making propounded by early theorists from the legal formalist school of
thought. 123 Any discussion of legal formalism is complicated by the fact that there are
numerous distinct views that fall under this rubric, as well as several distinct and
unrelated concepts suggested by the term.124 I therefore call my model an idealized
model because it does not represent the particular view of any scholar or branch of legal
formalist theorists. 125 Rather, it is somewhat like the Platonic ideal of legal analysis that
is typically associated with the early formalist school of thought. As typical early
formalist models are no longer viewed as descriptively robust, it is important to note that
I use it here mostly as a convenient framework for invoking commonly known concepts,
rather than suggesting that the model has independent normative or explanatory value in
contemporary law.
I will ultimately argue that legal contexts that approximate the idealized formalist
model will be more deductively determinate, and hence, more amenable to ex ante
computerized analysis. This model will give us a functional means of assessing the
relative degree of legal determinacy in a given context.

1. Some Concepts Associated With Legal Formalism
Preliminarily, it is helpful to explore some core concepts underlying formalism
that justify the structure of my model. In the sense used here, legal formalism describes a
particular model for describing the generation of legal outcomes.126 Formalism involves
a view about how legal actors generate conclusions about liability in particular factual
* * 127
situations.

Michael Sipser, Introduction to the Theory of Computation (1997) (discussing
determinate finite state automata).
122

See Langdell, supra note 5, at 20-21, for a famous example of legal formalist reasoning.
In that case, determination as to whether a contract had been formed under the "mailbox rule"
involved little more than 1) finding the rule - in this case, the famous "mailbox rule" that states
that if there is a contract offer, and the offeree places the acceptance letter in the mailbox, then the
contract is formed at that instant, 2) finding the facts - in the example, there was an offer and the
acceptance letter was placed in the mailbox, and 3) applying the law to the facts using deductive
logic -namely, the conclusive determination that the contract had been formed under the
"mailbox rule" when the acceptance was placed in the mailbox.
123

Pierre Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95
Iowa L. Rev. 195, 20 1-04 (2009).
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This is not intended to be a comprehensive overview of legal formalism.
16Leiter,

127

supra note 5, at 1141-42.
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If we think of the idealized formalist model as a model of legal outcome
generation, it is useful to divide the model into two conceptual phases. The first phase is
concerned with identifying the "inputs" to the legal outcome generation process.
Potential law inputs include official sources of law (e.g. statutes, administrative
regulations, judicial opinion, constitutional provisions) and penumbral law-like
considerations and norms (e.g. public policies, lawmaker intent, principles, values).
Inputs also include factual determinations ranging from relatively objective facts (e.g.
temperature), to value-based or discretion-based factual criteria (e.g. bad faith conduct).
This first conceptual phase emphasizes that legal decision-making in any given instance
requires a threshold determination about what should be included or excluded in the
process. This brings the focus to assumptions and constraints that any legal decisionmaking model has made about the range of appropriate inputs, as well assumptions about
how determinate such input selections are ex ante.
Having identified the inputs, the second conceptual phase of formalist decisionmaking involves the application of the law inputs to the factual inputs. We separate this
phase to highlight the fact that any model contains assumptions about the appropriate
range of processes for generating legal decisions (e.g. decision-making according to a
defined mode of inference, such as deductive or analogical reasoning). It also brings to
focus any assumptions the model has about the relative resolvability in applying laws to
facts using this decision-generating process.
Generating legal assessments can be thought of at a broad level as the process of
identifying appropriate and relevant inputs, and applying those inputs through an
analytical process to reach a legal conclusion.128
It is important to emphasize three main assumptions often associated with
formalist decision-making:
1) The ability to filter applicable from inapplicable inputs to the legal
outcome generation process ex ante;
2) An emphasis on "form," which implies a focus on
ex ante reified and explicit inputs over implicit inputs;
3) Legal decision-making proceeding according to rules. 129
Loosely speaking, the process of filtering involves the separating potentially
applicable laws and facts into a definitive subset of laws and facts that actually apply to a
given factual scenario. Legal decisions are made based upon this determined subset.
Decision-making according to rules implies determinacy about the outcome when laws

In later sections, I explore challenges to this view of legal decision-making from scholars.
One strain challenges the assumption that legal decisions are usually, or always the process of a
structured process for decision-making. The other strain challenges the degree to which legal
decisions -especially by judges -are actually meaningfully constrained by limitations.
128

Schauer, supra note 117, at 510 ("At the heart of the word 'formalism'
concept of decision making according to rule.").
129

37

. ..

lies the

The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review

Vol. XII

2011

are ultimately applied to fact. 130 These formalist assumptions will be explored in more
depth below.
2. The Tripartite Idealized Formalist Model
Under our stylized version of the legal formalist view, conclusions about legal
liability in particular factual situations involve three main steps131
1) Determining and ascertaining the applicable laws;
2) Determining and ascertaining the applicable facts; and then
3) Applying the law to the facts using deductive logic
to generate conclusions about liability. 132
This model will give us a framework for characterizing and articulating the
relative degree of legal determinacy in legal contexts. We must first imagine that our
idealized formalist model is capable of producing ex ante determinate outcomes.
Working backwards from this premise, we can identify those assumptions about the law
and legal decision-making that would have to hold for such a model to produce legal
decisions that were actually ex ante determinate.
Thus, these three steps will serve as a framework for identifying and organizing
those assumptions that are necessary components of legal determinacy.133 Having
identified these determinate assumptions, we can then characterize the relative legal
determinacy of legal outcomes in an actual legal context by the extent to which that
context adheres to or departs from these reference assumptions. 134 We can use this
model as a comparator for asking in what ways actual decision-making in particular
contexts - such as the personal income tax context - is different or similar to this
idealized determinate model? This will be our approach for characterizing relative legal
determinacy.
3. Idealized Formalist Model and Filtering
What underlying assumptions about legal decision-making would have to hold for
our model to produce determinate legal outcomes? In our model, we generate legal
outcomes by applying the laws to the facts via deductive reasoning. I preliminarily assert
130

d
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Schaeur, supra note 100, at 124-26.

Frank, supra note 5, at 648-49 (characterizing legal formalism as a mathematical
formula "Rule times Facts =Decision").
132
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See Langdell, supra note 5, at 20-21.

The uniting theme for each of these formalist assumptions is that each has a flavor of ex
ante certainty about the structure, process, and outcome of legal analysis.
134
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that to produce determinate outcomes we must have a process for uniquely identifying, ex
ante, the set of legal rules that will govern the legal decision in any given factual
circumstance. Why this assumption? If we did not have such a means of ex ante uniquely
identifying the applicable legal rules, or if the legal rules were unpredictable or
changeable ex ante, our model would produce differing outcomes depending on the legal
rules ultimately selected by an official. An ex ante unpredictable set of legal rules would
be incapable of producing determinate legal outcomes.
At some point, in making a legal determination, a legal actor will have to separate
out, from the universe of potential laws and facts, the particular ones that he will actually
use in his assessment. How determinate is this filtering process for making distinctions?
A core assumption underlying formalist decision-making is that there exists such a
determinate process for ex ante filtering law or factual inputs, from the larger set of
potentially applicable law or factual inputs.135 For example, when performing legal
analysis in the personal income tax context, the assumption is that there is some
determinate means of identifying the relevant laws (e.g. tax laws), and disregarding those
deemed inapplicable (e.g. building code laws).
The requirement of an ex ante
determinable set of laws and facts seems to presume that the relevant, legitimate, and
necessary legal inputs can be separated out from the larger universe of laws and facts.136
C. CharacterizingLegal Determinacy
1. Assumption - "Determining the Applicable Laws"
The first assumption relating to legal determinacy concerns the extent to which
there is an objective and identifiable set of legal rules that govern legal analysis under a
particular factual situation, and the extent to which a legal decisionmaker can ex ante
determine these rules. We can think of this filtering of laws as occurring on two levels of
abstraction. The first, higher level identifies categories of legal inputs that are considered
appropriate at all for consideration in making legal determinations in particular contexts.
At this high-level, there are going to be criteria, explicit or assumed as to which types of
norms (e.g., positive laws versus background principles) can be legitimately considered
in the legal determination process generally. A second, lower level of filtering involves
determining the actual laws that govern a particular factual situation.
a. Screening: Separating Law from Non-Law, Legal Positivism
Legal determinacy seems to require that legal decision-making occurs according
to an ex ante determinable set of legal rules. Let us suppose that a model of legal
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Schauer, supra note 117, at 510.

Leiter, supra note 5 (asserting the notion commonly associated with formalism that
legal reasoning proceeds through the process of applying logic to objective facts and objective,
unambiguous rules).
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decision-making must identify categories of legal inputs that are not valid for legal actors
to consider in the decision-making process. Within the framework of the idealized
formalist model of determinate decision-making, it appears that a legal official should
consider only legally positive laws.
Let us call the process of officially specifying, identifying and cordoning off from
legal officials invalid considerations "screening." 137 Legal-positivism frames one
dimension along which legal inputs can be screened under the idealized formalist model.
Brian Leiter helpfully clarifies the conceptual commingling between the concepts of
formalism and positivism. Leiter notes that formalism is a theory of legal decisionmaking, whereas positivism is a theory about the nature of law - what does and should
count as law, and ways in which society distinguishes "law" from "non-law."13 8 Under
our idealized formalist model, we can draw this distinction along positivist lines,
recognizing such positive rules as the only valid source of law for legal decision-making.
Such a distinction fits with our threshold assumption that one must be able to
identify the set of possible rules that count as law and be able to separate those from
others that we do not consider valid law, to have a determinable set of rules.1 39 Under the
positivist view most closely associated with H.L.A. Hart - there is a principle for
unambiguously identifying certain rules and norms as laws and others as "non-laws."
Under this view, a rule or norm can only become a law by following the officially
sanctioned lawmaking processes of the applicable legal system (e.g., enactment by vote
of an elected legislature). 140 Any directive, rule or norm, that does not follow the
officially sanctioned lawmaking procedure - the "criteria of legality" or "rule of
recognition" - is unambiguously a "non-law" under the legal positivist view.141
The classic example of such a lookalike, non-positive directive is "natural law" a normative assertion about what the law should be - frequently rooted in moral,
philosophical, or religious justifications - but which does not have the official pedigree of
a legal rule.142 Other variants on non-positive norms are "general principles of law" such
as justice or fairness, customary practices, and social norms. Frequently these nonpositive statements have the typical rhetorical form of positive laws (e.g., "No person
shall pay income taxes because taxation is wrongful stealing by the government.")
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Schauer, supra note 117, at 510.

See Leiter, supra note 5, at 1141-42 (distinguishing positivism as a "theory of law" and
formalism as a "theory of adjudication").
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139Id
10Hart, supra note 31, at 100-20. Hart called this officially sanctioned law-making process
the "Rule of Recognition."
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See Leiter, supra note 5, at 1141.
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Brian H. Bix, NaturalLaw Theory, in A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal
Theory 223-25 (1996) (Aquinas distinguished positive law from natural law on the ground that
positive law is "determined" in the sense that human discretion has made natural law specific and
concrete.).
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Despite the resemblance in form to positive laws, according to this view, such norms are
decidedly non-laws if they have not emerged through the official lawmaking process.
Under our idealized formalist model screening assumption, these non-laws would not be
legitimate candidates for determining legal outcomes, because we have no clear means of
identifying them like we do positive laws.
Underlying this idea is what might be called the assumption of separability in the
idealized formalist model. The determinate model seems to require that legal officials be
able to, ex ante, clearly separate law from non-law by some objective metric.143 Our legal
decision-maker who is attempting to define a determinable set of governing legal rules
must have some means of delimiting the relevant set of laws from the larger (potentially
infinite) set of hypothetically applicable norms. This assumption that it is possible for a
legal official to unambiguously separate valid law from invalid non-law has been termed
the "separability thesis."1 44 While legal positivism's principle is not the only such
demarcating standard, arguably, it appears to provide a relatively administrable one, and
for reasons to be explained shortly, stands as a likely pre-condition for the realistic
generation of consistently determinate legal outcomes.
b. Screening: Separating Penumbral, Law-Like Considerations
To produce determinate outcomes under the model, it further seems that legal
decision-makers can only consider the text of positive laws, and not the penumbral
aspects that are derivative of positive laws. Penumbral considerations of a statute include
items such as underlying legislative intent, purposes, or public policies that likely
animated its enactment. 145 Such penumbral considerations arguably represent a grey area
not fully addressed by legal-positivism's recognition principle. From a legal positivist
perspective, these penumbral considerations are arguably within the realm of legitimate
positivist considerations - at least compared to natural law - because legislative purposes
and intent are actually derivative of positive laws that have emerged from the official
lawmaking process. However, like natural law, it is typically difficult to specific, with
precision, ex ante the content of such penumbral considerations. Similar to non-positive
laws, penumbral considerations are often implicit, and have not themselves explicitly
gone through the recognition process (e.g., legislatures do not always vote explicitly and
separately on a specific legislative purpose or motivating problem for every given statute
that is enacted, nor do they necessarily explicitly include the motivations that produced
each individual legal rule or provision). 146

Id. (describing the positivist "Separability Thesis" as "What the law is and what the law
ought to be are separate questions").
143
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See Leiter, supra note 5, at 1141-42.

I label these considerations "penumbral" because, although they are derivative of a
positive law -a statute -they loom implicitly in the background.
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Although this is not typical conduct, there are some statutes that do have explicit
statements of legislative purpose.
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Nonetheless, it is typical for legal decision-makers to have common or specific
knowledge about the goals, problem, or purposes that likely animated a given statute. An
official could in principle take into account these implicit, penumbral considerations such
as likely legislative purpose, along with the explicit content of statutory laws, in arriving
at a legal decision.147 Employing such penumbral considerations - despite their
implicitness - might inform a different result than the strict application of only the text of
positive rules.
Determinacy under the idealized formalist model seems to require that such
penumbral considerations - such as the underlying legislative intent or animating public
policy - be screened from the legal decision-making process.148 As Frederick Schauer
states, "[f]ormalism is the way in which rules achieve their 'ruleness' precisely by ...
screening off from a decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would
otherwise take into account."149 Under textual-interpretive formalism only the text of a
positive statute, and its "plain meaning" is to be considered in the process. 5 0 Penumbral
considerations, despite their relevance in providing context, must not be considered in
formalist decision-making due to typical uncertainties about their legal pedigree and
meaning. Indeed, inadequate consideration of context is the sense in which the term
"formal" is typically used as a critique, rather than as a descriptive category. When we
criticize a judicial decision as overly "formal" we often mean that the judge has screened
from consideration some potentially relevant consideration such as context or legislative
purpose that would have painted a more nuanced picture of the substance, and has
instead, focused on certain explicit and positive legal inputs that have passed the
screening process. 1s1 The major problem is that the validity and relevance of any given
penumbral consideration is typically highly contestable, and their usage by officials ad
hoc, making them unlikely candidates for an objective, ex ante determinable rule set.
The degree to which such contestable considerations play an influential role in official
decision-making in a given context, will likely result in decreased determinacy of
outcomes.
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soDuncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in 13 The International Encyclopedia of the Social
and Behavioral Sciences 8634 (2001).
Schauer, supra note 117, at 510. Schauer also notes that formalism is often used to
critique a style of decision-making in which judges characterize the adherence to form over
substance as one of compulsion, rather than choice.
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c. Screening: Explicit and Reified Laws Over the Implicit
Under the model, determinacy seems to require that a legal decision-maker only
employ legal rules whose form and content is unambiguously, ex ante determinable.152
Note that being able to unambiguously determine the form and content of a legal rule is
distinct from being able to determine its ultimate meaning. Thus, an underlying formalist
assumption involves the favoring of explicit considerations over those norms or
considerations whose substantive content is implicit or inconclusive. Previously we
termed a law positive based upon the official nature of its pedigree - whether it was the
product of a societal rule of recognition and met the criteria of legality. But there is
another dimension along which we occasionally term a law positive, and that is based
upon the explicitness of its form and content. We sometimes call a rule "positive" in this
sense to the extent to which we can distinctly point out and disambiguate the content of
the rule, most commonly because it is fixed in written form in some authoritative text.153
Let us call a rule "reified" if our requirement is that the form and content of the
legal rule be embodied in some explicit, fixed, and identifiable form such as text. In the
classic framing of the idea of reification, Jeremy Bentham stated that "laws" must be
"conceived...always in determinate words."1 54 This is a distinct, but common use of the
phrase "positive" as applied to laws, norms, and other legal considerations.' 5 5 If a model
is to produce determinate legal outcomes, the ability to ex ante determine the form and
content of the legal inputs is a prerequisite assumption. Statutes are the epitome of
reified positive form - because we can point to them distinctly, and their content is fixed
in written form in an authoritative text. By contrast, general principles - such as justice are said to exist within the law, but often as broad overlay concepts, and not as reified
objects of explicit form.1 56 General principles are often neither clearly identifiable in
content, nor have a single, unambiguously agreed-upon form.
We saw that legal principles and penumbral considerations are, as a matter of
threshold determination, excluded as legal inputs from the idealized formalist model. A
second reason for excluding these under the model is that the content of these inputs is
not often ex ante determinable or determinate. Take for example, the public policies
underlying a particular statute. Laws are often animated by multiple, sometimes
conflicting, public policies. These animating public policies are often implicit, rather
than explicit in the text of the law. Imagine that a legal decision-maker would like to use
a particular public policy as a consideration in the decision-making process. This would
require the narrowing and identification of the public policy into a particular identifiable
152

It is worth re-emphasizing that I mean determinate in the precise manner of deductively,

textually formally determinate.
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Anthony Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence 30-31 (1998).
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Webster's Third New International Dictionary (2002) (defining "positive" as
"[p]rescribed by express enactment .. ,. expressed clearly or certainly").
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form. Because animating public policies are often broad, disagreed upon, and implicit, it
would be difficult to ex ante, determine the form, scope, and weight, of such a public
policy consideration. Because of that inability to determine its form and meaning, such a
non-determinable consideration would be at odds with determinate legal decisionmaking.
The same issue concerning reification occurs if a legal decision-maker were to
factor in legislative intent as a consideration in decision-making. It is usually difficult to
determine, ex ante the form and content of legislative intent. Legislative intent is often
implicit, multidimensional, and not reducible to any one particular, objective form. This
is primarily due to the problem of drawing particular conclusions concerning the
"collective intent" of legislatures composed of multiple individuals with differing goals
and motives. 157 Like non-positive norms, and unlike positive statutes, there is typically
not a single, fixed, undisputed form and content for these penumbral considerations.
Rather, one will typically be able to elect from a range of plausible arguments as to the,
sometimes inconsistent, legislative intent underlying a statute.
Similarly, the holding of a case, while positive with regard to its pedigree as a
source of law, might not be sufficiently reified to count as an input for the idealized
formalist model.158 Case holdings are often implicit, rather than explicit. Implicit
holdings are descriptions of particular facts that were decided in particular ways for
particular reasons. It is rarer that holdings are explicit, as rules articulated specifically by
the court (e.g., "Today we hold that . . ."). The problem is that the form and content of

implicit holdings are often capable of being formulated later, at varying, plausible
degrees of generality. Thus, the precise content of an implicit holding may not be
unambiguously defined ex ante. By contrast, the form and content of a statute is reified
and ex ante determinable, even if we imagine that the full scope of its meaning might not
be.
In sum, if our model is to produce ex ante determinate legal decisions according
to our model, there must be an ex ante determinable and objective set of legal rules that
govern the analysis. To the extent that rules that we use are not ex ante reified - in other
words, to the extent that there can be a threshold debate about what those rules are, and
what their form and content consist of - this undermines the ability to produce
determinate legal outcomes.
d. Determining Applicable Laws in Particular Factual Situations
Given a particular factual scenario, a legal decision-maker must ultimately
determine which of the potentially applicable laws or norms actually governs that
particular fact pattern. The previous section described the threshold screen presumed by
the idealized formalist model -and ability to screen the appropriate types (e.g., positive

57Greenawalt,

supra note 25, at 20-21.

18Legal dcsos are "positive" according to Hart to the extent that they have been created
through an official lawmaking procedure, such as judicial common law. Judicial common law
rules are simply separate, official sources of law from legislative rules. H.L.A. Hart, The
Concept of Law 98-100 (1961).
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statutes) of legal inputs envisioned by the model, from the larger universe of types of
potential legal inputs (e.g., natural laws, legislative purpose) to legal decision-making.
Let us imagine that a legal decision-maker has gone through the screening stage
described above.
Even if we have screened our potentially applicable legal
considerations to the subset of positive, reified legal inputs, there must still be a
determination as to which of those positive, reified laws actually governs a particular set
of facts before the legal decision-maker. Again, theoretical determinacy seems to require
that there be an objective means for determining which laws, of all those in force,
actually govern the facts presented. If there was significant uncertainty about whether
particular laws did or did not apply, we could not say that legal officials were making
their decisions on the basis of an ex ante determinable set of rules.
Here we examine the following question: given a factual scenario, what are the
applicable laws, and how determinate is it that given and particular legal rules apply? If
we are assessing an automobile accident, which laws govern? Is it tort law, contract law,
insurance law, vehicular laws, space law, or some combination of those? If we are
assessing personal income tax liability, which body or bodies of law potentially or
definitively govern given the facts? Within those bodies of law, which particular legal
rules, doctrines or provisions, in turn govern?
We can think of this law-filtering as occurring at two points. First, we can think
of filtering out entire bodies of law (e.g., tort law, contract law, space law) that appear
inapplicable to a given situation, and identifying bodies of law that appear applicable.1 59
Similarly, even within identified bodies of law, there is the assumption that we can
identify applicable sub-rules and provisions. Implied in this idea is the view that legal
contexts and legal rules are logically isolatable from the larger universe of possible laws
with respect to given factual situations. For a system to produce determinate legal
outcomes, there must be the assumption that "the governing legal rules" can be
objectively determined given the facts as inputs to the decision-making process. To the
extent that the governing laws or bodies of law are debatable or unclear in a given
instance, this casts doubt on the ability to produce determinate legal outcomes.
e. Single Governing Legal Rule Per Issue
In identifying the laws that govern a particular factual situation, if we are to
produce determinate outcomes, there is the embedded assumption that for each legal

Thomas Grey identified two distinct components to this formality of structure in the
legal formalist mode. See Grey, supra note 65, at 10-18. The first is that the laws are somewhat
formally structured into bodies of lawx, rules within bodies of lawx, and elements within rules.
Today, this view persists in the modern law, although not to the strong extent of perfectly
orthogonal geometrical ordering of laws and rules envisioned by formalists like Langdell. The
second aspect of formality of structure, what Grey calls "conceptual order," is no longer part of
mainstream legal thought. "Conceptual order" refers to the idea that all legal rules, like
mathematical geometry, should be formally deducible from a small number of axiomatic legal
principles. While appealing to formalists of Langdell' s era, this view is no longer seen as
plausible, nor is it widely shared. I should therefore emphasize that this aspect of conceptual
order is not part of the modern idealized formalist model for the purposes of this Article.
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issue, there must be but a single, governing legal rule. In other words, we must assume
that there do not exist multiple, legal rules, each of which could potentially be applied to
provide an alternative legal conclusion on an issue. Otherwise, if there were multiple
legal rules under which each the legal question could be resolved, then one could not
know, ex ante, which of the rules would be the one that was ultimately applied. Thus,
there is determinacy in the governing rule to the extent that there exists a single, clearly
identifiable controlling law and which correspondingly implies the absence of choice on
the part of the decision-maker among multiple applicable laws. 160
f. Linking Positivism, Formalism, and Legal Determinacy
The earlier discussion articulated central assumptions concerning the ex ante
determinability of the form, content, and applicability of laws that must hold if the
idealized formalist model is to produce determinate outcomes. If determinate legal
outcomes are indeed generated by applying laws employing deductive logic (an
assumption to be explored shortly), then those performing legal analysis must be able to
identify those applicable rules, and there must be agreement about those laws that apply
and their form and content.
As the above section suggests, there is a link between legal positivism, legal
formalism, and legal determinacy that it is helpful to explicitly reiterate and articulate.
As used here, idealized formalism is a view of legal-decision-making based upon the
notion that legal officials generate legal conclusions constrained by some fixed,
objective, and ex ante determinable set of laws.
How do legal officials identify the set of considerations that they should employ
in arriving at a legal decision? After all, there is a rather large universe of potential
considerations - statutory laws, natural laws and principles, context purpose - that a legal
official could employ in his decision. Legal positivism provides one principle by which
legal officials can carve out a determinable, and relatively well-defined category of
considerations - positive laws - from the large universe of possible considerations.
Finally, my contention is that, all things being equal, legal determinacy is
generally increased when we have a context in which can ex ante identify the legal rules
that will actually be employed by legal decision-makers. If we have two legal contexts,
one in which the governing rule-set is relatively fixed, objective, and identifiable, and the
other in which the rule-set is ad hoc, inconsistent, or subject to determination ex post by
an official on a case-by-case basis, it is more likely (but not necessary) that legal
decisions in the former will tend to be marginally more determinate. As I have used it,
legal determinacy is concerned with constraint-based predictability on the part of legal
officials. 161 It is hard to claim that legal outcomes are going to be ex ante predictable by

See, e.g., John Hasnas, Back to the Future. From CriticalLegal Studies Forwardto
Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the IndeterminacyArgument, 45 Duke L.J. 84,
160

84-85 (1995) (showing that legal decision-makers often must choose between many plausible
legal choices).
11See

Singer, supra note 121, at 1-12.
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non-officials, when it is not clear which considerations will ultimately be officially
applied.
Similarly, all things being equal, we should expect legal determinacy to be
generally increased when we can uncontestably identify the content of a legal rule. Legal
positivism's association with reified legal inputs - statutory declarations - should
ultimately have the effect of making less contestable what a law says. Clearly this is a
different proposition from what a law means, what was intended to mean, which can and
often is a source of indeterminacy. While there is room to debate the meaning of a
statute, there is typically much less room to debate the statute's form. The form of the
rule is apparent from the text of the statute and relatively incontrovertible in form (but not
necessarily meaning). By contrast, legal authority that is not reified in a fixed text - for
example, legislative purpose - there is room to debate both the form of the rule and, upon
electing a form, its ultimate meaning. Thus, we would expect the reification of a law in a
fixed, explicit, authoritative text, should have the overall effect of constraining legal
outcomes in the contexts where they are applicable.
Another way of considering the relationship between determinacy, formalism, and
positivism is by framing it in terms of choice. 162 As previously noted, theorists often
characterize indeterminacy in terms of explicit or implicit choices available to legal
decision-makers in making legal determinations. 163 To the extent that legal decisionmakers have greater choice in the available rules or paths to various legal outcomes, there
will be relatively more legal indeterminacy. By contrast, legal determinacy implies the
relative absence of choice available to legal decision-makers in arriving at legal
determinations. Formalism and positivism can be thought of as models of legal decisionmaking and laws respectively, in which the possibility of explicit choices available to
legal decision-makers has been reduced ex ante.
2. Assumption - "What are the Applicable Facts?"
In this next section, I will explore a variety of assumptions concerning the ability
to separate, identify, and assess legal facts that would be have to hold in a model that
purported to produce determinate legal outcomes.
a. Determining Applicable Facts in a Particular Factual Situations
If the idealized formalist model purports to produce determinate legal outcomes,
then there are several embedded assumptions related to the filtering of "legal facts."
Again, let us suppose that we are applying the idealized formalist model to a particular
factual situation to arrive at a legal outcome. The previous section discussed assumptions
concerning the ability to filter applicable from non-applicable laws. Given a particular
factual situation, there are analogous issues about the ability to determinately filter
applicable from non-applicable facts.
162

See Kennedy, supra note 151, at 8634-36.
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See Singer, supra note 119, at 1-12.
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Under a particular factual situation, a whole host of available "facts" could
potentially be brought to bear on the issue. Ultimately a legal decision-maker must focus
on a particular subset of facts, from the broader set of potentially applicable facts under
that scenario. In order to produce determinate outcomes, there is the embedded idea that
there is some objective means of separating and filtering the relevant from the nonrelevant facts under the laws, in any given instance.
b. Measurability of Facts
The idealized formalist model contains the assumption that it is possible to
objectively determine what facts actually occurred in a given situation. Similarly, there is
also the assumption that the facts that occurred can accurately be measured or determined
in a meaningful way.
3. Assumption - "Applying the Law to the Facts"
The third and final step of the idealized formalist model of legal analysis assumes
the applicable laws and the applicable facts have been ascertained. Once ascertained, the
final step involves applying the applicable laws to the relevant facts to determine
substantive liability. This step, as well, contains several determinate assumptions about
the process of legal analysis.
a. Legal Decisions Generated According to Formal Mode of Analysis
For legal decisions to be determinate under the model, they must be generated
according to a constrained, determined process. Constrained legal analysis implies that
authoritative legal actors are producing legal outcomes by applying the identified laws to
the identified facts, through some particular, acceptable mode of legal inference (e.g.,
deductive, inductive, analogical, or instrumental reasoning). By contrast, it is possible
that legal decision-makers are generating legal outcomes by some process other than
constrained legal analysis, or by no process at all. The greater the extent to which legaldecision-making occurs according to an ex ante and defined, structured and predictable
process, the more determinate the outcomes under that process will be. By contrast, the
greater the extent to which legal decision-making occurs according to an ad hoc process
or no process at all, the less determinate those outcomes will be.164 The idealized
formalist model assumes that all legal decisions made under the model occur through the
process of constrained legal analysis.

164
See Frank, supra note 5, at 648-63. Frank and other realists have been caricatured as
holding the view that legal decisions can be so indeterminate as to depend upon what a 'judge
had for breakfast." E.g., Dworkin, supra note 5 at 36 (noting that many factors lead to legal
indeterminacy, despite the decision-maker operating within the constraints of legal formalism).
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b. Deductive Reasoning as the Mode of Inference
In the idealized formalist model, deductive reasoning is the mode of inference that
determines liability. Even if we assume that legal actors are indeed generating legal
decisions according to constrained, inferential analysis, there is a choice about which of
the acceptable mode of inference legal officials can use: deductive, inductive, analogical,
or instrumental reasoning. The assumption underlying the idealized formalist model and
its production of determinate legal outcomes, is that deductive logic is the only available
mode of inference.
As described earlier, deductive reasoning is the application of formal deductive
logic in order to generate conclusions that necessarily follow from the premises. Implicit
in this idea in formalism is the notion that the only reasoning necessary in order to come
to the correct legal conclusion is the application of deductive logic.1 65 Having been
supplied with the relevant laws, and the relevant facts, the job of the legal decision-maker
- the judge or the lawyer attempting to determine liability - is simply to mechanically
apply the laws of deductive logic
c. Focus on ex-post rather than ex-ante view
Legal decision-makers such as judges can view legal determinations from two
differing time perspectives - the ex post, and the ex ante viewpoints.166 Judges are most
often considering a set of facts that occurred in the past, between the particular litigants
before the court.167 This can be termed the ex post view. However, in the common-law
system of lawmaking, the decisions in particular cases - the holdings - become rules that
govern future decisions through the principles of precedent and stare decisis. 168 Thus,
judges can look at legal decisions from the point of view of the rule that will work best in
future cases. We can term this the ex ante view, because it is considering the outcome in
the current case from the perspective of its governing impact on future incidents that
haven't yet happened, but may occur.
Depending upon the viewpoint taken, this can dramatically affect the likely
outcome. A holding which benefits future litigants might come at the expense of fairness
to the current litigants.169 Similarly, legal analysis under certain facts, when applied
See Grey, supra note 65, at 16 ("[T]he application of legal rules to individual fact
situations in the decision of cases was then like the application of geometric theorems to solve
practical problems of measurement.").
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16See

Farnsworth, supra note 8,at 3-11 (2007), fo nexcellent discussion of this issue.

main exception to this involves decisions concerning injunctions involving likely
future behavior. Various doctrines, including standing, prevent the court from considering factual
circumstances involving parties other than the litigants before the court.
17The

18See Farnsworth, supra note 82, at 3-11.

See id. for an example of a bank robbery gone awry in which the bank teller refuses to
hand over $5000. As a result of this, a customer is shot and killed. If the customer sues the bank
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literally under deductive logic, might produce undesirable rules going forward. This
forward-looking, ex ante best approach is often termed "instrumentalism" or
"functionalism."1 70 The idealized formalist model assumes that such forward-looking,
instrumental analysis cannot be part of the legal decision-making process. If it were, the
legal outcome would be determined by something other than an explicit, ex ante reified
law. Rather, decisions under the idealized formalist model are based upon the deductive
application of the applicable laws to the applicable facts, despite the implications of the
decision going forward.
d. Forebearance in Review and Nonattendance to Exceptions
A well-known problem in jurisprudence is that the text of governing laws is often
overinclusive and underinclusive relative to the behavior that is intended to be
regulated.' 7 ' For every law, there are going to be circumstances where the literal text of
the law seems to apply, even if the purpose of the law is not served. In these
circumstances, legal decision-makers are occasionally free to craft exceptions to the rule
to avoid the undesired outcome. 172 The determinate context assumes intolerance to the
application of such exceptions to literal application of the laws.
Moreover, legal decision-makers often have opportunities to second-guess or
challenge even reasonable, and constrained layperson assessments of the law. In a
determinate legal context, there will be implicit or explicit policies restraining or
disallowing routine, independent reassessments on the part of officials of good faith,
reasonable applications of the law.
e. Resolvability of a given law and decomposition of resolvability
Another assumption embedded in the idealized formalist model is that a given law
is definitively resolvable one way or another, as applied to any set of facts. In other
words, this is the assumption that there will be always a clear and objective answer as to
the question of whether a given law has or has not been violated under a given set of
facts.
A related assumption of the idealized formalist model is that the resolvability of
the law as a whole is simply a function of resolving its individual parts as applied to the
for negligence, the result might be different depending upon whether we take the ex ante or ex
post view. If we look at it from the ex post view from the point of view of the customer plaintiff,
$5000 seems like a small price to pay for somebody's life. But if we look at it from an ex ante
view, finding banks liable might make them more willing to hand over money to bank robbers in
the future to avoid liability. This in turn might incentivize more bank robberies overall, as
robbers realize there is now more money to be had.
170
Robert S. Summers, Professor Fuller'sJurisprudenceandAmerica' s Dominant
Philosophy of Law, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 43 3-49 (1978).
'71

Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871, 873-75 (1991).
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facts. Most (perhaps all) laws are made up of subparts or elements, and can be logically
divided into such elements. These elements are simply legal categories ("no person," "no
motor vehicle," "no corporations under this code," "all citizens") or legal criteria
("unsafe," "substantial," "ordinary care," "greater than 65 miles per hour"). The
idealized formalist model assumes that the resolvability of the law as a whole is equal to
the sum of the individual resolutions of each of the individual elements, and the matching
of each to a fact or a set of facts. In other words, to figure out whether the law, as a
whole, applies is simply to resolve each of the elements to see whether the element
applies to the facts. If every legal category and legal criterion applies, then the law, as
whole, itself applies. This is the assumption of decomposability of resolution of the law
through resolution of the individual elements.
f. Conceptualism of Legal Categories and Concepts
Conceptualism refers to the assumption that legal categories and concepts (e.g.,
legal elements and criteria) are sufficiently meaningful and expressive in themselves so
as to permit one to derive legal conclusions from those categories and concepts, without
the need to import extrinsic interpretive materials.1 73 In other words, when a legal
decision-maker is applying a legal rule based solely upon the text of the rule and the legal
categories comprising its elements, that there is sufficient meaning inherent in the
categories to permit its resolution.174 Application of a law solely on the basis of its words
and their expressed meaning is referred to as "textual interpretive formalism." 7 5
For example, once again take the simplified legal rule, "No person may drive a
vehicle upon a highway at a speed greater than 65 miles per hour." Within this legal rule
are several legal categories, including "vehicle," "person," and "highway." Upon
application of this rule to a particular factual circumstance - such an automobile driving
on a particular road at a particular speed on a particular day - there must ultimately be a
legal determination as to whether these legal categories apply to those circumstances.
Conceptually expressive legal categories are often constraining. We think of each
of these legal categories - such as "vehicle" - as containing its own meaning - that is, a
series of implicit shared, background contextual rules which help guide its application in
any particular circumstance. For example the category "vehicle" might, with widespread
agreement, implicitly contain the background rule "vehicles means 'motor vehicles."'
According to Hart there is often a "core of settled meaning" inherent in many of the
words used to form legal categories.1 76 To the extent that the implicit background rules
that form the core of the meaning of legal categories are sufficiently expressive to guide
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See Schiag, supra note 123, at 201-02.

174

See Kennedy, supra note 149, at 8635.

supra note 99 at 607 ("There must be a core of settled meaning, but there will be, as
well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor
obviously ruled out.").
16Hart
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and constrain application in any given application - when we look at a particular instance
of an automobile on a highway, and decide that that the category "vehicle" does indeed
cover automobiles - there is the legal conceptualism in legal categories.17 7 By contrast,
to the extent that legal categories are not inherently self-expressive in this functional way
they may not be sufficiently conceptually meaningful to effectively constrain choice.
g. Formal Realizability of Legal Criteria and Categories
A core concept of legal formalism is "decision-making according to rule."' 7 8 The
idealized formalist model thus assumes that each individual element or legal criterion can
be objectively, definitively and cleanly resolved under any set of facts. The extent to
which the application of the law is relatively determinate by reference to external metrics
is the degree to which such a law is "formally realizable."
Thus, the concept of "formal realizability" has two distinct components. The first
aspect of formal realizability is the degree to which legal categories and criteria can be
definitively applied and resolved under a given set of facts. According to Duncan
Kennedy, it is the degree to which legal categories and criteria "have the quality of
'ruleness' " as opposed to the quality of a discretionary or uncertain standard.179 The
second aspect of formal realizability is the degree to which the resolution of the criteria
or legal category is linked to measurable or explicitly defined, real-world facts. Thus our
simplified vehicle law would be formally-realizable, because the criterion is "a speed
greater than 65 miles per hour" is definitively and objectively resolvable one way or the
other by a well defined, assessable real-world factual metric - the speed of the vehicle,
as measured by, say, a radar gun or an odometer. To the extent that the predicates within
a law are discretionary, the law is not formally realizable.
Decision-making according to rule is thus strongly related to both formalrealizability and conceptualism.
Conceptualism implies that legal categories are
inherently expressive enough to give rise to definitional tests that constrain their
application to particular facts. Formal realizability means that these tests, once applied,
will be capable of being definitively resolved, one way or another, by reference to real
world facts.

17 7

Id.
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Schauer, supra note 117, at 510.

Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1685, 1687-88 (1976).
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D. CharacterizingIndeterminacy
1. The Spectrum of Indeterminacy
Having provided a way to describe relative determinacy, we also need a means of
characterizing relative indeterminacy. The argument thus far has been that particular
legal contexts can vary along a spectrum in terms of the relative ex ante determinacy of
legal decisions in those contexts. In the last section, I provided a framework for
characterizing such relative determinacy. I did this by articulating a set of assumptions
about the legal decision-making process that would have to hold for a legal context to
routinely produce determinate legal outcomes. We need a similar method of describing
degrees of legal indeterminacy in order to characterize legal contexts that reside at other
end of the spectrum. In this section, I will provide such a framework by drawing from
the research of scholars from the Legal Realist and Critical Legal Studies traditions. My
method will be to use the idealized formalist model as a comparative foil, to articulate the
model's descriptive inadequacies when contrasted with the way legal decision-making
actually occurs under many real world legal scenarios.
Legal indeterminacy is largely a function of the choices available to official legal
decision-makers. 180 In the typical instance, legal officials have a range of decisions that
they must resolve: options as to what the laws are, what the facts are, how the laws are to
be applied to the facts, what, if any formal process to abide by, and what the ultimate
decision should be. Generally speaking, the larger the range of choices available to legal
officials, the harder it will be to predict any one particular legal outcome. By contrast, to
the extent that such choices are constrained, legal decisions will usually be relatively
more (but not necessarily fully) determinate. The availability of more options along more
dimensions is what characterizes relative indeterminacy in legal decision-making.
This insight - that there is a nexus between official choice and legal
indeterminacy - was a significant contribution of the Critical Legal Studies and Legal
Realist scholars. While their other contributions are too diverse to summarize here, these
scholars, especially Critical Legal Studies writers, are most noted for the political valence
of their arguments reacting against particular assumptions embedded in prior modes of
legal thinking. It is important to note that my Article does not address the political or
critical points from their scholarship. Rather, I will focus on what I think are some of
their under-appreciated analytical and descriptive contributions in linking legal
uncertainty to choice.
In critiquing legal formalism and embedded formalist assumptions in prevailing
legal thought, many of these scholars essentially argued that the legal formalist view of
decision-making provided an inaccurate, na'ie, and over-simplified view of actual legal
decision-making. 181 The legal formalist view was premised on the non-existence of
"Singer, supra note 119, at 11-12.
181
These scholars, especially Critical Legal Studies writers, are most noted for the political
valence of their arguments reacting against particular assumptions embedded in prior modes of
legal thinking. It is important to note that my Article does not address the political or critical
points from their scholarship. Rather, I will focus on what I think are some of their under-
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choice on the part of legal decision-makers like judges. Instead, the force of logic and
rules was said to compel legal outcomes. Legal Realist scholars were the first to critique
this view, highlighting the multiplicity of choices available to judges in the decisionmaking process.1 82 The legal formalist model was vulnerable for professing to deny the
application of choice in legal decision-making when choice was clearly involved.183
Many Critical Legal Studies scholars took this enterprise much further, demonstrating a
number of previously unrecognized, and more subtle choices available to legal officials.
One of the useful ways of thinking about this body of scholarship is to view it as a
rather comprehensive taxonomy of the types of choices available to legal officials.
Across a broad range of articles, these scholars thoroughly highlighted the points during
the legal decision-making process in which options were explicitly or implicitly available
to legal authorities. This in turn, in the aggregate, provides a useful (if unintentionally
created) roadmap for identifying and characterizing relative indeterminacy. In explaining
that the structure of modern legal discourse permitted a large, but finite range of viable
legal arguments, these scholars mapped out the predictable patterns in which such
arguments, and options occur. 184 In other words, even if the outcome of any given legal
decision might be indeterminate, the structure, semiotics, legal moves, and range of ways
which legal decisions can be indeterminate are themselves relatively determinate. 185
These scholars delineated the major points and axes along which legal officials tend to
have choices when generating decisions.
In this section, I argue that we can use these recognized choice-points as a means
for characterizing relative legal indeterminacy. These various, decisional-points, form
the various dimensions of indeterminacy along which we can position a given legal
context. In the previous section I identified a means of characterizing relative
determinacy by legal contexts that adhere to the idealized formalist model. However, we
can also characterize relative determinacy as the absence of potential indeterminacy.
2. The Major Ways in Which Legal Contexts Can Be Indeterminate
I will attempt to set forth some of the major dimensions of indeterminacy
identified in the literature. In the previous section I identified several assumptions that
would likely have to hold in a particular legal setting for outcomes to be truly ex ante
determinate. My approach here will be to reiterate these assumptions and to provide for
each, a corresponding critique drawn from the critical literature. We can consider these
appreciated analytical and descriptive contributions in linking legal uncertainty to choice.
Robert Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 Pol. Sci.
Q. 470 (1923); Frank, supra note 5.
182

Schauer, supra note 117, at 112 (characterizing critiques of the Supreme Court's famous
Lochner decision as objections to the characterization of the decision as determined and denial of
the possibility of choice on the part of the Court).
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critiques the dimensions of relative indeterminacy. I will propose that we use these
critiques to characterize the relative indeterminacy of legal decision-making in a given
context. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list of the ways in which legal decisions
can be indeterminate. Rather, I will summarize some of the important factors that
contribute to the ex ante indeterminacy of legal outcomes.
In short, the legal formalist model, at least in the idealized form presented here,
presupposed that there were definitive laws and facts covering a given factual scenario
and that the job of legal actors was to discover and apply these laws to the facts to
determine liability. In the anti-formalist scholarship, critics argued that in a given
situation, basic questions about what the applicable laws, facts, and decision-making
processes are much less certain or determinate than the formalist model implies. Many
seemingly objective components of the law - such as which laws are relevant to a given
legal analysis, and which facts are applicable to an analysis - are in many cases arguable,
capable of being characterized in dramatically differing but equally plausible ways, and
subject to inclusion or exclusion at the discretion of legal decision-makers. Thus,
according to the critics, unlike the objectivity suggested by legal formalism, there was a
fundamental inability to conclusively predetermine the inputs or outcome of legal
decision-making.
Recall that I employed the idealized formalist model to help identify the
assumptions underlying a hypothetical decision-making process that could be capable of
producing determinate legal decisions. Let us once again imagine that we have an
official decision-maker in the process of determining a legal outcome. For example, let
us consider a Federal judge determining the status of a government restraint on speech, or
a tax official determining an individual's liability under the personal income tax code. In
order to produce determinate legal outcomes, the idealized formalist model tells us that
the decision-maker must first make a determination of the applicable rules that govern the
situation. Thus, we will first examine critiques concerning the degree to which the legal
rules that govern any given factual scenario are fixed and ex ante determinable.
a. Determining the Applicable Laws
In order to produce determinate outcomes, the idealized model seems to require
that the legal rules which govern any given factual situation are legally positive, unique,
identifiable, non-contradictory, and are of a form and content that is unambiguous. For
the model to presume otherwise would allow for uncertainty and choice on the part of a
legal-decision-maker and indeterminate legal outcomes.
This first assumption - the proposition that legal decision-making is and should
only be governed by positive laws -is subject to both normative and descriptive
critiques. The idealized formalist model's positivist assumption -that legal decisions are
based upon only those legal rules that have explicitly emerged from society's official
"rule of recognition" -plainly does not hold when one examines many real world legal
decision-making contexts. It is not uncommon in legal decision-making for judges and
other decision-makers to employ considerations that are non-positive in nature (e.g.
rationalizing a decision on the basis of higher principles of justice or fairness) as the basis
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for their legal outcome.186 Moreover, the normative principle that only positive laws
should be determinative is by no means conclusively accepted, and several legal theorists
expressly advocate for non-positive legal principles to be used in the judicial decisionmaking process.18 7 From a realistic perspective, it is not difficult to find legal contexts in
which it is more or less common or acceptable to invoke higher principles as a
justification for decision-making. To the extent to which considerations that are not
strictly legally positive in nature are routinely considered in a particular context, the
idealized formalist model's assumption of only strictly positive governing rules is
undermined.
Implicit also in the idealized formalist model is the notion that we can objectively,
uniformly and cleanly, in any factual situation that we are trying to analyze - distinguish
the applicable laws from the non-applicable laws. This is the positivist influence implying the objective conceptual separability of all of the inputs in the legal analytical
process. Let us take the example of a traffic accident, and imagine that we are attempting
to determine liability under this scenario. A preliminary step requires us to answer the
question, "What are the likely laws governing this legal context?" Of the entire corpus of
laws, it is fairly easy to eliminate as likely irrelevant, large bodies of law - anti-trust law
or space law, for example. This allows us focus on those areas of law that are possibly
relevant - for example, tort, insurance, or perhaps contract law. In doing this winnowing
of possible bodies of law, we are in effect, separating the relevant or applicable laws from
the non-relevant or non-applicable laws. If we examine the assumptions embedded
within the idealized formalist model, this process appears objective and clean. However,
in reality it may not be so clear which bodies of law apply to particular factual scenarios.
There may be doctrines of law that sit on the margins of particular sets of facts. The
decision to apply certain bodies of law (e.g. agency law to an insurance policy in an
automobile accident) may ultimately rest with legal official, and may not be determinable
until that point.
Beyond this issue, there is an additional dimension of uncertainty. The idealized
formalist model seems to require the rejection of legal rules whose form and content are
not unambiguously ex ante determinable. To do otherwise would introduce rules of
uncertain content, which would not lead to determinate outcomes. One could not
determine the outcome of a factual scenario based upon applying a rule whose substance
was ex ante ambiguous. Such a restriction appears to exclude from decision-making,
those considerations that are penumbral in form. Again, such penumbral considerations
include things like the implicit legislative intent and the unarticulated, but likely
animating policy goals of legislation. For reasons detailed in the previous section, the

16Singer, supra note 119, at 17 ("The availability of general principles, whether of
constitutional or of common law, to nullify or limit the application of specific rules is a
potentially devastating critique of the determinacy of legal doctrine. No matter how specific and
easy to apply a set of rules is, its application is rendered less determinate if it coexists with legally
enforceable standards that potentially could be used to eviscerate it."); see, e.g., United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (appealing to a "miscarriage of justice" in prejudicial criminal
lineup).
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Dworkin, supra note 155.
56

The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review

Vol. XII

2011

precise content of such penumbral considerations are often uncertain, speculative, and
open to debate (and hence provides choice among legal decision-makers). For example,
a single piece of legislation often has multiple purposes, some of which are occasionally
at odds with one another. Moreover, it rarely makes sense to talk of the "intent" of a
collective body composed of separate individuals such as a legislature, each with
different subjective and objective views and political goals. 188
Once again, the assumptions of the idealized formalist model dovetail with what
is observed in practice. It is common for decision-makers to invoke and employ
penumbral considerations in their decision-making in practice. 189Courts routinely
speculate about the purpose, policy goals, and legislative intent of statutes despite the fact
that the scope and form of such penumbral considerations is often ambiguous and subject
to a range of plausible characterizations. 190 In order to explicitly rely upon a penumbral,
contestable, or ambiguous consideration such as "statutory purpose," an official will elect
just one of many possible, distinguishable formulations.. The extent to which legal
decision-makers tend to employ or disregard implicit or ambiguous penumbral
considerations might be more common in particular decision-making areas, and less
common in others. The inability to predict which formulation an official will ultimately
rely upon will tend to increase the indeterminacy of such decision-making.
A further questionable assumption enmeshed in the idealized formalized model, is
that there is always a single, determinable governing legal rule that controls in a given
circumstance. In many circumstances, there are actually multiple, explicit legal rules that
facially govern a situation by their literal terms. 191 Thus, a decision-maker is often
presented with an explicit choice of prima facie governing legal rules. It is not
uncommon to have different legal rules on-point within the same source of authority. For
example, within the same title of statutory code, there are frequently separate rules each
of which might govern a given factual situation with equal plausibility.1 92 Similarly,
there are often legal rules on point emanating from different, equally authoritative,
sources. 193Beyond that, as some scholars have pointed out, sometimes plausibly
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Greenawalt, supra note 25, at 20.

189
See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 205 (1986) (speculating that
"the only purpose this statute seems narrowly tailored to advance is the impermissible one of
protecting the major political parties from competition precisely when that competition would be
most meaningful").
190

d

See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (198 1)("These cases involve two statutes,
each of which by its literal terms applies to the facts before us.").
191

See, e.g., Smith v. Goldstein, 447 F.Supp. 1244 (D. Del. 1978)("Preliminarily, the parties
dispute whether [10 Del. C.] section 8119 or section 8106 is controlling should both provisions be
deemed applicable.").
192

193
See, e.g., Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Federal
securities laws contain two candidate statutes of limitations. The first is §13 of the Securities Act
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governing legal rules actually logically contradict one another.1 94 Thus, the assumption
that there is always one, determinative rule, is simply not true in many instances.
Decision-makers often have explicit choices among applicable rules.
Even when it appears that there is only one applicable rule, decision-makers can
sometimes avoid applying that rule by creating an explicit exception. It is a staple of
common-law rule-making to develop an exception where the literal application of a rule
will result in undesirable or unjust outcomes. 1 In many instances, judges have explicit
or implicit discretion to create such exceptions. Again, we can imagine a range of
contexts to which the judicial creation of exceptions is common, tolerated and condoned
to contexts in which decision-makers rarely invoke or are not permitted to create
exceptions. Similarly undermining the assumption of the dispositive nature of existing
rules, common law appellate judges have the ability to occasionally overrule even on
point, existing laws.
This assumption is further undercut because decision-makers often have choices
about the scope of non-reified sources of authority, such as case holdings. Judges can
usually distinguish or apply given case holdings. The degree to which case-law holdings
influence determinations about liability varies from context to context. In some contexts,
such as broad areas of Constitutional law, the body of governing law is largely based
upon case law. In such areas, to engage in predictive legal decision-making based solely
upon textual sources without attempting to engage in case-law would often produce
unhelpful and inaccurate determinations. By contrast, in other areas, case law plays a
relatively smaller role. In those instances, often the body of applicable case law is much
smaller, and it is accepted that much of the typical legal decision-making can be made
based upon the text of reified statutes without subsequent resort to case holdings. It might
be highly relevant to consult case-law in First Amendment jurisprudence, but practically
irrelevant in terms of most day-to-day decisions regarding building code compliance. In
legal contexts where case law plays a large role, there are additional choices as to which
earlier cases, if any, directly (or analogically) apply and govern or influence outcomes
given a particular factual scenario.196 This renders such case law dependent contexts
relatively less determinate.
Moreover, unlike statutory law, where the form and content (but not meaning) of
the statute is embodied in an authoritative text, case holdings are often implicit. Courts
often decide a case, and announce their reasoning, without articulating the rule of the case
going forward. Thus, the holding of the case, and the governing rule drawn from that
holding is often implicit, rather than explicit (e.g. "today we hold").197 Because such
of 1933 ... .The second candidate is § 20A(b)(4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.").
194

Singer, supra note 119, at 15.

Schauer, supra note 117, at 515. (Schauer describes a case in which a petitioner filed a
form at 5:03 pm, missing a statutory deadline of 5:00 pm. The court avoided literally applying
the rule by creating an exception due to the petitioner's determinental reliance on bad official
advice that contributed to the delay.).
195

16See
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Cass Sunstein, On AnlgclReasoning, 16Hr.LRe.741, 744 (1993).

For an example of such an explicit holding, see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360
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holdings/rules of the case are implicit, rather than explicit and reified, their content is
debatable and opening to varying statements of scope. When holdings are implicit,
judges can often elect from among multiple plausible characterizations at various levels
of breadth. It is important to distinguish ambiguity in the content and form of a legal
rule, from ambiguity about the meaning of the legal rule. Even when we have a legal rule
of unambiguous form, such as in a statute, there is still possible ambiguity about its
meaning. The problem with an implicit holding is that there is potential ambiguity about
both the form and its eventual meaning. This allows for even greater latitude among
decision-makers, who can often avoid application of statutes or other holdings by
invoking the penumbral rules embedded in implicit holdings.
b. Determining the Applicable Facts
Not only must a legal decision-maker grapple with the laws but she must also
grapple with the facts to which those laws will be applied. The idealized formalist model
has a series of assumptions about the determinacy of facts in a given scenario that are
parallel to the ones concerning law. These assumptions have been subject to similar
critiques in the academic scholarship. Several scholars have noted that often whether
facts are considered relevant by decision-makers may be somewhat arbitrarily dependent
on how they are initially characterized. 198 According to some critics, what appears to be
a straightforward determination of facts by an official arbiter of the law may be more
subject to ex post subjectivity than appears at first glance. 199
In producing determinate outcomes, the idealized formalist model seems to imply
that the relevant facts are fixed, unambiguous, and objectively ascertainable. Scholars
have argued that there are often multiple ways of characterizing the same facts, and that,
different characterizations can lead to different legal outcomes.200 For example, Mark
Kelman has noted that decision-makers often have to elect different time frames under
which they analyze facts. 20 1 Framing, for example, the facts of a crime over a shorter or
longer time horizon, can impact whether crimes are considered separate acts, or part of a
continuous stream of activity.2 02 Moreover, it is often possible to plausibly characterize
the same set of facts at differing levels of generality in order to invoke or avoid the literal
(1979) ("Today we hold that such systematic exclusion of women that results in jury venires
averaging less than 15% female violates the Constitution's fair-cross-section requirement.").
Frank, supra note 5, at 650 ("There are simple controversies and they involve
comparatively simple questions of fact. But the facts occurred long before the lawsuit arose. The
facts themselves do not walk into court. The court has to guess what actually happened. .. .)
198
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See Richard Michael Fischl, Some Realism About CriticalLegal Studies, 41 U. Miami L.

Rev. 505, 5 13-15.
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See Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 Stan.

L. Rev. 591, 593-95 (1981).
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application of a legal category. 203 The choice between one particular portrayal of a
situation and another can lead to vastly different outcomes. 204 Several scholars have
noted that often whether facts are considered relevant by decision-makers may be
somewhat arbitrarily dependent on clearly subjective decisions. 205
Similarly, the idealized formalist model presumes the ex ante ability to separate
objectively relevant from objectively irrelevant facts. Again, in reality, the relevance and
applicability of various facts is often a discretionary choice on the part of legal
officials. 206 The idealized formalist model also presumes that there is one set of
ascertainable facts that compel a particular outcome. In most scenarios, there are facts
that militate towards one outcome and other facts that support towards the opposite
outcome. 207 The decision-maker has to choose among the potential contradictory facts,
and will often justify her decision by emphasizing the various facts that support its
conclusion, and de-emphasizing those that undercut her conclusion.
Finally, the idealized formalist model contains the assumption that facts are
objectively measurable. An obvious objection to this is that many factual categories are
abstract or value-based, rather than framed in discrete quantities. Moreover, even when
facts are, in determinable in principle, there will often be actual difficulties in actually
determining them. For example, in a car accident scenario, there may be an objectively
true answer as to the exact time that a pedestrian stepped off of a curb. In reality, the
ascertainment of that exact time may be fraught with difficulty, involving everything
from measurement errors, inaccurate evidence, or dispute among sources of evidence.
c. Applying the Laws to the Facts
Finally, writers have critiqued the model's assumptions concerning the process
under which legal decisions are actually generated. The idealized formalist model
assumes that legal-decision-makers generate legal outcomes according to a constrained,
deductive, model of legal analysis.

Witness, in patent law, the rule excluding prior art references, depending upon whether
the prior art is in the same field of art as the patent at issue. Narrow or broad framing of the field
of endeavor can determine whether the prior art does or does not apply. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d
1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
203

204

Coleman & Leiter, supra note 109, at 561.

205

Frank, supra note 5, at 650.

e.g., United States v. Hathaway, 949 F.2d 609, 610 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he proper
in
this
case is solely a comparison of the elements of arson ..,. into that crime's generic
inquiry
elements. ... Accordingly, the particular facts of Hathaway's actual conduct ..,. are not
relevant.").
26See,

207

Coleman & Leiter, supra note 109, at 561.
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d. Logical Deduction as Mode of Legal Decision-making
We can think of the deductive mode of decision-making that is presupposed by
the formalist model, as itself open to question. The view that legal decision-making
always results from such a constrained, mechanized analytical process lends itself to
several obvious critiques. First, some critics query the fundamental premise that legal
decisions usually occur as the result of any constrained, analytical process.208 Legal
realist scholars, in particular, argued that many legal decisions could be attributed to
idiosyncratic beliefs particular to individual judges, such as their political or value views,
rather than resulting from any formal process of constrained legal analysis.209 Even when
operating within a constrained process, other scholars have noted that, despite constraints,
decision-makers usually have choices to avoid mechanical outcomes.210 Moreover, there
is evidence that, in actual cases, legal decision-makers arrive at legal conclusions that are
not be plausible if they are acting solely under the explicit constraints. Jury nullification,
in which juries refuse to apply a clearly applicable law to avoid an unjust outcome, is one
such piece of counter-evidence to the underlying assumption of legal outcomes solely
based upon deductive reasoning. 21 1
Even if we assume that legal decision-making proceeds in terms of a constrained,
formal mode of inference or reasoning, the deductive mode of inference presupposed by
the idealized formalist model is just one, among many accepted modes of reasoning or
inference used in the legal decision-making process. Other modes of inference, such as
analogical or instrumental reasoning are arguably more prevalent within the context of
American judicial decision-making. Indeed, the entire structure of precedent based,
common law decision-making is premised upon justifying legal decisions on the basis of
analogical grounds from similar, but not identical, cases.212 Likewise, it is common for
judges to justify their decisions on instrumental (or consequentialist or "public policy")
grounds. 213 Thus, the mode and process of decision-making in any given instance might
itself be a matter of choice available to a decision-maker. The inherent discretion
available to officials employing analogical or instrumental analysis, rather than deductive
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Id.
Id.
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Singer, supra note 119.
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Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification. Black Power in the CriminalJustice

System, 105 Yale L.J. 677, 700 (1995) ("Jury nullification occurs when ajury acquits a defendant
~who it believes is guilty of the crime with which he is charged.").
See, e.g., Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d. 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("With both these
guideposts in mind, we survey the various cases to which Akro and Luker analogize the instant
case.").
212

See, e.g., Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness of Atlanta v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 826
(5th Cir. 1979) ("For these reasons, we hold, as a matter of policy, that appellants' challenge to §
8 is not justiciable.").
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reasoning increases the likelihood that the outcomes in those contexts will be ex ante
indeterminate.
Additionally, the assumption that a legal official will employ the deductive mode
of inference in generating legal outcomes suggests a particular and limited function for
legal officials - that of ascertaining and arriving at correct legal answers. But in many
legal contexts, legal officials are serving a different functional rule - that of final dispute
resolution between conflicting societal entities. That is, legal officials are often called
upon because two or more parties have plausible, conflicting rights or interests, and some
authoritative selection among these competing interests is needed. Nuisance cases
illustrate this well. The result of a nuisance case is often not so much the derivation of
some objectively correct answer, as it involves the balancing of the related interests of,
say, residents and a nearby polluting factory with an eye to public policy. Deductive
reasoning as a mode of inference does not capture such scenarios descriptively. To the
extent to which legal contexts routinely concern dispute resolution, involving the
balancing or electing of competing rights and interests, the idealized formalist's
assumption of deductive analysis will likely not apply in that context.
e. Inherently Expressive Legal Categories
In applying laws to the facts, the idealized formalist model assumes that legal
categories and criteria are inherently expressive and self-limiting enough to constrain
their application. Let us explore some critiques of this assumption. It is well known that
many legal criteria are expressly designed, not to maximize ex ante determinability, but
to give ex post discretion and flexibility on the part of decision-makers. This is the
classic "rules vs. standards" distinction, where the inherent meaning of legal criteria cast
as standards involve the explicit and intentional grant of discretion to an official (e.g.
defendant's failure to employ "reasonable" care)214 or, are cast at such a level of
generality, so as to afford implicit discretion (e.g. an "ultra-hazardous" activity in
torts). 215 Thus, legal outcomes resulting from legal standards are often not ex ante
determinable, contravening the formalist's model's assumption.
Moreover, even among legal categories where discretion is not intended, the
idealized formalist model seems to assume inherent meaning in every legal category so as
to make its application routinely dispositive. This is the assumption of "category
conceptualism." But it is clear that, some words are not inherently self-expressive. Some

See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Rest., Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("Ordinarily,
liability for negligence is based on the failure to exercise reasonable care in the conduct of one's
personal activities.").
214

215
A defendant who knowingly engages in abnormally dangerous activity or causes an
abnormally dangerous condition to exist, may be held liable for any resulting harm to persons or
property even if the defendant exercised reasonable care. Restatement (Second) of Torts §
519(1).
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words are unintentionally ambiguous or vague. 216 Others words are "open-textured"
words with intrinsically, broad, inclusive meanings. 217
Moreover, even words with widely agreed-upon meanings (such as the term
"vehicle"), in many cases, do not produce objectively dispositive outcomes based upon
the word's inherent meaning alone. H.L.A. Hart's example of "No Vehicles in the Park"
demonstrates that legal categories like "vehicles" are often proxies for more complex
rules ("Non emergency, motor vehicles") that embody unarticulated underlying policies
("Overall safety, but exceptions for emergencies," "Non-motorized vehicles are typically
safe and quiet") that animate the legal category. 218 Under Hart's conception, legal
categories often have a core or settled meaning ("Vehicles as motor vehicles") that
overlaps with the underlying animating policy ("Safety, quiet"), as well as a penumbral
grey-area of unsettled meaning. 219 The degree to which the core-meaning dominates the
penumbra varies from word to word. In some words, the penumbral grey-area
overshadows any core meaning, leaving room for uncertainty and choice in its typical
application.
Others have critiqued the assumption of inherent expressiveness of legal
categories on other grounds.
Some legal categories employ words that involve
"essentially contested" concepts such as "privacy" and "autonomy," which are
intrinsically value-based and not ex ante resolvable through logical deduction. 220
Moreover, others have pointed out that even words of apparently well-defined scope (e.g.
real property) have their meaning change over time and framing, because shared
understandings are always rooted in the larger context.221 A final critique is that the
application of most legal rules - even ex ante, reified, legal rules - require some minimal
interpretation by the one employing them. The idealized formalist model fails to
recognize that there are often, multiple plausible modes of interpretation (e.g. originalist,
textualist, instrumentalist) which may result in different outcomes depending upon the
method employed. 222 The only method of interpretation embedded in the idealized
formalist model is strict textual-formalist interpretation. 223

A word is ambiguous if there are at least two different plausible meanings are available.
Unlike ambiguity, a word is vague if it is fundamentally unclear as to any meaning in context.
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3. Determinacy as Absence of Indeterminacy
We have now elaborated a more robust means of capturing the concept of legal
indeterminacy. To recap, we have conceptualized indeterminacy primarily as a function
of the range of choices available to official decision-makers throughout the legal
decision-making process. My claim is that indeterminacy is a quality that is usefully
characterized along these multiple dimensions of choice. The previous section surveyed
some of the most important ways in which choices tend to be available to legal decisionmakers in generating legal outcomes. We thus can characterize legal indeterminacy in
terms of these distinct "dimensions" of indeterminacy linked to the availability of official
choice. In this section, I will argue that in considering indeterminacy in this systematic
way, it not only helps us consider that concept more holistically, but it also allows us to
better consider the concept of determinacy. We can think of determinacy not simply as
adherence to the assumptions early identified in the idealized formalist model. We can
instead more robustly characterize relative determinacy by the absence of indeterminate
choices that might be comparatively more available in other legal contexts.
Before getting to that conclusion, it is important to re-emphasize an underlying
point about indeterminacy and determinacy. Part of the argument thus far has been that it
is possible to contrast the relative determinacy or indeterminacy of legal outcomes in
different legal contexts. Thus, the average legal outcome in the First Amendment context
might tend to be more indeterminate than the average outcome in the personal income tax
context. But, the point is not simply that the determinacy of legal outcomes is
characteristically different from one legal context to another. Nor is the point that the
"indeterminate /determinate" classification is a false dichotomy. As mentioned, Larry
Solum has persuasively argued that the vast majority of decisions in legal contexts are
neither wholly determinate, nor wholly indeterminate, but fall in a broader third category
of "under-determined" legal decisions. 224 Rather, the point is that within this broader
category of "under-determined" legal contexts, the relative determinacy of legal
outcomes can vary on a sliding spectrum from relatively more, to relatively less
determinate. That is, the degree to which legal outcomes are constrained or involve
official choices, can vary incrementally from context to context, along the previously
identified dimensions.
So how can we account for the concept of relative determinacy? One way to
think about the above discussion is that there are somewhat discrete points in the legal
outcome generation process in which official decision-makers have to ultimately come to
a determination. These dimensions correspond to threshold questions that officials must
decide during legal analysis. Examples include questions about what law applies to a
given liability determination, what the law means in a certain situation, which facts count,
how to interpret the facts, how the facts are applied to the law, and whether other "extralegal" considerations go into the decision-making analysis. 225 Whether there are going to
be choices available to a decision-maker for a given decision-point will vary by context.
In other words, we can view the choice-points identified in the aggregate by the Critical
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Legal Studies and Legal Realist (and other) literatures, as the major types of choices that
theoretically might present themselves to officials within the confines of the structured
semiotics and agreed-upon bounds of American legal discourse and process. 226
In some contexts we will see the full range of choices identified actually available
to legal officials. However, in many other contexts, the types of choices actually
available to officials will fall short of the theoretical possible extent. This is because in
those latter contexts, many of the choice-points identified in theory will have been be
explicit or implicitly constrained. For example, if we took legal indeterminacy to its
logical extreme, we could argue that any legal norm could govern any legal decision. In
reality, in the personal income tax context, for example, legal analysis is primarily and
practically confined to only those provisions of Title 26 of the Federal Code, and the
corresponding state and local codes, in most instances. Thus, we must separate the
theoretical availability of choices, from the actual choices available to decision-makers
in particular contexts. This is important because, from a legal theory standpoint, this
framework gives us a vocabulary for understanding why it is that legal decisions appear
to be more or less determinate in certain contexts. I will discuss this point more fully in
Part V.
With that understanding in mind, let us now turn to the idea of characterizing the
relative indeterminacy or determinacy of legal outcomes in a particular context. The
general approach is fairly straightforward. Once we've identified a particular legal
context, the idea is to explore how legal decision-making actually occurs in that context who the relevant legal decision-makers are, and how the process occurs. We can
characterize a legal context by whether it tends to adhere or depart from the idealized
formalist model. To the extent that decision-making in the given context appears to
actually embody many of the assumptions of determinacy identified in the idealized
formalist model, we can characterize legal decisions as being relatively more
determinate, on the determinacy/indeterminacy spectrum. By contrast, to the extent that
actual decision-making tends to embody many of the theoretical dimensions of
indeterminacy - including multiple, available choice-points for decision-makers - the
context will be relatively more indeterminate.
This approach might seem to suggest that relative determinacy is a measurable
characteristic that is consistent within a given context from decision to decision, across
different officials, and over time. By contrast, it is clear that in certain contexts, some
officials might take a more determinate approach (for example, to First Amendment
decision-making) than their contemporary peers. The requirement of some characteristic
level of determinacy for all contexts is not what I am suggesting. Rather, I am proposing
that the consistency of the determinacy of decision-making across time, across officials,
and across decisions, within a given context, is itself a dimension of relative determinacy.
But it is also possible that legal contexts have inconsistent or non-characteristic
determinacy properties, because legal decision-making is not uniform or consistent.27
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This, I argue, would be a form of indeterminacy, because legal decisions would not be
consistently predictable, even if they occasionally were.
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Let's take an example, to make this framework more concrete. Once again, let's
look at the personal income tax context - and determine whether legal outcomes in that
context, overall, tend to be relatively more or less determinate. Our working intuition is
that outcomes tend to be relatively more determinate --- buttressed by the fact that
liability can be calculated, under this context, in many instances partially by computer.
That is, while outcomes under the personal income tax context are by no means always
determinate or predictable, they tend to be more predictable than, say, the average
constitutional dispute. The major point is that the theoretical availability of choice by
decision-makers tends to be relatively unavailable in the personal income tax context for
various reasons. In other words, if we take the major dimensions of indeterminacy that
have been developed in the literature - we find that these dimensions figure less
prominently in the average determination of liability that occurs the personal income tax
context, relative to other contexts.
Before applying the framework, it is important to reemphasize a central point, lest
the reader be overcome by objections. My argument here is not that the personal income
tax context is always or perfectly determinate. There are always going to be exceptions
and special cases that we can find that will jump to mind. I am not saying that legal
contexts such as the personal income tax do not sometimes involve nuanced issues of
legal judgment, experience, and unpredictability. Rather, it is that legal outcomes under
the personal income tax context are relatively more determinate than in other contexts.
On the spectrum that characterizes indeterminate legal contexts on one end, and idealized
formalist legal contexts on the other end, the personal income tax context is closer to the
idealized formalist end of the spectrum.
Applying the Framework to the Personal Income Tax Context
There are two broad themes that help us to understand the relative determinacy of
the average outcome in the personal income tax context. Again, let's consider
indeterminacy as a function of choices available to official decision-makers. First, in law
generally, it is probably true that the vast majority of legal analysis and assessment of
legal outcomes is conducted, not by officials like judges or by trained lawyers, but by lay
(non legally-trained) individuals.
That is, if we consider the universe of legal
assessments that are made on a daily basis - the vast majority of such assessments are
made informally by those governed by the law - individuals and employees as they are
going about their personal and work lives. They are informally and heuristically, or
formally, determining whether their daily conduct is compliant with their formal or
informal understanding of the law. (e.g. Lay drivers assessing whether their conduct
comports with the vehicular laws in their daily commutes). This is often referred to as
conduct operating "in the shadow of law." 228 Though it is true that there is some subset of
those daily legal assessments that are made by judges, or by hired attorneys, they are
likely small by comparison to that larger set.

Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law. The
Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).
228
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This is similarly true in the personal income tax context, where roughly 70 million
personal income tax returns are self-prepared by lay-persons, (most of whom who are not
legally trained attorneys).229 Thus, to a large degree, because the code regulates so many
laypersons, its structure is geared around lay use and application. Thus, many of the legal
categories and criteria that are employed in the code are intended to be meaningful to lay
persons, and where not meaningful, reasonable lay interpretations are often accepted. 230
Again, this is not to say that there are not facts that present grey areas that must be
litigated. However, on a percentage basis, out of the over 100 million assessments of tax
liability actually conducted annually, these litigated exceptions are relatively uncommon.
Even if these issues are sometimes litigated by filers with complicated facts, this does not
mean that this is representative of legal assessment generally as I have characterized it
within the larger framework of routine, informal analysis.
Second, the ability of officials to actually second-guess application of law
decisions made by those non-legally trained individuals is relatively limited. From a
numerical perspective, only a little over 1% of all returns are audited and hence receive
significant scrutiny from official decision-makers.231
Among the 1% of instances
audited, even fewer of those result in substantive decisions by the individual actually
being challenged. Moreover, there is arguably an implicit policy protecting reasonable,
but incorrect, legal determinations that are made in good faith.2 32 This suggests a
deference to the ordinary and good faith analyses by lay persons, and a general

In 2008, there were 142,450,569 individual tax returns filed with the IRS. Internal
Revenue Service, Individual Income Tax Returns Filed and Sources of Income, 2008,
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/08inl2ms.xls. United States Government Accountability Office,
PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS, In a Limited Study, Chain Preparers Made Serious Errors
(2006), 4. There is evidence that the number of self-prepared returns has increased significantly
since then, due to increased use of tax software and e-filing.
229

This does not mean that the personal income tax code does not have many highly
technical terms of art that are inaccessible to laypersons. Rather, I mean that we can contrast the
personal income tax code with other bodies of law that are primarily intended to be read and
applied by expert intermediaries, rather than by lay persons directly. Federal antitrust laws come
to mind as such an example. In that body of law, there is not the general expectation that nonlegally trained individuals (e.g. ordinary laypersons) will be interpreting and applying the law on
a regular basis. Rather, the intended regulated class in antitrust typically consists of sophisticated
corporate entities with professional and expert legal representation.
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Kristin E. Hick man, A Problem of Remedy. Responding to Treasury's (Lack oJ)
Compliance with Administrative ProcedureAct Rulemaking Requirements, 76 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 1153, 1188-89 (2008).
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22See, 34 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Taxation §71851 ("The chief requisites of criminal tax
evasion are.. .a willful attempt to evade tax.. .The taxpayer may negate [the] IRS's claim of
willfulness.. .by shoving his good faith belief that he wasn't violating the law, even if that belief
isn't objectively reasonable.") See, also 34 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Taxation §71626 (Accuracy
related penalties "do not apply to any portion of an underpayment if the taxpayer shows that there
was reasonable cause for it, and that he acted in good faith.").
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forbearance on official challenges to such assessments if they are truly plausible. 233 This
policy of official forbearance reduces the role of choice in the authoritative decisionmaking process. One way of characterizing the income liability analysis is that of
coming up with a liability assessment that is sufficiently close - within a margin of error
- to the official determination - to be acceptable to the authorities. 234
Returning to my model, an initial point of potential indeterminacy in any legal
decision-making process concern the question, "What are the applicable laws?" 235
Unlike in other contexts those assessing their personal federal income tax liability will
generally be justified in limiting their consideration to the one body of law - the rules
housed in Title 26 of the Federal Code. 236 Contrast the personal income tax context with
other legal contexts, such as the traffic accident scenario mentioned previously. There, a
whole range of rules and doctrines from various bodies of law, ranging from tort law,
contract law, insurance law, and health law, may or may not plausibly provide the
governing rule set. In that context, there are threshold choices about governing laws that
an official must make, contributing to overall indeterminacy as to ultimate legal liability.
By contrast, for reasons explored more thoroughly in section V, personal income tax
filers can generally be confident in limiting their analysis to the rules embodied in Title
26.237 This is one less potential point of indeterminacy at issue in that context.
Generally speaking, we would expect the greater the number of plausible
arguments that laws from different and varied areas of law need to be considered in the
liability question, the more ex ante indeterminacy we would expect there to be
concerning overall questions of liability. Moreover, the body of governing law in the
personal income tax context is both relatively determinate, and reified in form. Similarly,
penumbral considerations such as public policy or legislative intent are not expected to be
part of the typical decision-making process of the lay taxpayer when engaging in legal
analysis. As discussed, the possibility that officials might employ such unpredictable
penumbral considerations in legal decision-making increases indeterminacy. Thus, the
fact that the legal rules that govern the personal income tax context are relatively selfcontained and ex ante determinable in both form and content, should increase the average
determinacy of legal outcomes when compared to contexts where this is not the case.

233
234

id.

I am grateful to Professor Victor Fleischer for this excellent characterization.

Due to space constraints, I will not proceed systematically through all of the potential
dimensions of indeterminacy. Rather, I will proceed through several representative dimensions.
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See Michael James Bommarito II & Daniel Martin Katz, A MathematicalApproach to
the Study of the United States Code, 389 Physica A (2010) (measuring the complexity of various
provisions of the Federal Code, and determining that, by various complexity metrics, most of the
related provisions are housed within Title 26 itself).
236

tiisnot to say that there are not exceptions to this rule, and some percentage of
tax payers must consider a much more complicated host of rules. That is, there will be
exceptions. But for the majority of tax payers, when taken in the absolute, this appears to be the
accepted justification.
27Again,
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A second potential dimension of indeterminacy concerns the question, "What are
the relevant facts?" Under the idealized formalist model, there is an assumption that
there is an objective and distinct line between relevant and non-relevant facts. For many
individuals in the personal income tax context the relevant facts are relatively easily
discernable from the universe of potential facts. Determining income simply involves
some combination of employer wages, and investment income for many filers. It is
relatively easy, in the average case, to discern such income, as employers and financial
companies, on reporting forms, have previously and explicitly so demarcated it. 238
Similarly, adhering to the assumption of the idealized formalist model, many of the
underlying legal facts are measurable and definite. For example, the IRS offers a service
where it can, for many taxpayers, determine that taxpayer's liability based upon available
information about income and existing withholding and tax payments. 239 If the content
and applicability of many of the threshold fact that went into the liability determination
were routinely debatable and uncertain, this would not be possible. 240 By contrast, in
other contexts - for example in a negligence lawsuit - the applicability and content of
threshold facts are frequently contested, not-measurable, and capable of different
characterizations. A significant number of the important substantive provisions in the
personal income tax are "formally realizable," and therefore, can be definitively resolved
by reference to tangible and measurable real-world facts.
Moreover, it appears that the lawmakers who created the personal income tax
code deliberately chose many legal categories with relatively greater conceptual
expressiveness - that is whose widely accepted core meaning resolves many, if not most,
instances in which it is applied. For example, the personal income tax code uses legal
categories such as "income" and "spouse." 24 1 By contrast, legal categories whose core
meanings are open-textured or include explicit discretion - such as "reasonable" or "fair"
may be relatively less present in the substantive provisions of this body of code.242 To
the extent that these meaningful categories have a strong "core meaning," and only
occasionally produce uncertainties, there will be relatively increased determinacy

This might not be true in some more complicated cases, but in many cases, it is, and it is
important not let the exception dominate the rule.
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Internal Revenue Service, The IRS Will Figure Your Tax For You: Publication 967
(2009). The IRS can determine the taxes automatically for many taxpayers.
239

240

Id

26 U.S.C. §1(a) ("There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of-(1) every married
individual .. ,. who makes a single return jointly with his spouse under section 6013.").
241

242
For example, the term "reasonable" appears only 378 times in Title 26, comparatively
fewer instances than in other comparable titles. Moreover, most of the time, the term reasonable
appears in penalty and defense provisions for failure to file or provide information, rather than in
substantive personal income rules. 26 U.S.C. 1, et seq. (2009).
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compared with contexts routinely employing conceptually non-expressive, or opentextured legal terms. 243
Finally, the model's third set of potential indeterminacies concerns the way in
which legal officials actually apply laws to facts in decision-making. Like the idealized
formalist model, much of the analysis in the personal income tax context involves
deductive logic as the mode of inference. That is, in order to assess liability, much of the
analysis actually involves straightforward mechanical deductive inference. In most
instances, a taxpayer determining her liabilities need not resort to (nor is she expected to)
engage in analogical or instrumental reasoning to predict or assess liability, nor will an
official typically challenge such a lay assessment on the basis of a different mode of
inference preferred by the official.
In short, the personal income tax context adheres to many of the assumptions of
determinacy identified in the idealized formalist model.
4. Using Indeterminacy to Understand Computational Amenability
On a theoretical level, taking the argument from the previous section, we consider
legal contexts relatively more determinate in nature because they exhibit relatively fewer
dimensions of indeterminacy. We can systematically examine a given legal context along
each of the dimensions of potential indeterminacy, and assess it along the indeterminacydeterminacy spectrum. If the portion of the law exhibits relatively fewer of these
dimensions of indeterminacy, and more of the dimensions of determinacy, we can
consider it practically more determinate. In other words, we now have a more rigorous
way of characterizing determinacy -- as roughly approximating the idealized formalist
model. As I am suggesting, when an area is practically determinate under this theoretical
definition, it will also likely be more amenable to computation. 244
Again, let's take as a starting point the idealized formalist model of liability
determination. As indicated previously, if we were to encounter an area of law that
approximated this model, it would likely be highly amenable to computation by rules
based legal reasoning systems. In other words, if we were to find a portion of the law
that exhibits to a greater degree, some of the following core characteristics of the
idealized formalist model, the application of this law would be highly computable:
* The set of legal rules governing the factual context to be analyzed were
relatively self-contained, separable from other bodies of law, individually
isolatable, and ex-ante reified
Similarly, take the building code context, in which there are often formally well-defined
or informally well understood categories such as "windows." While there may be debates at the
margin about what a "window" is in a building -perhaps a glass door blurs the line between
window and door -by and large, the vast majority of the issues will involve conventional
windows upon which all will agree.
243

See Harry Surden, Michael Genesereth & Bret Logue, RepresentationalComplexity in
Law, Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law 193194 (2007).
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* The individual legal rules were formally realizable, and the legal categories
that constituted the elements of the legal rules were conceptually meaningful
and self-contained in their application
* The facts in arising from the typical context were relatively logically
separable and measurable
* The application of deductive logic, as a mode of legal inference, produced
legal decisions that were jurisprudentially acceptable and/or accurate.
As discussed, it is these theoretical characteristics that characterize much of the
personal income tax context, and which make much of that context amenable to
computation. Legal analysis of personal income tax liability implicates the Internal
Revenue Code, Title 26 of the United States Code. 245 This body of law is a selfcontained body of reified statutory law. It is separable from other, potentially applicable
bodies of law, during the analysis of personal income liability, in most instances. Many
(but not all) of the legal rules contained within the personal income code are consciously
formulated as "formally realizable" rules. The individual elements which comprise those
rules contain sufficient meaning for application, or are explicitly defined. Finally, many
of the legal facts necessary for the resolution of the legal rules are numerical in nature
and measurable. The rules are formulated such that deductive reasoning, as the mode of
inference, produces authoritatively acceptable results. It is these characteristics that make
it possible to create computer models of legal analysis in the personal income tax context,
and computationally reason about those results.
IV. LEGAL INDETERMINACY IN COMPUTER MODELS

A. Linking Legal and Computer Models ofLegal Analysis
As argued so far, the thesis of this Article is that portions of the law that appear
more determinate - that is, that exhibit fewer of the dimensions of indeterminacy in the
liability determination process - will likely be more computable by rules-based
automated reasoning systems. In this section I will explore, from the computer science
perspective, why a legal context that is more formalist and determinate will be more
amenable to automated legal analysis.
1. Understanding Computer Modeling of Legal Contexts
We frequently use computers to analyze data that represent some phenomenon or
aspect of the real world. To do this, we represent the data and the knowledge about the
phenomenon or feature that we are aiming to analyze in a symbolic structure capable of
being manipulated by computer systems. 246 This computational representation of the
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I.R.C. §1 (2000).
26A

spreadsheet representing the income of a small business is a familiar example. In such
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phenomenon is known as the computer model. Computer models frequently aim to
simplify the phenomenon that they are trying to represent in order to make analysis
tractable while still preserving its essential features to make such analysis useful. In the
case of automated legal reasoning systems, we are attempting to create a computer model
of particular laws and the manner in which they are actually applied within the legal
system to particular factual circumstances. Computer models can be top-down, logically
structured or statistical in nature; the focus of my analysis is on the former. Useful
results from a computer system are only as good as the underlying computer model of the
phenomenon or aspect of the real world that is to be represented.
The degree to which software engineers can create useful computer models of
legal decision-making in a given context is dependent upon the degree to which legal
decision-making in a given context is relatively determinate. This is because a software
engineer has to create a computer model of the relevant features of the decision-making
process from the perspective of the legal officials who are the official arbiters in that
context. Such a model of decision-making might include, among other things, a model of
the laws (and other factors) that determine legal outcomes in a particular context, and the
manner in which these factors are applied. The easier it is to determine ex ante with
specificity the legal rules and factors that go into official decisions in a particular context,
the easier it will be for a software engineer to ex ante create an accurate computer model
which incorporates these relevant considerations.
To understand why, consider the task of the software engineer who is modeling
just one portion of the legal decision-making process - the set of legal rules and factors
that govern outcomes. To produce useable results, computer models of legal decisionmaking must accurately represent the way official decisions are actually made in that
context. As noted previously, in any given context, officials can consider a wide range of
factors in their decision-making - from explicitly positive statutes to implicit and
"penumbral" considerations. Outcomes depend not only upon positive statutory laws,
administrative regulations and case-law precedent, but also common law doctrines,
principles of justice, fairness, or equity, private and public institutional dynamics, the
persuasiveness of arguments, ideological and personal considerations, public policy
concerns, and rights and interest balancing of competing parties. Thus, in theory, to
accurately represent decision-making, a computer model might need to represent any or
all of these types of considerations.
Imagine the difficulty of creating a fixed computer model of a legal rule-set in a
relatively indeterminate legal context. First, the relevant legal rules and other
considerations employed by officials in decision-making may not be consistent from one
instance to the next. For example, in the First Amendment context, there may be little
consistency in the degree to which judges employ public policy concerns to resolve
decisions from one case to the next. It may not be possible to predict the impact of any
given factor in any particular instance with the certainty required by a computer model.
Thus, a relatively static computer model may be fundamentally at odds with the way
a spreadsheet, the creator deems particular spreadsheet cells to represent inflows or outflows of
cash over a particular time. The computer is able to calculate and manipulate the numeric cash
values in the spreadsheet cells. Because of the structure imposed by the creator in assigning
meaning to particular cells, and relating that meaning to the actual business, we can consider such
a spreadsheet as an abstracted computer model of the cash flow of that particular business.
72
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decision-making tends to occur in particular contexts. Second, certain factors that
influence legal decision-making are extremely difficult to model computationally because
they are simply too abstract or complex. For example, to the extent that specific concerns
of public policy or fairness consistently influence decision-making in a given context, it
may be impossible to usefully model the abstract and complex dynamics involved within
a computer model. Computer models often require a form of representative reductionism
of complex or abstract concepts and objects. Factors that are more abstract are
correspondingly more difficult to reduce to a representative computer form ex ante. In
particular legal contexts, official decisions routinely appear to take into consideration
abstract principles such as "fairness" into the outcome. It would be difficult to create a
meaningful computer representation of such a high level principle, because such
principles are frequently capable of a wide scope in interpretation, weight, and meaning
when actually employed by officials.
Let us consider a computer engineer who is attempting to create a computer
model of a relatively indeterminate legal context, but who does not include certain
difficult-to-model, yet influential factors, like public policy, that routinely influence legal
decision-making in that context. Let's first take the example of a nalve engineer who
does not have a nuanced legal theoretical understanding of decision-making in the First
Amendment context. That engineer may be tempted to simply computationally represent
the textual provisions of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment in her computer
model. She might chose to do so because the Constitutional textual provision is fixed and
relatively clear, or for practical reasons, because the other more abstract and
indeterminate considerations are simply too difficult to model computationally.
Such a computer model would not adequately represent legal actual legal
decision-making in that context. Such a textually focused model would miss the role that
other factors beyond textual provisions play in legal decision-making in that arena.
Clearly considerations such as historical bodies of case-law precedent, and competing
public policies of free speech versus public governance, instrumental concerns,
ideological, personal, and institutional dynamics, and factual nuances of an individual
factual scenario, bear on most decisions. Moreover, these considerations may factor
differently from case to case. The nalve software engineer who does not appreciate the
role of such malleable extra-textual factors, will not be able to appreciate the limits on the
creation of a useful computational model of legal decision-making in that context, nor the
problems with creating a top-down, formally structured computer model, which usefully
representing these considerations. 247
As noted, some researchers have created statisticalmodels of legal decision-making in
relatively indeterminate legal contexts. In these statistical models, certain variables are found to
be relatively predictive of outcomes. See Martin et al., supra note 4. In that article, a statistical
analysis of Supreme Court decisions determined that cases from the D.C. Circuit were likely to be
affirmed by the Supreme Court. This, and several other general variables (such as whether a
lower decision was classified as liberal), were predictive of legal outcomes. Such a list of
variables, and their relative weighting, can also be considered a model of legal decision-making
in a particular context -albeit a statistical model. The difference is that top-down, logically
structured models attempt to express meaning explicitly, whereas the variables found within
statistical models represent a variety of implicit data. Statistical models can be very robust, and
can often expose relationships that were unknown to those attempting to create a top-down,
247
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By contrast, in a relatively determinate legal context, it will be more feasible to
create a representative computer model of the relevant set of factors and legal rules that
determine decision-making. This is because the implicit and explicit constraints on
choice and judgment act as a simplifying filter on legal decision-making. There are
relatively fewer types of decisional factors for an engineer to model in a computer
system, and those that are left to represent, tend to be more ex ante determinable, and
more straightforward to represent computationally. Although legal formalism may be an
inadequate descriptive theoretical model for most of American legal decision-making,
and although legally formalist contexts are frequently criticized as inflexible and
mechanical where they do exist, the simplification and determinacy of formal and
determinate legal contexts turns out to be a benefit rather than a drawback from a
computer modeling perspective.
To illustrate the point, let us consider a software engineer computationally
representing the rule-set in a relatively determinate area such as the personal income tax
context. The software engineer will be justified in omitting many of the abstract and
indeterminate decisional factors - for example political or policy considerations - from
her computer model. This is because the constraints on what officials can bring to bear
on decision-making in that context permit us to essentially abstract away these factors
from consideration; such factors are not permitted to routinely impact legal decisionmaking in that context. The decisional restrictions upon official legal decision-making
across multiple dimensions of indeterminacy, allow us to safely ignore these
considerations and still have a relatively accurate computational model of legal decisionmaking in that context.
In such a determinate legal context, a software engineer will be justified in simply
relying upon representing the explicit positive statutory laws and regulations in her
computer model, to the exclusion of other types of legal inputs. This is because in those
contexts, through implicit and explicit norms of restraint and forbearance on official
choice and review in legal decision-making, the easily identifiable positive provisions are
the primary factors in decision-making in most instances. For example, for many, tax
filers, our system has intentionally limited consideration to the ex ante fixed and
determinable set of legal provisions contained within Title 26 of the Federal Code and
related IRS regulations.248 Because of this relative determinacy, engineers are capable of
creating accurate computer models of the relevant legal rule-set in software systems such
as Turbotax.249 Were the majority of personal income tax decisions based upon a highly
malleable set of legal rules determined on an ad hoc basis at litigation-time by officials,
fixed, accurate computer models would not be possible. The more that the rule-set that
governs official legal decision-making in a particular context is ex ante determinable and
fixed, the more likely engineers will be able to created representative computer models of
the governing rule-set.

logical model.
Samuel Donaldson, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals: Cases, Problems &
Materials (2nd ed. 2007) 3-4.
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A useable computer model must also have a representation of the decisionmaking process - the way in which legal rules are used and applied -- in a given context.
Determinacy considerations with regards to analytical processes will also impact our
ability to produce an accurate model. The more that actual decision-making occurs
according to a consistent, constrained, and determinate process, the easier it will be to
model the process computationally.
For example, if legal decision-makers and
laypersons consistently employ textual, deductive legal reasoning to derive legal
outcomes, such a process will be more amenable to computational models. To the extent
that the process is ad hoc, inconsistent, and reliant upon more flexible modes of inference
- such as analogical reasoning -- within a given context, the more difficult it will be to
create a useable computer.
Finally, determinacy considerations relating to the form and content of legal rules
will impact the ability of computer systems to partially or fully automatically apply these
rules to facts. Let's assume that we have a set of legal rules that serve as the framework
for legal decision-making in a given determinate context. Because we are operating in a
relatively determinate legal context, we can be relatively certain that official legal
decisions will actually be based the product of deductive application of this set of legal
rules. Application of the legal rules in the context will consist of systematically
proceeding through the rules, and where relevant, resolving them element-by-element.
As noted previously, the simple fact that we have an agreed-upon, determinable
rule-set will not be sufficient to augment the determinacy of legal outcomes in a given
context. 250 Rather, the elements of the legal rules - the legal categories and criteria
within the body of the legal rules - must be sufficiently constrained such that their
application is clear under most instances.
Take, for example, a building code regulation that requires that the minimum
width of a window in a residential building is 20 inches.251 My assertion is that a
provision like this has been intentionally crafted so that when a layperson applies it to the
typical factual scenario, the legal outcome will be relatively determinate. Consider what
makes the application of this provision relatively determinate. First, the provision
employs a conceptually expressive legal category in its predicate - a "window." The
term "window" is conceptually expressive in the residential building code context
because there is a broad core of settled meaning in the term. Thus, even without an
explicit legislative definition, there is going to be widespread agreement between official
and layperson about what qualifies as a window based upon implicit context. The
strictures of language and context will correspondingly constrain official choice. 252
250

See, e.g., J. Clark Kelso, Judicial Technology in the Courts, 44 Am. Jur. Trials 1 20

(Describing a computer system that formalized the structure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. While the structure wvas formalized in computer form, the application of the
individual components of the guideline contained criteria that were largely discretionary and left
for the judge).
251
See, e.g., The International Residential Code, §R 310.1.3, requiring a minimum 20 inch
width for at least one window in any bedroom.

See Schauer, supra note 117, at 512. Schauer describes the way in which conceptually
expressive words constrain official choice, noting, "When I say that pelicans are birds, the truth
252
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Contrast the expressiveness of the term "window" with a less expressive legal category
such as "the best edition of a work" found in the Copyright code. 253
Conceptually expressive terms may be inherently constraining. Officials who
wish to depart from core meaning in adopting an idiosyncratic interpretation will bear
costs in doing so, including the costs of justifying their departure through explanation, the
risk of having a decision overturned, and social norms that penalize such departures as
improper. Over the long run, these costs should act to constrain the typical application.
Additional implicit or explicit policies restraining official review and discretion can
bolster determinacy by limiting the opportunities of officials to routinely challenge
determinations by laypersons within the accepted range of meaning.
Moreover, the residential construction context is probably such that we would
imagine that the typical instance of a window is going to be relatively non-contestable.
True, there may be exceptions, but it is important to consider how common the
exceptions are relative to the typical case. It is probably not the case that the grey area perhaps a wall made of glass bricks -- will dominate the typical case, and or that for each
and every instance of a window in a house design, the architect will debate whether it is
or is not an archetypal window. We can expect the term window to cover the majority of
anticipated cases without controversy. When examined in their entirety, we would
imagine the majority of actual windows to be likely exemplars of prototypical windows,
even if there is the occasional exception. The consistency of the likely factual scenarios
arising in a given context is important for determinacy. There must be a correspondence
between chosen terminology and range of plausible facts such that term uncontroversially
covers the typical, anticipated case. Not every regulable context shares this characteristic
of consistent, anticipatable facts.
Finally, the legal standard to be applied to the window is formally realizable.
That is, we can determine compliance or non-compliance with this provision by a
relatively objective, external metric -the width of the window measured in inches. In the
typical instance, the architect who designs a window to these specifications can be
relatively certain about prima-facie compliance with the regulation.
The same characteristics that make the application of this provision relatively
determinate also make it more likely that we can make such a provision computable. An
automated reasoning system can only apply and resolve legal categories if the logic
underlying the category, and the data representing real world facts, have been structured
in manner processable by computers. We can imagine two ways in which this might
happen. In a partially automated analysis, a computer system can take advantage of an
explicit assertion on the part of a person as to the applicability of an element within a
legal rule.
To continue with our example, let's imagine an architect has created an
architectural design for a residential house, using electronic architectural drafting
software such as AutoCAD. In the process of creating his electronic blueprint, he has
explicitly designated within that system that certain architectural elements in a particular
blueprint are "windows." Moreover, assume that the width of the window was precisely
designated in the design. An automated legal reasoning system could take advantage of
of the statement follows inexorably from the meaning of the term 'bird.'".
253
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the architect's assertion that a particular element should be considered a window for legal
compliance purposes, to determine whether the design complied with the minimum width
provision. This "legal" assertion - that a particular element in is a "window" for which
there are relevant governing legal provisions - has been captured in semantic, structured
data in the electronic architectural design, and is hence processable by such a system.
We can term such an assertion about a legal category, element, or standard that
has been memorialized in structured data, capable of being analyzed by a computer, a
"captured legal assertion." 254 Potentially useable legal assertions are captured more
commonly than most people realize. In the process of carrying out everyday business
and personal interactions, it is not unusual to record and store explicit information about
those interactions, which can be harnessed for legal compliance purposes. For example,
consider a credit card issued to an employee for business use. If the card has been used
appropriately, a corporation might take advantage of the fact that each use of this
business credit card can be thought of as an implicit legal assertion that the purchase was
for business purposes. Access to data about such purchases that have been pre-classified
as business expenses can enable increased automation concerning tax compliance and
business expense deductions. Similar examples will be found in any field that regularly
keeps and depends upon electronic records. Businesses and individuals routinely make
implicit and explicit assertions about real world objects or transactions which, when
captured electronically, can be increasingly employed to automate legal assessment in
relatively determinate contexts.
Employing this idea, certain laws might be reformulated so that the resolution of
legal criteria might be made formally realizable by an explicit, statutory rule which links
determination of that criteria to particular types of data. Such formally realizable rules
are not always possible or useful in every context, as an explicit rule often requires
reductionism in regulatory ability and flexibility. Legal rules amenable to computation
are simply not appropriate for every, or most, regulatory scenarios, given the tradeoffs
involved. However, in distinct situations, explicit rules based upon the resolution of data
might serve as a sufficiently useful proxy for more complex regulatory goals. This is just
to emphasize the following point: simply because contemporary computers do not have
the technical capability for exercising independent, human-like legal judgment, need not
mean that they cannot be used for automatic regulation where appropriate, as long as
regulators realistically understand the technological limitations and social and regulatory
tradeoffs.

Even without such an explicit assertion on the part of an architect, we could imagine
other ways in which an automated system might logically infer that a particular architectural
element found in an electronic building design is a "window," subject to compliance by the
example provision. There might be an implicit rule describing windows that the computer system
might take advantage of. For example, there are particular architectural symbols that represent
windows that follow precise rules. A computer with a rule capable of deciphering these symbols
might infer which elements are windows, and then analyze whether they are compliant with the
provision. Finally, we could imagine there being a legal definition of a "window" containing a
precise rule for resolving and applying that element.
254
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2. What it Means for a Computer to "Understand" the Law
In a computer system that purports to engage in reasoning about the law and
liability, the computer system must have some "understanding" about the substance of
the law. What does it mean for a computer to have an understanding of the law? At its
most basic level, this simply means that the underlying logic of the law is faithfully
represented within the computer system. All computer systems that purport to engage in
legal reasoning about laws assessing liability, have, on some level, a computerized
"version" or representation of the laws, in a form that the computer is able to understand.
There are many means of representing the logic underlying laws in computer
systems. Earlier in the Article, I noted that almost every law can be formulated into an
"if-then" statement. This is because most laws are formed in such a way that they
constitute a general description of a factual situation and behavior to be regulated - for
example "driving a vehicle on a highway over 65 miles per hour" - followed by the legal
consequences should that situation actually arise.
Thus, most laws can be re-formulated in the form IF General Description of
Situation THEN Legal Consequences (civil or criminal liability).
At a simple level, computer systems purporting to engage in rules-based legal
analysis often replicate this If-Then logical formulation. But the transition from written
English rules to computer logical rules is not automatic. This If-Then structure must be
translated by a person into computer understandable form. This usually means that the
logic is replicated within a computer programming language. It is an important point that
there is an essential translation going on in that process. A person - often a computer
programmer must ultimately make an interpretation of the law - usually guided by an
attorney or attorneys - and as closely as possible replicate the underlying logic of the law
in the logic of software. Thus, within the personal income tax software that determines
liability under the personal income tax code, there is a computer understandable
representation of the logic of personal income tax laws. Such software contains internal
symbolic representations of the logic underlying the provisions of the personal income
tax code in a structured form capable of being processed by the computer.
For example, take the section of the personal income tax code that sets out the
federal tax rates for marginal dollars earned. This is found in 26 U.S.C. § 1. In this
section, the statute sets the tax rate for marginal dollar depending on income earned.
What is the "substance" of this law to be translated into computer understandable form?
It is the underlying logic that tells readers which tax rate to apply to additional dollars
over certain income thresholds.
For example, in 2008, unmarried income tax filers had to pay federal taxes at a
rate of 330 for every dollar of income earned over $164,550 but below $357,700, and a
rate of 3500 for every dollar earned over $357, 700.255 In a computerized reasoning
system which aimed to model the substance of this law and ultimately apply it, this
underlying substance must be translated into computer code in such a way that preserves
the underlying logic of the section. Thus, at a very basic level, we can think of this
translation as a series of logical "if-then" statements, which say roughly, "IF income is
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I.R.C. § 1(c) (2000).
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greater than $164,000 and less than or equal to $357,700, THEN the tax rate is 33%."256
Because the logic of the substance of the law has been preserved and translated in the
way that the computer can apply, we can say that the computer, in a very loose sense
"understands" what the law means. Moreover, systems often have access to the data
necessary to apply and resolve these legal provisions. Because income information can
often be accessed, downloaded, and aggregated, along with information about the
properties of the income (e.g. when acquired, source, type), the system can automatically
apply the rules to determine tax liability in many instances.
Of course, many laws are much more complicated to represent than a tax
schedule, which is mostly mathematical in nature. Representation in computer form of
an object or concept often involves a form of simplification and reductionism in
translating its underlying logic or meaning into computational form. We can imagine that
many legal concepts - e.g. negligence or good faith - are simply too complex,
amorphous, or contestable to be meaningfully represented by a series of logical
statements and their interrelationships in an isolated computer system.
Note further that in the previous example, the computer was not required to
exercise discretion or judgment in legal application - something beyond the ability of
contemporary computers. Nonetheless, in a meaningful way, the system was able to
efficiently resolve legal liability. Hence the connection between legal determinacy and
amenability to computation - it is the very fact that relatively determinate legal categories
and criteria are typically less abstract and more realizable that increases our ability to
represent and resolve them computationally based upon their underlying logic. Finally,
consider that the task of resolving liability, while relatively mechanical and determinate
from a legal theoretical standpoint, was by no means simple or trivial from a legal
compliance standpoint. In real terms, the task of aggregating data - for example income
data - from multiple sources, and applying them to multiple legal provisions, is one of
considerable informational complexity in terms of potential transaction costs, yet was
capable of being automated.
We might also think of the related problem of interpretation by the computer
programmer. By converting the substantive logic of a law into computer logic, the
computer programmer has effectively made an assertion about the definitive
interpretation of a law. As a practical matter, we know that laws are often subject to
multiple interpretations. We might be worried about computer systems that purport to fix
authoritative interpretations of the law in computer logic, when such interpretations are
open to debate. Although it is not the subject of this Article, it is worth reflecting upon
the fact that private companies that produce personal income tax software which are used
by millions of U.S. tax filers, have become the de-facto arbiters of meaning of much of
U.S. law, simply by virtue of their position as logical translator of software.
To take another simple example of a computer system purporting to represent the
substantive logic of the law. Consider traffic law enforcement systems like "red light
cameras." These are electronic camera systems that are poised at intersections and
automatically take photos of vehicles passing through intersections when the traffic light
is red for vehicular code violations. We can think of the red light cameras as enforcing a
In reality, such provisions would be represented in a much more sophisticated
computational form.
256
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particular portion of the vehicle code - the prohibition on driving through intersections
against red lights. 257 What this means practically, is that somewhere within this device is
a rudimentary logical representation of the substance of the portion of the vehicle code
governing driving through red lights. This example might not be so obvious, because the
logic may be implicit in the design as to way the device works, rather through an explicit
series of "If-Then" statements written in software.
Nonetheless, we can think of this system as replicating the basic logic underlying
the substance of the law. The substance of the law asserts that the crossing of an
intersection in the direction where the traffic light is red is a violation. The underlying
logic of the legal criterion in the provision is formally realizable. We can definitively
resolve whether this criterion applies in a given situation, because it has been formulated
to be determinable by a relatively objective, external metric - the position of the vehicle
in the intersection, and the status of the red light in the direction of the vehicle. To
determine a violation, a red light camera can sense both when the traffic light is red, and
when a vehicle is in the intersection in contradiction of the light. We can characterize the
camera as arriving at a prima-facie legal conclusion about the violation of this legal
provision when the car enters the intersection against the light. True, the camera might
not always be correct in identifying motor vehicles, and it might occasionally ticket for
legally excusable violations (e.g. an ambulance speeding to an emergency). I discuss such
issues in the next section when we characterize automated determinations as simply
prima-facie legal conclusions. Nonetheless, as long as the logic of a legal context can be
faithfully reproduced in computer-understandable form, and the legal categories and
criteria are formally realizable under accessible data, a system should be able to
reasonably analyze factual situations under it.
The lesson is that some legal contexts happen to be determinate enough that we
can make useful software models that capture their essential legal logic and meaning.
Lawmakers did not create these legal contexts with the express intention of enabling
automated legal analysis. Rather, they intended to create predictable and reliable legal
rules for laypersons, in contexts where certainty and reliability are paramount. It just so
happens that creating legal contexts that are determinate enough for laypersons to guide
their behavior with certainty, also happens to create the conditions for computability. In
other words, amenability to computation is simply a byproduct of particular aspects of
legal determinacy. Thus, one proxy for discovering areas of law that are likely to be
more amenable to computation is to focus on those legal rules requiring routine
compliance by laypersons in predictable scenarios.
By contrast, as I will suggest in the next section, lawmakers might intentionally
design legal rules with the express intention that they be computable. For example, FCC
rules for the use of radio spectrum might be designed from the outset by lawmakers, so
that electronic devices might automatically comply with the substantive restrictions on
their use. Creating legal rights and obligations with the primary intention that they be
computable is a different enterprise than modeling existing legal rights and obligations in
257
See, e.g., Cal. Veh. Code §21453 (2009) ("A driver facing a steady circular red signal
alone shall stop at a marked limit line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the near side
of the intersection or, if none, then before entering the intersection, and shall remain stopped until
an indication to proceed is shown. .. .)
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computational form. The difference is nuanced, but important, and requires important
reflection on the degree to which computable laws can serve underlying regulatory goals.
V. CREATING DETERMINATE LEGAL CONTEXTS

In this section, I argue that lawmakers can consciously calibrate the degree of
determinacy in a legal context. One reason that they might consider doing so is to make
liability in that legal context more amenable to assessment by automated computer
systems. Drawing from legal theory, I develop some general approaches for purposely
adjusting the degree of legal determinacy in a particular context that lawmakers might
pursue. Through this lens, they can explicitly consider the known trade-offs associated
with determinate and formal legal contexts.
A. Determinacy Varies By Legal Context
The argument up to this point has been that the relative amenability to
computation of a legal context is linked to a particular type of legal determinacy deductive, textual determinacy. Moreover, the degree of legal determinacy varies among
legal contexts. We have seen that legal contexts can be placed along a spectrum from
less to greater legal determinacy.
We have developed a theoretical means of
characterizing the degree of legal determinacy in a particular legal context. One of the
major contributions of the anti-formalist scholars was to provide a roadmap for the ways
in which legal contexts tend to be indeterminate. Even if particular legal outcomes
might be indeterminate, the overall structure of the ways in which legal outcomes tend to
be indeterminate, is itself relatively determinate. In other words, there is only a limited
number of ways in which legal outcomes tend to be indeterminate, and these points of
indeterminacy tend to come in a repeated and predictable structure. This overall
framework of the way in which legal contexts tend to be indeterminate, is what I have
termed the "dimensions of indeterminacy."
We can get a rough approximation of the degree of legal determinacy in a
particular, existing legal context, by comparing it to our abstract fully determinate context
- the idealized formalist model. This approach is to assess the context along known
points of indeterminacy. We can compare a given legal context - like the personal
income context - to the idealized formalist model. We can then see where that context
adheres to or departs from our idealized model. To the extent that it approximates that
model, that portion of law is characteristically formal, and to the extent that it departs
from that model it is non-formal and indeterminate. In this way, we can similarly
characterize the First Amendment context as relatively less determinate than the personal
income tax context along multiple dimensions.
B. The Degree of Determinacy in Law Can Be Calibrated
Not only can we characterize the relative degree of determinacy among legal
contexts, in this section, I contend that determinacy can be, and is, consciously
architected by lawmakers. This is based upon an important insight from the "Rules v.
81
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Standards" literature. This major idea is related to the concept of "choice of form" of law.
Choices that lawmakers employ in architecting the text of laws, in turn, can dramatically
affect the substance of the law, and how these laws are applied and enforced. This in
turns, tells us a great deal about how determinacy is instantiated in the law. 258
To recap, one basic idea underlying the rules and standards literature is that
lawmakers typically have the choice of multiple possible forms in which to express a
given law, in writing. In other words, if the goal of lawmakers is to regulate a particular
behavior, there are often different linguistic formulations of the law, and different levels
of abstraction, that we can roughly characterize as aiming at the same underlying
behavior. Depending on the particular form of the law chosen, there can be different
substantive results in the application of the law.
To use our familiar example, imagine that lawmakers want to pass a law
regulating unsafe driving. Lawmakers can choose between different linguistic versions
of the "same" law - different versions aiming at the same underlying behavior. In the
classic example, lawmakers might choose to create the unsafe driving law in the form of
a "rule":
Rule:
"No one shall drive a vehicle faster than 65 miles per hour."
versus the comparable law cast as a standard
Standard:
"No one shall drive a vehicle at unsafe speeds."
In both instances, these two laws, although cast in different linguistic forms and
levels of abstraction, are aiming to regulate the same underlying behavior of unsafe
driving. 259 Rules and standards can be seen as two poles of a particular dimension of
abstractness. Most laws can be thought of as residing on a continuum between rules and
standards, with some laws leaning towards the rule end, and others toward the standards
end, often with no obvious distinction.
As discussed previously, a primary characteristic that makes a particular legal
directive more like a rule, rather than like a standard, is that has a strong degree of factual
determinability. This means that the legal criterion or category is structured such that one
can determine, with a relatively strong degree of certainty, whether a rule has been
violated in a given factual situation. Stating rule elements in terms of concrete,
measurable properties of objects and entities involved in factual situations is the typical
approach.260 As Duncan Kennedy has described it, "The extreme of formal realizability is
a directive to an official that requires him to respond to the presence together of each of a
list of easily distinguishable factual aspects of a situation by intervening in a determinate

See Kennedy, supra note 178, at 1710 ("In picking a form through which to achieve
some goal, we are almost always making a statement that is independent or at least
distinguishable from the statement we make in choosing the goal itself.").
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Harry Surden, StructuralRights in Privacy, 60 S.M.U. L. Rev. 1605, 1616 (2007).
Id. at 1710.
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way. 261 The consequence of creating a law in the form of a rule that exhibits "formal
realizability," is that there is greater ex ante certainty about legal outcomes for
hypothetical and actual scenarios under the rule. 262 The rule is therefore more legally
determinate.
In the frame of this Article's model, we can see that the text of a law is just one of
the many dimensions that lawmakers can theoretically calibrate to increase constrained
predictability. We can think of the "Rules v. Standards" literature as making the point
that opportunity for choice can be architected by lawmakers through the tool of the
language and form employed in formulating a law. But "textual form" is just but one of
the many, potential points of indeterminacy in performing legal analysis. The idealized
formalist model identified several other dimensions of potential indeterminacy or choice.
We can therefore extend the basic insight from the Rules and Standards literature
about lawmaker choices in formulating laws. We can think, more generally, that
lawmakers can architect increased determinacy by ex ante reducing known points of
ambiguity and by ex ante limiting opportunities to interject uncertainty and choice in the
law within a predictable structure. The next section will formulate two general
approaches to this idea.
C. DisambiguatingMeta-Rules to Increase Determinacy

How do lawmakers calibrate the degree of determinacy or indeterminacy in a
given legal context? I suggest that one way they do this is through disambiguatingmeta
rules. A meta-rule is a "rule about a rule." Rules regulate some subject matter. The
subject matter that meta-rules regulate is other rules. A disambiguating meta-rule is a
particular type of meta-rule which has been explicitly promulgated by a lawmaker to ex
ante settle or constrain a predictable, and potentially open point of indeterminacy. Thus,
lawmakers and other official legal decision-makers can make decision-making in a given
legal context incrementally more determinate by explicitly resolving predictable points of
legal uncertainty through the promulgation of disambiguating meta-rules.
In order to understand meta-rules generally, it is helpful to look H.L.A. Hart's
analogous distinction in asserting that all laws can be classified as either primary or
secondary rules. 263 The crucial distinction is that primary rules concern the regulation of
basic human behavior. 264 Primary laws spell out the behaviors that people are prohibited
from doing or required to do under the law - for example, the prohibition of stealing or
the requirement to pay taxes. 265 Secondary rules are all of the other laws that aren't
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Kennedy, supra note 179, at 1687-88.
22Cass

Sunstein, Problems With Rules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953, 998-1002 (1995).

23See Hart, supra note 31, at 77-90.

Of course laws regulate non-human entities, such as governments and corporations, but
for simplicity purposes, I leave omit this.
264

25See Hart, supra note 31, at 77-90.
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primary rules - that aren't concerned with the basic substance of what people can and
cannot do. 266 Rather, secondary rules are mainly concerned with how the legal system
itself operates - official rules about the process of creating 267 or changing legal
obligations. 268 Hart's secondary rules are analogous to my use of the terminology "metarules," in that purpose of meta-rules is not to regulate something that is the primary
concern of the system (e.g rights and obligations). Rather, the concern of meta-rules is to
regulate some aspect (e.g. determinacy and predictability of substantive rules in the case
of disambiguatingmeta-rules) of substantive rules that in turn are the primary concern of
the legal system. In my formulation, meta-rules provide clarifying information about
other rules, or topics touched upon or omitted by other rules.
It is important to distinguish between two distinct uses of the word "rule" in this
Article. In the previous section, I spoke of a rule in the "Rules v. Standards" context. 269
In that context, the term suggested a particular categorization of a form of law that lawmakers sometimes elect. A law formed in the manner of a "rule," such as a numerical
speed limit of 65 miles per hour, exhibits a high degree of formal realizability. It is thus
more formal, and liability is ex ante relatively more predictable under a given set of
factual circumstances (e.g. a vehicle traveling 80 miles per hour). By contrast, in this
section, when I speak of a rule in the sense of a "meta-rule," I refer to the generic use of
the term "rule," which simply means a directive that regulates behavior, regardless of
form. In that generic sense, all laws are rules. To avoid confusion, I will refer to the
"Rules v. Standards" meaning as a formally realizable law.

A disambiguating meta-rule is an explicitly promulgated rule by a lawmaker that
ex ante resolves an anticipated, potential point of indeterminacy in legal decision-making
in a given context. Thus, lawmakers and other official legal decision-makers can make
an area of law more formalist or determinate by resolving legal uncertainties through the
promulgation of disambiguating meta-rules. A common example of a disambiguating
meta-rule can occur in the interpretation of legal writing.
A good example of a disambiguating meta-rule comes from the Copyright Act. In
several places, the act includes lists of exemplars, prefaced by the language "such as."
For example, in describing the copyright doctrine of fair use, the act states, "the fair use
of a copyrighted work...for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
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Hart also described primary rules as those that are "duty imposing" and secondary rules

as those that are "power conferring." See K.-K. Lee, Hart's Primaryand Secondary Rules, 77

Mind 561 (1968).
For example, a well known secondary rule is the "rule of recognition." This, according
to Hart's positivist theory, is a rule that society uses to officially create substantive laws.
267

28D.

Gerber, Levels ofRules and Hart's Concept of Law, 81 Mind 102 (1972).

269
The term "rule" has emerged from the literature as the common way of referring to a law
which is formally realizable. This is unfortunate terminology, because it is so ambiguous, given
that the term "rule" has so many meanings. However, I will continue to use the term "rule" in
order to be consistent with the existing scholarship.
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teaching,...scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 270 This "such
as" language potentially raises a known and commonly repeated pattern of ambiguity and
point of potential indeterminacy: Is this meant to be an exclusive list or an illustrative
list? In statutory interpretation, this ambiguity is usually settled by resort to one of the
canons of statutory construction. On one side, there is the canon of construction
expressio unius est exclusio alterius - the express mention of one thing excludes all

others. This would imply that that lists of items in legislation should generally be
interpreted as exclusive and closed-ended. On the other side, is the common meaning of
the phrase "such as" which suggests an open ended, or illustrative list.
Based upon common interpretation practices, most would probably give the
interpretation as an open-ended illustrative list the edge based upon the "such as"
language. However, there would certainly be a debatable point of ambiguity here. The
Copyright Act specifically addresses this potential point of indeterminacy with a
disambiguating meta-rule. The act states, "The terms 'including' and 'such as' are
illustrative and not limitative." 27 1 In directly resolving this potential point of
indeterminacy, the Copyright Act was made incrementally more determinate than it
otherwise would have been.
Interpretive Process Meta-Rules
Another example will illustrate other applications of disambiguating meta-rules.
In interpreting contracts or legislation, there are often open questions about the purpose
of the legislation and about the intended "mode of interpretation" of the legislation. This
is a potential source of indeterminacy, because at a later point, there could be open,
equally plausible arguments about the desired mode of interpretation of legislation by the
authors.
To use a familiar example, there are often debates about whether to employ
originalist or non-originalist modes of interpretation in Constitutional cases. In theory,
authors of such documents can include self-referencing disambiguating meta-rules within
the document itself which can reduce (although not completely eliminate) a potential
source of indeterminacy. For example, we could imagine a version of the United States
Constitution that explicitly included a clause that said, "The default mode of
interpretation for this document should be to give meaning as it was originally
understood by the authors at the time of writing." 272 Or, we could equally imagine a
clause indicating that the default mode of interpretation should be "flexible to take into
account changing societal values and realities." These are both examples of
disambiguating meta-rules which help make an area of law incrementally more
determinate by disambiguating an outstanding indeterminacy.

2017

U.S.C. §107.

271

17 U.S.C. §101.
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See Andrew C oan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in ConstitutionalInterpretation, 158

U. Pa. L. Rev. 1025, 1040 n.47 (discussing normative implications of such a hypothetical
provision).
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Meta-rules can be implicit or explicit. For example, let's apply this idea to the
personal income tax context and consider once again what makes this context relatively
more determinate, and hence computable. The vast majority of tax filers believe that they
only need to consult the legal rules contained within the personal income tax code, and do
not need to look to other areas of law, such as antitrust law in order to be compliant with
the law. Although there is some number of filers who have very complex tax filings who
are perhaps exceptions to this rule, there are many filers who fit this profile.
What justifies this belief that their legal duty is satisfied by examining only those
rules contained within the personal income tax context? In many other areas of law, this
is an open area of indeterminacy - it is often quite arguable that many other areas might
govern a particular liability context. How did this disambiguation come about? Such
taxpayers justified in their belief in two ways: formally, through the language of the
personal income tax code 273 , and informally, because of official conduct on the part of
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Let's explore the latter, considering the norm of
forbearance as an informal meta-rule. The IRS accepts the filings of millions of taxpayers
who have only assessed their tax liability under the personal income tax code. From a
practical standpoint, we can think of the IRS as having created an informal or implicit
disambiguating meta-rule, which collapses a potential point of indeterminacy, into a point
of relative determinacy. The IRS is implicitly validating the conduct, for most taxpayers
of ignoring other (arguably relevant) bodies of law by refraining from consistently
challenging the determination of tax-liability based primarily on the provisions of Title
26.
This informal, meta-rule example is important, because it represents an overall
theoretical approach for creating new areas of law that are amenable to computation. As
I mentioned earlier, part of why practically determinate contexts are relatively more
computable is that we can think of them as simplifying filters for the creation of accurate
computer reasoning models. Should lawmakers choose to make new and future areas
more amenable to computation, they can consciously do so by promulgating
disambiguating meta-rules to collapse points of indeterminacy to make them more
determinate.
Similarly, lawmakers could choose to ignore the potential area of
indeterminacy, implicitly creating indeterminacy about this point of legal decisionmaking.
D. Making Non-Amenable Areas of Law Amenable to Computation

1. Standards Often Decompose Into Rules
We can employ the ideas of this Article to discover other formal elements in the
law. As suggested previously, formal and determinate legal contexts are more likely to
be amenable to computation than others. We can use this approach to find portions of the
law that previously seemed non-amenable to computation, and make them more
For the formal disambiguating meta-rule language, see 26 U.S.C. §1 ("There is hereby
imposed on the taxable income of every a tax determined in accordance with the following table")
(emphasis added).
273
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amenable. Let's consider rules and standards as opposites on the spectrum of relative
determinacy. In theory, standards are less determinate and more subject to uncertainty
and discretion. However in practice, many indeterminate standards actually decompose
into determinate rules. 274 That is, in order to comply with discretionary standards,
laypersons looking to comply with the law often, for a practical matter, construct
intermediate "rules" that are much more administrable that they believe are compliant
with the standards. Thus, much of the law that appears not-amenable to computation,
might be more amenable than it seems upon first glance, if we can capture these informal
intermediate rules, which are said to be compliant with the law.
For example, let's revisit our earlier example of submitting "business expenses"
as a tax deduction from a theoretical vantage point. The phrase "business expense" is a
classic standard, in that it is indeterminate, open-ended, and not well defined. However,
as we observed previously, many individuals, in an effort to comply with legal standards
such as this, actual adopt implicit rules in practice. People and businesses cannot
typically function in an environment of complete legal uncertainty, so they often adopt
intermediate rules and policies that they believe are a good proxy for compliance with
legal standards.
It is these rules and policies that we might be able to capture computationally.
Thus, a business user might adopt an administrable rule that he uses his business credit
card only for lodging and travel expenses incurred during business trips. In this case, the
previously indeterminate standard has decomposed into a determinate rule. According to
the thesis of this Article, since this rule serves as a proxy for the standard, but is now
more formal and determinate, this might be captured in automated reasoning systems.
Such systems might be able to incorporate business expenses under this formal rule
because there is a implicit legal assertion that the expenses coming from the business
credit card are fall under the legal "business expense" standard. It is possible to capture,
within computer systems, this previously indeterminate aspect of income tax law.
Let's take another example of a law phrased as a standard, which, for practical
compliance purposes, might collapse into an intermediate rule. 275 One building code
regulation indicates that in order to comply with the American With Disabilities Act, 276
door handles must not "require tight grasping". 277 The phrase "tight grasping" is a
classic standard in that it is indeterminate and open-ended. However, imagine an
architect attempting to comply with this open-ended standard in practice. She might
create an informal intermediate rule. We can imagine an offical industry organization
that tests door handles for "tight graspability," and certifies certain models as compliant
Frederick S-chauer, The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulfication of Standards, 14 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 803 (2005).
274
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Id. at 805-809.
26See

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §12101, et. Seq).
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Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines §4.13.9 ("Door Hardware.
Handles, pulls, latches, locks, and other operating devices on accessible doors shall have a shape
that is easy to grasp with one hand and does not require tight grasping, tight pinching, or twisting
of the wrist to operate.").
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with this legal standard. Thus, the architect might choose to comply with this loose
standard by adherence to the intermediate rule: use only such ADA certified door handles
in buildings.2 78 It is not difficult to imagine automating reasoning systems capturing this
data in a system in which architects are attempting to automatically comply with the
building code regulations. An architect, on his computerized building design, might
indicate that a particular door handle will be built using a specific approved product
model, which in turn, can be automatically verified as compliant under the rule. By
harnessing this fact that a previously indeterminate standard has been rendered
effectively determinate by decomposition through an intermediate rule, the effective
domain of computability has been expanded.
2. Desirable Traits of a Formal Legal Rule
We can think of lawmakers as having a choice in regulating. They can regulate
the same underlying behavior by fashioning a law as a determinate rule, or an
indeterminate standard. One well-known problem is that determinate rules are often both
underinclusive and overinclusive relative to the behavior that they aim to regulate. 279
Thus, to use our speed limit example once again, in passing a law that "no one shall drive
a vehicle faster than 65 miles per hour," lawmakers may truly care about regulating the
underlying behavior of "unsafe driving." However, the rule - "greater than 65 miles per
hour" might be an administrable and formally realizable proxy for the standard "unsafe
driving." While in theory, lawmakers would like to only apply the law to instances of
"unsafe driving," administrability and cost issues might make this an unduly costly law to
apply.
Since the rule "greater than 65 miles per hour" is only a proxy for the behavior
that lawmakers would like to actually regulate, the rule is going to be both under and over
inclusive to that target behavior when actually applied. Thus, we might have instances of
drivers traveling at 64 miles per hour, but driving unsafely, who would fall outside the
bounds of the rule. Similarly, we might see drivers traveling at 66 miles per hour in a
very safe manner. The different levels of abstraction at which the rule and the standard
exist make this imperfect fit inevitable.
Nonetheless, we can conceive of a metric for a desirable determinate rule. We
can think of factual situations in which both the rule and the standard would apply, as the
"overlap" between the two domains. For a formal rule to be an effective proxy for a
standard, there should be a high degree of overlap between factual situations covered by
both the rule, and the standard. Underinclusiveness occurs in factual situations when the
standard applies but not the rule, and overinclusiveness occurs when the rule applies, but
not the standard. Although imperfect overlap is inevitable, a high degree of overlap, with
only a small percentage of cases falling under only one or the other, is the desirable
metric in a good proxy rule.

Charles S. Han, Kincho H. Law, & John C. Kunz, Making Automated Building Code
Checking a Reality, Facility Mgmt. J., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 22-28.
278
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Surden, supra note 259, at 1627.
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This metric has implications to the extent that lawmakers consider making more
formal and determinate previously less determinate areas of law, to allow them to be
processable by computers. If indeterminate areas of law are incrementally changed into
more determinate areas of law, we should explicitly consider the extent to which the
reformulated rules overlap with the general behavior that we desire to regulate. To the
extent that the overlap is slight and many exceptions occur, the reformulated rule might
be inadequate.
Prima-Facie Automated Compliance
Finally, what of the primary objection to determinate legal contexts - that they
produce unjust results when officials are unable to take into account exceptional
circumstances to avoid literal, but unreasonable outcomes? To reemphasize, I don't
mean to suggest that lawmakers should have a policy of creating increasingly determinate
laws in many, or most contexts simply to enable computability. Lawmakers need to
balance the degree of overlap against other potential tradeoffs in terms of flexibility and
fairness in regulation. Legal determinacy is not the primary value to be emphasized in
many contexts concerning individual rights, fairness, and other fundamental concerns.
This suggests a rather limited role for fully determinate contexts.
Nonetheless, there are structural concepts that might be employed to balance the
tradeoff between legal certainty and official discretion, in contexts, where, for example,
economic efficiency is the primary value considered. One notion is the idea that
automated legal analysis is only prima-facie in nature. Essentially, to the extent that legal
outcomes are determinate enough to be computable - such as in the personal income tax
context - the result from the automated reasoning system might represent only a "first
cut" or prima-facie legal analysis, rather than have a legally determinative effect. In
different contexts, lawmakers could selectively choose what weight officials should give
to computer-generated legal conclusions, and to what extent, and at what rate, to review
and take objections to logically derived conclusions.
A prima-facie weight might have a similar effect as the restraint imposed upon
official discretion by a legal presumption. In that way, it may be possible to get the
efficiency benefits of automated conclusions - if the exceptions are rare - while retaining
some of the flexibility for avoiding unwanted outcomes. Computerized systems are be
able to precisely identify the rules and data that led to their automated prima-facie legal
determinations. A layperson relying upon such a determination could point to this series
of steps as a good-faith basis for their legal position. Nonetheless, officials or laypersons
might also have opportunity to contest these automated results in some instances. In
most legal contexts, we have non-officials conducting the majority of day-to-day legal
analyses, with legal officials only weighing in with authoritative pronouncements
occasionally in formal settings. If we could gauge the rate at which non-official primafacie analyses of legal outcomes matched officially determined legal outcomes, this
would be a good measure of the ex ante determinability of legal outcomes in that context.
Something like this might already be occurring, at least implicitly, in the personal
income tax context. For some significant percentage of filers, the deductive application
of the rules produces satisfactory results -so the prima-facie automated conclusions are
sufficient and acceptable to both layperson and official. The percentage of satisfactory
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cases is high enough that society can get the benefits of the efficiency gains of
automating compliance. However, for some percentage of those who fall under the
exceptions due to increased complexity, or to the inflexibility of legal rules, they have the
opportunity to make their case through appeal if necessary. In this way, lawmakers might
intelligently balance efficiency and flexibility in particular contexts.

VI. CONCLUSION

The theoretical limits and scope of automated legal analysis can best be
understood through the lens of legal theory. In presenting a model for where in the law
automated legal analysis is possible and why, we can think of this Article as also having
developed a more general model of determinacy of legal outcomes in the law.
Within the legal literature, this Article pushes back against the view that
automation of legal analysis is not possible in any area of law, by providing a means to
identify relatively determinate portions even amidst a background of indeterminacy. One
observation is that although the task of the lawyer in performing legal analysis mostly
involves professional judgment, there is some small subset of legal analysis that is
relatively mechanical. 28 1 A rough heuristic is that where the task of the lawyer is
approximately mechanical, it is more likely to be (eventually) automatable via
computers. 282 With respect to the computer science literature, this Article aims to provide
a bridge for a body of scholarship that has largely not incorporated necessary insights
from the legal theory canon. This lack of theoretical understanding, I believe, has
hindered previous efforts in the computer science domain as effort has been devoted to
projects beyond outside of their realistic scope.
Beyond the theoretical issues, this piece only tangentially touches upon several
important normative topics.283 Notably, I do not take a position as to whether automation
is desirable, even when possible. This Article notes some of the claimed benefits of
automating legal analysis, most notably gains in efficiency. 284 However, it is not enough

A statute of limitations is the paradigm example of a mechanical legal analysis. While it
is true that statutes of limitation permit exceptions, tolling or in some instances there is
uncertainty or debate about, the start period, it is probably correct to say that more often than not,
in the routine day-to-day statute of limitations assessment, a statute of limitation analysis involves
a simple mechanical calculation.
281

282
A somewhat simplified way of thinking about the thesis is the following: Where
attorneys are acting like computers in their computerized analysis, they can be replaced by
computers. But, where they are not acting like computers -which comprise the vast majority of
situations in the law -they cannot. Such a characterization should give the legal profession
another framework to think about those significant value-added activities that attorneys perform.

This normative question is crucially important, and although beyond the scope of this
theoretical piece, will be the subject of future work.
283

The first benefit typically touted, is the potential to allow greater access to the law to
public than is accessible today. Access to the legal analysis, for many, is practically unattainable,
because it requires the rather expensive intermediation of attorneys. Some have argued that
284
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to mention the benefits of such systems without briefly reflecting on the costs. Generally
speaking, there are several well known problems with formalist and determinate bodies
of law. In particular, it is often argued that the lack of discretion characteristic in such
systems reduces the availability of flexibility in judgment and often leads to unjust or
oppressive results. 2 85 Additionally, formalist rules are often only a crude proxy for
underlying regulatory goals, and are often underinclusive or overinclusive relative to the
behavior that they wish to regulate.
Given the potential efficiency gains in automating legal analysis in select
contexts, and the observation that more determinate and formalist laws are most
amenable to automation, it is easy to imagine efficiency pressures dominating other
desirable considerations in creating laws, including justice, fairness, equality, and
flexibility concerns. It is important to be cautious and aware of such concerns.286 As a
preliminary matter, it seems reasonable that increased automation and determinacy is
inappropriate where important rights, values, or other issues of significant consequence
are at stake. Moreover, increased or near-perfect efficiency in enforcing laws is not
always an unqualified good in every context. There are sometimes implicit values of
freedom and self-expression embedded in the ability of the government to imperfectly
enforce laws, which we society may wish to preserve. Finally, there are many scenarios
where law is serving some other important societal functions not primarily concerned
with the determination of "correct" legal answers. For example, other scholars have
explored the ceremonial or conflict resolution role of law in society, in which correct
determinations of legal conclusions are often quite beside the point. 287 Future
scholarship on this topic should take these normative concerns and critiques seriously in
delineating the desired scope of such automation.

automated systems have the potential to increase access to the law in some circumstances. In
some communities, where individuals are under-served, such systems could provide greater
empowerment and ability to work within the law, without attorneys. Though this would likely
disintermediate lawyers as to certain activities, in many instances, it could potentially reach lowincome communities that practically were unable to access attorneys at all. Additionally, should
automated legal reasoning systems become widespread where they are possible - there will likely
be immediate efficiency and accessibility gains. Another touted benefit stems from the fact that
computers are excellent at organizing complexity. The proliferation of statutes and codes can
make compliance with many regulations cumbersome and overwhelming. The ability of rulesbases systems to organize and analyze the laws, and perhaps, even detect unnoticed logical
contradictions within the laws is a societal benefit.
285

Kennedy, supra note 178, at 1689.

I don't take a position in this Article, except to note that in some areas where efficiency
is a major consideration, and legal analysis by and large is mechanically conducted anyway, this
might be a candidate for automation.
286

See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950, 993 (1979) (noting the ceremonial role of legal
divorce proceedings separate and apart from their legal meaning).
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